| Matter of Thomas v Osborne |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 04007 [51 AD3d 1064] |
| May 1, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Randolph S. Thomas, Respondent, v Alicia D.Osborne, Appellant. (And Four Other Related Proceedings.) |
—[*1] Mark N. Oursler, Cooperstown, for respondent. Tracy Donovan Laughlin, Law Guardian, Cherry Valley.
Kavanagh, J. Appeal from a corrected order of the Family Court of Otsego County(Coccoma, J.), entered October 19, 2006, which, among other things, granted petitioner'sapplication, in five proceedings pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior order ofcustody.
Petitioner (hereinafter the father) and respondent (hereinafter the mother) are the parents ofone son (born in 2000). The mother had sole custody of the child, but, in July 2005, the fatherfiled a petition to modify custody alleging, among other things, that the child was being abusedwhile in the mother's home. After a first appearance, Family Court directed the Otsego CountyDepartment of Social Services (hereinafter DSS) to conduct an investigation pursuant to FamilyCt Act § 1034. After a report was filed with the court by DSS,[FN1]Family Court issued an order of protection which prohibited the mother from allowing the childto have contact with Daniel [*2]Garbera and Pamela Trask, twoindividuals with whom the mother was residing, and from residing at the home with Garbera andTrask. Thereafter, in January 2006, a custody and visitation order was issued, upon agreement,awarding joint legal custody, with the father having physical custody. The order also specifiedthat the mother would have parenting time with the child on alternate weekends and required themother to comply with the order of protection. The mother did not file an appeal from this order.
Both parties then filed modification and violation petitions. The father alleged that themother failed to comply with the order of protection, specifically that the child continued to havecontact with Garbera and Trask. As a result, the father sought sole custody of the child. Themother's petitions alleged that the father had willfully violated the custody and visitation orderbecause he acted in a way designed to interfere and effectively deprive her of her right to visitwith the child. She also claimed that the father was harassing her by repeatedly parking hisautomobile on her lawn when he brought the child to her home. After a hearing on all petitions,Family Court found that the father had not willfully violated the custody and visitation order anddenied the mother's petitions. It also found that the mother had failed to comply with the order ofprotection by allowing the child to have continued contact with Garbera and Trask and that thechild had been harmed by the mother's failure to abide by the provisions contained in the order ofprotection. The court granted the father's petition and awarded him sole custody of the child, withsupervised visitation by the mother for two hours on alternating Saturdays and for 1½ hoursevery Wednesday. Family Court also extended the order of protection until the child's 18thbirthday.[FN2]The mother now appeals.
Initially, it must be noted that it has been clearly established, given the parties' obviousantipathy for each other and their inability to effectively communicate and work togetherregarding the child, that joint custody is simply not feasible nor is it in the child's best interest (see Matter of Goldsmith v Goldsmith,50 AD3d 1190, 1191 [2008]; Matter of Kilmartin v Kilmartin, 44 AD3d 1099, 1101 [2007]; Matter of Eck v Eck, 33 AD3d1082, 1083 [2006]). The father also established that circumstances had sufficiently changedsince the January 2006 custody order was issued and, therefore, a modification was required (see Matter of Grant v Grant, 47 AD3d1027, 1028 [2008]; Matter ofMartin v Martin, 45 AD3d 1244, 1245 [2007]; Matter of Kilmartin v Kilmartin,44 AD3d at 1101).
The mother's flagrant violation of Family Court's direction that the child not have any contactwith either Garbera or Trask is stark proof that a modification of the custodial arrangement wasin the child's best interest (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982];Matter of Kilmartin v Kilmartin, 44 AD3d at 1101). Family Court's concern regarding theexposure of this child to these two individuals is well founded. Garbera not only has a history ofdomestic violence and a criminal record, but he has been the subject of two indicated reports tothe New York State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment which alleged that, onseparate occasions, he threatened to shoot his former wife with a loaded shotgun while she heldtheir four-month-old child and later discharged a loaded firearm into a residence where his wifeand child slept. Trask has children of her own and, because of her inability to provide for their[*3]care and well-being, has consented to the termination of herparental rights. Equally important, each has refused to cooperate with DSS in its investigationinto allegations that the child had been physically abused while at their residence. Also, evidenceintroduced at the hearing confirmed that their contact with the child has had a profound andadverse impact upon him. The mother's failure to recognize the risk posed to her child by herongoing relationships with these two individuals, and her willingness to persistently place herown self-interest above that of her child, established that a modification in custody and visitationis clearly needed and was in the child's best interest (see Matter of VanDusen v VanDusen, 39 AD3d 893, 894 [2007];Matter of Wiedenkeller v Hall, 37AD3d 1033, 1036 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 816 [2007]; Matter of Roe v Roe, 33 AD3d1152, 1153 [2006]).
Moreover, testimony at the hearing revealed that the child has responded positively to hisfather being principally charged with his care. The father has facilitated the child's involvementin counseling in an effort to treat his propensity towards anger and aggression. Since the childhas resided principally with the father, he appears to enjoy school and has participatedenthusiastically in church activities with his extended family. The child's situation has, by anymeasure, substantially improved since he has been with the father and we see no reason to disturbFamily Court's decision to award the father sole custody of the child.
