| Stringer v Musacchia |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 10439 [46 AD3d 1274] |
| December 27, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Eric Stringer, Respondent, v Barbara Musacchia, Individually andas Trustee of the John Musacchia Residual Trust B-1, et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Lewis & Stanzione, Catskill (Ralph C. Lewis Jr. of counsel), for respondent.
Mercure, J.P. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ceresia, Jr., J.), entered December6, 2006 in Greene County, which, among other things, granted plaintiff's cross motion for partialsummary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1).
Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder while constructing a shed on the property ofdefendants in the Town of Lexington, Greene County. Plaintiff, a self-employed constructioncontractor, agreed to build the shed for his friend, John Musacchia, in return for his inclusion in ahunting trip organized by Musacchia and held on defendants' property. Musacchia organized thehunting trips annually, and they evidently included celebrities and were filmed for television.Guests who were not "celebrity types" were expected to work on the property in theafternoon—engaging in "projects," such as "tree planting, plowing fields, maintenance,fencing, whatever generally needed to be done"—after hunting in the morning. Plaintiffwas eager to be included in the hunting trip, and Musacchia permitted him to attend in exchangefor his labor in building the shed. Plaintiff concedes that he was not compensated for building theshed, that he did not expect to receive any remuneration and that he paid his own travel expenses.
Nevertheless, plaintiff commenced this action, alleging negligence and violations of [*2]Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and § 241 (6).Defendants answered and moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Theyasserted, among other things, that plaintiff acted as a volunteer in building the shed and wastherefore not an "employee" entitled to the protections of the Labor Law. Plaintiff cross-movedfor partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240(1).[FN*]Supreme Court partially granted defendants' motion by dismissing the negligence and Labor Law§§ 200 and 241 (6) claims, but granted plaintiff's cross motion for partial summaryjudgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. Defendants appeal and we now reverse thatpart of the order of Supreme Court that granted plaintiff's cross motion and partially denieddefendants' motion.
It is well settled that "in order to invoke the protections afforded by . . . LaborLaw [§ 240] and to come within the special class for whose benefit liability is imposedupon contractors, owners and their agents, a 'plaintiff must demonstrate that he [or she] was bothpermitted or suffered to work on a building or structure and that he [or she] was hired bysomeone, be it owner, contractor or their agent' " (Mordkofsky v V.C.V. Dev. Corp.,76 NY2d 573, 576-577 [1990] [citations omitted and emphasis added], quoting Whelen vWarwick Val. Civic & Social Club, 47 NY2d 970, 971 [1979]; see Labor Law§ 2 [5], [7]; Lee v Jones, 230 AD2d 435, 436 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d802 [1997]). Therefore, "[a] volunteer who offers his [or her] services gratuitously cannot claimthe protection afforded by the 'flat and unvarying duty' flowing to this special class" (Whelenv Warwick Val. Civic & Social Club, 47 NY2d at 971, quoting Yearke v Zarcone, 57AD2d 457, 459 [1977], lv denied 43 NY2d 643 [1977]; see Curatolo v Postiglione, 2 AD3d480, 481 [2003]; Marks v Morehouse, 222 AD2d 785, 787 [1995]). As this Courthas explained, the Legislature's intent in enacting Labor Law § 240 " 'was to protectwork[ers] engaged in their jobs' " (Alver v Duarte, 80 AD2d 182, 183 [1981], quotingYearke v Zarcone, 57 AD2d at 461). In other words, "[a]bsolute liability is imposed toprotect the employee from [the] hazards of his [or her] work which he [or she] has nochoice in avoiding if he [or she] is to earn a livelihood" (Yearke v Zarcone, 57 AD2d at460 [emphasis added]), rather than for the protection of volunteers choosing to offer theirservices gratuitously (see Mordkofsky v V.C.V. Dev. Corp., 76 NY2d at 577). Moreover,and contrary to the position adopted by the dissent, a defendant is not required to show thatconstruction work is casual in order to establish that the plaintiff is a volunteer and, therefore,outside the class protected by Labor Law § 240 (see Whelen v Warwick Val. Civic &Social Club, 47 NY2d at 971 [concluding that a plaintiff working voluntarily and withoutpay on the construction of a storage building on premises owned by the defendant civicorganization was a volunteer]; Schwab v Campbell, 266 AD2d 840, 841 [1999][concluding that the decedent assisting the defendant farm owner in the construction of a barnwas a volunteer]).
