| People v Pitt |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 07035 [43 AD3d 1248] |
| September 27, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Matthew R.Pitt, Appellant. |
—[*1] J. Russell Langwig III, Special Prosecutor, Schoharie, for respondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schoharie County (Bartlett III, J.),rendered September 28, 2005, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes ofattempted rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, attempted sexual abuse in the firstdegree (two counts) and endangering the welfare of a child (three counts).
Defendant was indicted on 610 counts charging various sexual crimes committed againstthree minor children between February 2000 and March 2003. Following lengthy pleanegotiations, defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to the crimes of attempted rape in the firstdegree, rape in the second degree, attempted sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts) andendangering the welfare of a child (three counts). He waived his right to appeal. Defendant wassentenced to, among other things, an aggregate term of imprisonment of 6 to 12 years and nowappeals.
In light of his appeal waiver, defendant's sole contention on appeal is that his constitutionalspeedy trial rights were violated.[FN*]We disagree and therefore affirm the judgment [*2]of conviction.When assessing a constitutional speedy trial claim, we must balance "(1) the extent of the delay;(2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there hasbeen an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indicationthat the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay" (People v Taranovich, 37NY2d 442, 445 [1975]; see People vAlger, 23 AD3d 706, 706 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 845 [2006]). Bearing thesefactors in mind, we find that the almost 18-month period between defendant's arrest on fourfelony complaints and his indictment and arraignment on the instant grand jury charges did notviolate his constitutional speedy trial rights. During this period, plea negotiations wereconducted—as evidenced by defendant's written waiver of his statutory speedy trial rightsexecuted less than four months after his arrest and, apparently, never retracted. Also, thecharges—including a charge of rape in the first degree, a class B felony, and 295 chargesof rape in the second degree, class D felonies—are numerous and of a serious nature.Additionally, defendant was released on bail, so an extended period of pretrial incarceration isnot an issue, and there is no indication in the record that the defense was impaired in any way bythe delay. Thus, on balance, we find that County Court properly weighed the Taranovichfactors and concluded that the delay was not unreasonable, and we affirm defendant's conviction(see People v Arrington [Ish], 31AD3d 801, 802 [2006], lvs denied 7 NY3d 865, 868 [2006]; People v Alger,23 AD3d at 706; People v Guishard,15 AD3d 731, 732 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 789 [2005]; People vBenjamin, 296 AD2d 666, 667 [2002]).
Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Peters and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Footnote *: This issue was properlypreserved by motion before County Court (see People v Bancroft, 23 AD3d 850, 850-851 [2005], lvdenied 6 NY3d 752 [2005]; Peoplev Alger, 23 AD3d 706, 706 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 845 [2006]).