| Matter of Elliot v Marble |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01879 [49 AD3d 923] |
| March 6, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Nancy Elliot, Appellant, v Edwin Marble,Respondent. (And Five Other Related Proceedings.) |
—[*1] Elena Jaffe Tastensen, Saratoga Springs, for respondent. Veronica M. Kosich, Law Guardian, Catskill.
Kane, J. Appeals from two orders of the Family Court of Saratoga County (Hall, J.), enteredSeptember 6, 2006, which, among other things, granted respondent's applications, in sixproceedings pursuant to Family Ct Act articles 6 and 8, to find petitioner in violation of priororders of protection and custody.
Petitioner (hereinafter the mother) and respondent (hereinafter the father) are the parents ofone daughter (born in 2000). Orders of protection required the parties to remain at least five feetaway from each other except as necessary to effectuate court-ordered visitation. The orders alsoprovided that all custodial transfers take place at a specified neutral location. The partiesappeared in Family Court and stipulated to an order of custody and visitation. Before the orderwas reduced to writing, the mother filed two petitions, one alleging a violation of the bench orderand the other alleging a violation of the order of protection in her favor. The court, on its ownmotion, dismissed the first petition, apparently on the belief that the petition addressed behavioroccurring prior to the stipulation. When the mother appealed that dismissal, the court reinstatedthe petition and placed it on the calendar. After the custody order was reduced to writing, thefather filed two petitions alleging that the mother violated both the custody order and the order ofprotection by, among other things, failing to deliver the child to the transfer location on [*2]unspecified occasions. The mother filed two additional violationpetitions.
At the first appearance where the mother was represented by counsel, Family Court(Abramson, J.) chose to hold a hearing, over the mother's objection, on the father's two violationpetitions.[FN*]Without making any factual findings, the court found the mother in violation, but adjourneddisposition on the violations to be decided by the assigned judge.
A hearing was held before Family Court (Hall, J.) on the mother's four petitions anddisposition of the adjudicated violations. The court could not locate the first petition, which hadbeen restored to the calendar, and refused to sign subpoenas for witnesses and records whichapparently only pertained to that lost petition. Although the mother previously had counsel, sheproceeded pro se with standby counsel and attempted to handle the evidence separately as to eachpetition. When the mother sought to recall the father to the stand for her second petition, thecourt informed her that she had already called him once and was precluded from recalling him.With the only proof being testimony from the father on one petition and narrative testimony fromthe mother, the court dismissed her petitions for failure of proof. On the father's violationpetitions, the court adopted as contempt the prior judge's determination that the orders wereviolated and imposed a sentence of 15 days incarceration for each violation, with sentencessuspended pending future violations of either order. The mother appeals.
Family Court (Hall, J.) erred by imposing a sanction against the mother on the violationpetitions without making any findings of fact or determination of willfulness. Moreover, inrendering that disposition, the court mistakenly relied on the prior determination by Family Court(Abramson, J.) as establishing a willful violation when, in fact, such a conclusion had not beenmade. A court may punish a person for failing to obey a lawful court order "if, after [a] hearing,the court is satisfied by competent proof that the respondent has willfully failed to obey any suchorder" (Family Ct Act § 846-a; see Matter of Aumell v King, 18 AD3d 905, 905-906 [2005]).Although the mother admitted that she did not deliver the child to the specified location on someoccasions, she explained that she could not afford gas for transportation and pointed to aprovision in the custody order permitting the father to utilize a cab at the mother's expense if shecould not provide transportation. That alternate provision created a question as to whether themother actually violated the order when she did not personally transport the child. Evidenceregarding the mother's financial inability to provide transportation created a question regardingwillfulness. Significantly, the lack of factual findings here by either the judge who presided overthe initial hearing or the judge who rendered the disposition precludes appellate review (seeMatter of Miller v Miller, 220 AD2d 133, 136 [1996]); we cannot tell whether there was afinding of willfulness, whether the order's alternate provision regarding transportation wasconsidered, or even the dates on which the mother is deemed to have violated the order. Hence,we remit for a new hearing, after which the court must set forth the facts essential to its decision(see CPLR 4213 [b]; Matter of Rose BB., 243 AD2d 999, 1001 [1997];Matter of Miller v Miller, 220 AD2d at 136; Matter of Ross v Sherwood DiversifiedServs., 88 AD2d 936, 936 [1982]; Matter of Cordes v Cordes, 61 AD2d 981, 982[1978]; see also Judiciary Law § 770).[*3]
Additionally, the mother was denied a fair hearing on herpetitions. Family Court (Hall, J.) noted that the hearing addressed the mother's four petitions, yetthe one restored to the calendar—after having been improperly dismissed—was notin the court file. Had that petition been located in the court file at the time, the court might nothave denied all of the requested subpoenas, especially since the mother maintains that thesubpoenas were relevant to the missing petition. We also find error in the court's refusal to permitthe mother to recall the father to the stand when she explained her incorrect understanding thatevidence was to be elicited separately for each petition. Although the mother, by proceeding prose, did not acquire rights greater than those afforded other litigants (see Matter of Mosso v Mosso, 6 AD3d827, 828 [2004]), her confusion was understandable based upon comments made by thecourt and her statement that she was advised of that procedure by standby counsel. Given thisreasonable confusion and the lack of any prejudice to the father, the court should have affordedthe pro se mother some latitude, especially considering that she was trying to present evidenceand adhere to the court's procedures but was frustrated merely by her lack of legal training(see id.). Because she was unreasonably prevented from offering proof on her petitions,we reinstate those petitions and remit for further proceedings (see id.; see also Matter of Williams vWilliams, 35 AD3d 1098, 1100 [2006]).
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Spain and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders are reversed,on the law, without costs, and matter remitted to the Family Court of Saratoga County for furtherproceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.
Footnote *: Curiously, despite the mother'spetitions having been filed first, Family Court adjourned those petitions for a hearing at a laterdate.