It must be noted that a plaintiff's agreement with an employer that all earnings will be appliedto reduce a debt owed to the employer will not affect the plaintiff's employment status if theplaintiff was " 'permitted or suffered to work' on the premises, for monetaryconsideration, by the [employer]" (Vernum v Zilka, 241 AD2d 885, 887 [1997][citation omitted and emphasis added], quoting Labor [*3]Law§ 2 [7]; see Thompson v Marotta, 256 AD2d 1124, 1125 [1998] [holding theplaintiff to be an employee fulfilling an obligation when landlord waived security deposit inexchange for job]). When plaintiffs are not " 'fulfilling [an] obligation' " by performing the work,however, they will be considered volunteers (Schwab v Campbell, 266 AD2d at 841),even if they are to receive some nonmonetary benefit as a result of performing the job anddefendants would otherwise have had to pay someone to complete the job (see Howerter vDugan, 232 AD2d 524, 525 [1996] [holding that the plaintiff was a volunteer despite hisreceipt of firewood in exchange for cutting down the defendant homeowners' trees whenhomeowners otherwise would have had to pay for the job]). Similarly here, although Musacchiatestified that plaintiff was included in the hunting trip in exchange for agreeing to design andbuild a shed that Musacchia had wanted built for years, plaintiff admitted that he knew he wouldnot be compensated for building the shed—in contrast to previous jobs that he hadperformed for Musacchia for which he had been compensated. Thus, despite the intangiblebenefit that plaintiff might have enjoyed from participating in the hunt, because plaintiff chose tovolunteer his services, was under no obligation to complete the shed and knew that he wouldreceive no monetary consideration, he was not an employee entitled to the protections of theLabor Law, and defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §240 cause of action must be granted and the complaint dismissed in its entirety (see id.;see also Schwab v Campbell, 266 AD2d at 841; cf. Thompson v Marotta, 256AD2d at 1125; Vernum v Zilka, 241 AD2d at 886-887).
Defendants' remaining arguments are rendered academic by our determination.
Crew III and Rose, JJ., concur.
Spain, J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent, agreeing with Supreme Court's determinationthat plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. To besure, "[a] volunteer who offers his [or her] services gratuitously cannot claim theprotection afforded by the 'flat and unvarying duty' flowing to [the] special class [of employeesprotected by] section 240" (Whelen v Warwick Val. Civic & Social Club, 47 NY2d 970,971 [1979] [emphasis added], quoting Yearke v Zarcone, 57 AD2d 457, 459 [1977],lv denied 43 NY2d 643 [1977]).
Here, plaintiff, a self-employed construction contractor, and John Musacchia negotiated anagreement whereby plaintiff would be permitted to engage in the planned hunting event on thesubject property and, in exchange, plaintiff would design, oversee and construct a shed on theproperty. Plaintiff was in the process of "fulfilling [his] obligation" (Schwab v Campbell,266 AD2d 840, 841 [1999]) under that agreement—completing the construction of theshed—when he slipped and fell from the ladder. As such, plaintiff was not merely offering" 'the casual assistance of a friend, neighbor or relative' " (Alver v Duarte, 80 AD2d 182,183 [1981], quoting Yearke v Zarcone, 57 AD2d at 461; cf. Tse Chin Cheung v G &M Hardware & Elec., 249 AD2d 28, 29 [1998]; Howerter v Dugan, 232 AD2d 524,525 [1996]), "helping out" the property owner (Curatolo v Postiglione, 2 AD3d 480, 481 [2003]), or acting as "[a]volunteer who offers his services gratuitously" (Whelen v Warwick Val. Civic & SocialClub, 47 NY2d at 971). "[G]ratuitous" work is that which is "[d]one or performed withoutobligation to do so; given without consideration" (Black's Law Dictionary 721 [8th ed 2004]).
The uncontroverted fact here is that plaintiff was obligated to complete this work. [*4]Significantly, Musacchia would not have permitted him to join thehunting event (and had previously rejected plaintiff's request to join) without the concomitantquid pro quo that plaintiff would accomplish the erection of the shed. Plaintiff's status as an"employee" (Labor Law § 2 [5]), who was "employed" (Labor Law § 2 [7]), does notturn on whether he receives an actual paycheck for work performed at this site (see e.g.Vernum v Zilka, 241 AD2d 885, 886-887 [1997]). Regardless of whether a worker such asplaintiff was required to pay for the hunting event and was monetarily compensated for buildingthe shed, or was charged to participate in the hunt and deemed to be thereafter paying off thatdebt incurred by erecting the shed (see Thompson v Marotta, 256 AD2d 1124, 1125[1998]; Vernum v Zilka, supra), or—as here—a quid pro quo barterarrangement was entered in which no money was exchanged, the construction work such asperformed by plaintiff was not gratuitous; rather, it was substantially equivalent to acting as ageneral contractor to design, oversee and complete the building of a structure. Thus, plaintiff waswithin the class of persons for whose benefit Labor Law § 240 was enacted.
Further, plaintiff established a prima facie case of entitlement to summary judgment givenhis uncontroverted testimony that the ladder "kicked out" from underneath him, causing his fallfrom the elevated work site (seeDowling v McCloskey Comm. Servs. Corp., 45 AD3d 1232, 1233 [2007]; Mitchellv Atlas Copco N. Am., 307 AD2d 635, 636-637 [2003]; Smith v Pergament Enters. ofS.I., 271 AD2d 870, 871-872 [2000]; see also Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d280, 289 n 8 [2003]), and defendant failed to submit evidence raising a triable issue of factin response (see Ball v Cascade TissueGroup-N.Y., Inc., 36 AD3d 1187, 1188 [2007]). Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled tosummary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim.
Peters, J., concurs. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, with costs to defendants,by reversing so much thereof as granted plaintiff's cross motion for partial summary judgmentand partially denied defendants' motion for summary judgment; plaintiff's cross motion denied,defendants' motion granted in its entirety and complaint dismissed; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Footnote *: Defendants did not raise, ineither their answer or their submissions on the respective summary judgment motions, their claimthat they are exempt from Labor Law § 240 (1) as the owners of a single-family dwelling.As such, that claim is unpreserved.