Nor do we find merit in the mother's complaints that the social worker who testified at thehearing was not objective and exhibited a pronounced bias in favor of the father. Karrie Crippen,a licensed social worker, testified to meeting biweekly with the child since January 2006. Duringthose sessions, she reported that the child had told her that he was afraid of "Dan," had recurringnightmares and was obviously reluctant to talk about any time that he had spent with his mother.Crippen recommended, based upon her observations, that the child be evaluated by a psychiatristand offered opinions at the hearing concerning the child that were based primarily upon herobservations of him over a six-month period. Moreover, her testimony was simply part of alarger body of proof introduced during the course of this hearing which provided ample supportfor Family Court's determination that it was in the child's best interest to award sole custody tothe father (see Matter of Robinson vCleveland, 42 AD3d 708, 710 [2007]; Matter of Millett v Millett, 270 AD2d520, 521 [2000]).
Similarly, we disagree with the mother's claim that Family Court erred by failing to conduct aLincoln hearing. In making this determination, the court recognized that the child hadbeen reluctant, throughout these proceedings, to discuss with anyone the contact that he had withhis mother or the specifics of what had actually occurred during the time he had spent at herhome. The court recognized that a Lincoln hearing might have had a harmful effect onwhatever progress the child had made to date in therapy and acted providently to "spare the childany further stress" (Posporelis vPosporelis, 41 AD3d 986, 991 [2007]).
The mother also takes exception to Family Court's order regarding visitation and therequirement that it be held in a specific place and be supervised. In that regard, Family Courtordered the mother to have visitation on Wednesdays from 3:30 p.m. until 5:00 p.m. at a FamilyCourt child's center and on alternate Saturdays from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. at a McDonald'srestaurant. Given the mother's history of not complying with the court's orders directing that thechild have no contact with Garbera or Trask when in her care, the specific conditions as outlinedin the order were justified and enjoy ample support in the record. The order does not seek todeprive the mother, as she claims, of a meaningful opportunity to visit with the child and, in ourview, was appropriately structured as to reflect the child's best interest (see Matter of Maziejka v Fennelly, 3AD3d 748, 749 [2004]; Matter of Larry v O'Neill, 307 AD2d 410, 411 [2003]).
The mother also seeks to challenge the procedure and factual conclusions upon which FamilyCourt based its initial decision to issue an order of protection and to award physical custody ofthe child to the father. She argues that the order of protection was issued sua sponte, without thecourt having a proper petition before it to serve as a basis for the order of protection. The mothernever filed an appeal from the order of protection (see Matter of Houck v Garraway, 293AD2d 782, 783 [2002]) and consented to the custody order which incorporated this order ofprotection and awarded physical custody of the child to the father. Therefore, these claims are notproperly before this Court (see Matter ofBarrow v Kirksey, 15 AD3d 801, 802 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 701 [2005]).However, considering that Family Court had before it, at the time it originally issued the order ofprotection, the father's claims that the child was being hit while in the mother's home as well asDSS's investigation regarding Garbera and Trask, it was justified in its concerns that resulted inthe order of protection.
Similarly, the mother argues that requiring the permanent order of protection to remain ineffect until the child's 18th birthday without a provision for periodic review was error andinappropriate. Viewing Garbera and Trask's history, and the negative impact each has already hadon this child, Family Court acted within its authority in ordering that the order of protectioncontinue until the child's 18th birthday (see Family Ct Act § 656; Matter of Candace S., 38 AD3d786, 788 [2007]; Matter of CollinH., 28 AD3d 806 [2006]; Matter of Bronson v Bronson, 23 AD3d 932, 933 [2005]).
Finally, we address the mother's claim that Family Court improperly admitted into evidencethe contents of the investigative report issued by DSS. The report was prepared as a result of aninvestigation by DSS into the father's allegation that the child had reported that he had beenstruck while at the mother's home.[FN3]After the report was reviewed by Family Court, it issued the order of protection barring Garberaand Trask from having any further contact with the child. The mother, without asking for ahearing on the findings contained in the report, consented to the order giving physical custody ofthe child to the father. More importantly, the contents of the report simply restated what hadalready been established by other evidence introduced at the hearing and, in the context of thisproceeding, its admission was harmless error (see Matter of Rush v Rush, 201 AD2d 836,837-838 [1994]). We have reviewed the mother's remaining claims and find them to be withoutmerit.
Peters, J.P., Spain, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the corrected order isaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote 1: In the investigation, DSSattempted, without success, to interview the two individuals with whom the mother resided,Pamela Trask and Daniel Garbera. The residence in which the mother resides is owned byGarbera.
Footnote 2: This October 2006 correctedorder was later slightly modified, changing the Wednesday visitation to alternating Wednesdays,because the mother had problems regarding transportation.
Footnote 3: The child did not identify who itwas that allegedly struck him.