exceeding .08 per cent. The arraigning judge, J. Sorrentino, suspended Defendant's NYS driver's license pursuant to VTL1193(2)(e), and defense counsel requested the case be adjourned for a "hardship hearing" under VTL1193(2)(e)(7)(e).
On December 3, 2024, the presiding judge in AP4, J. Lewis, held the hardship hearing. Below constitutes the court's findings of fact and law from that hearing.Findings of FactJannette Hodapp
at the wheel with the engine running forcing other vehicles to swerve around him. The results of a chemical test showed that defendant had a blood alcohol content of .140%. On November 3, 2011, defense counsel made an oral application for a hardship privilege pursuant to VTL1193 [2] [e] [7] [e].
Hardship Hearing On November 10, 2011, the court held a hardship hearing pursuant to VTL 1192 [2] [e] [7] [e]. The defendant"
, the defendant was charged under VTL 1192 (2) and after an initial adjournment of the arraignment, a Prompt Suspension Hearing was held pursuant to VTL1193 (2)(e)(7). At the hearing, the Town Justice made the required findings that the charging documents were sufficient and that there was evidence indicating that the Defendant was driving with a BAC over .10, (now .08) or higher. The Defendant, through counsel, began his rebuttal and attempted to elicit testimony from the arresting Officer who"
), the defendant's license was suspended pending prosecution, pursuant
to VTL1193(2)(e)(7). However, after a Pringle Hearing the defendant was granted a hardship
privilege to allow the defendant to drive to and from her employment, school and child care.
Defense counsel submitted omnibus motions, pursuant to which probable cause and Huntley
Hearings were conducted on March 25, 2011.
Facts of the Case.
[*2]The prosecution presented the arresting officer"
), the defendant's license was suspended pending prosecution, pursuant
to VTL1193(2)(e)(7). However, after a Pringle Hearing the defendant was granted a hardship
privilege to allow the defendant to drive to and from her employment, school and child care.
Defense counsel submitted omnibus motions, pursuant to which probable cause and Huntley
Hearings were conducted on March 25, 2011.
Facts of the Case.
[*2]The prosecution presented the arresting officer"
, Richmond County 1995]). Where the highest charge against a defendant is punishable
by a sentence of more than three months, the People are required to state their readiness for trial
within 90 days of commencing the criminal action (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). Since VTL 1192 (3) is
punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to a year, the People had 90 days from December 14,
2017, to be ready for trial (VTL1193[1][b]).
The defendant has the initial burden of showing through sworn allegations of fact"
herein, a violation of VTL 1192
(3), is a misdemeanor which is punishable by, inter alia, a sentence of
imprisonment for not more than one year. VTL1193 (1) (b). Accordingly, the People
were obligated to announce their readiness within 90 days of the commencement of the
action. CPL § 30.30 (1) (b).
The CPL § 30.30 time period began to run on the date of the defendant's first
physical appearance in court, at her arraignment, on January 29, 2024. CPL § 30.30
(7) (b"
driving while
intoxicated, VTL 1192(2), the defendant's license was suspended pending prosecution, pursuant
to VTL1193(2)(e)(7). However, after a Pringle Hearing the defendant was granted a hardship
privilege to allow the defendant to drive to and from her employment, school and child care.
Defense counsel submitted omnibus motions, pursuant to which probable cause and Huntley
Hearings were conducted on March 25, 2011.
Facts of the Case.
driving while
intoxicated, VTL 1192(2), the defendant's license was suspended pending prosecution, pursuant
to VTL1193(2)(e)(7). However, after a Pringle Hearing the defendant was granted a hardship
privilege to allow the defendant to drive to and from her employment, school and child care.
Defense counsel submitted omnibus motions, pursuant to which probable cause and Huntley
Hearings were conducted on March 25, 2011.
Facts of the Case.
incarceration; and (5) whether the defense was impaired by the delay (see Taranovich, 37 NY2d [*5]at 445). The Court evaluates these factors on an ad hoc basis, "since no rigid precepts may be formulated which apply to each and every instance" of an alleged constitutional right to speedy trial violation (id.).
Driving while intoxicated is a serious offense punishable by up to one year in jail (VTL1193[1][b]). While a traffic infraction is not a crime"
