| People v Baggett |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 09659 [57 AD3d 1093] |
| December 11, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Avante Baggett,Appellant. |
—[*1] Holley Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Anna E. Remet of counsel), forrespondent.
Kane, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Bruhn, J.), renderedSeptember 7, 2005, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of burglary in the second degree(five counts) and grand larceny in the fourth degree (two counts).
Defendant was charged in connection with several burglaries. After County Court denied hismotion to suppress four written statements and one audio recording wherein he admitted to thesecrimes, a jury convicted defendant of burglary in the second degree (five counts) and grand larceny inthe fourth degree (two counts). Defendant was sentenced to prison terms of 7½ years on eachburglary conviction and 1
Defendant's main argument urging suppression is that his first incriminating statement was made inresponse to police questioning prior to the administration of Miranda warnings, and that allfurther statements were tainted by this allegedly improper questioning. Miranda warnings arerequired when a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation (see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 129 [2005]; People vBerg, 92 NY2d 701, 704 [1999]). To determine if a person was in custody, courts must evaluatethe circumstances and decide "whether a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing would havebelieved that he or she was not free to leave" at the time that the statement was made (People vPaulman, 5 NY3d at 129; see People v Burry, 52 AD3d [*2]856, 859 [2008], lv dismissed 10 NY3d 956 [2008]). ThePeople bore the initial burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's statements werevoluntary (see People v Rosa, 65 NY2d 380, 386 [1985]; People v Huntley, 15NY2d 72, 78 [1965]). Here, this required proof that defendant was not subjected to custodialinterrogation before Miranda warnings were administered.
Even giving deference to the suppression court's credibility determinations (see People v Ward, 42 AD3d 579,580 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 883 [2007]; People v Langenbach, 38 AD3d 1105, 1105 [2007], lv denied9 NY3d 866 [2007]), the People did not meet their burden. A reasonable, innocent person would nothave felt free to leave at the time that defendant made his first incriminating statement. According to thehearing testimony credited by County Court, shortly after midnight a police car with its lights on pulledover the car that defendant was riding in, despite the driver not having committed any traffic violations.Defendant was asked to exit the vehicle and accompany the officers to the police station, while his ridewas sent on its way. Defendant was not handcuffed, but was transported in a marked policecar.[FN*]At the station, he was placed in an interview room, where he sat for a period of time before beingquestioned. The door was closed when questioning ensued. An officer told defendant what informationthey had, including an accusation against defendant by his associate. After defendant denied havingstolen anything, the police continued to question him. According to one police officer, when he inquiredwhat defendant's friend would say about a particular stolen bicycle, defendant "eventually admitted to it. . . [t]o taking the bike." At that time, questioning ceased and did not resume until afterMiranda warnings were administered at 2:17 a.m.
The questions which led defendant to make his first admission were accusatory in nature, ratherthan merely investigatory, and were designed to elicit an incriminating response (see People v Payne, 41 AD3d 512,513 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 814 [2008]; People v Vachet, 5 AD3d 700, 701-702 [2004], lv denied 3NY3d 649 [2004]; People v Hardy, 223 AD2d 839, 841 [1996]). Considering thecircumstances from defendant's initial interaction with the police through the accusatory questioning thatled to his first admission, an innocent person would not have felt free to leave even prior to thatadmission (see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d at 129; People v Payne, 41 AD3d at513-514; People v Vachet, 5 AD3d at 702). Thus, defendant was subjected to custodialinterrogation when he made his first incriminating statement. Although Miranda warnings weregiven before his subsequent statements were made, those statements were tainted by the prioradmission and there was no significant break in the questioning (see People v Payne, 41 AD3dat 513-514; People v Durrin, 32 AD3d665, 668 [2006]; People v Vachet, 5 AD3d at 702). Because the questioning constitutedone continuous chain of events, defendant was entitled to have all of his statements suppressed (seeid.; cf. People v Paulman, 5 NY3d at 130).[*3]
Based upon our reversal, we need not address defendant'sremaining contentions.
Mercure, J.P., Spain, Carpinello and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isreversed, on the law, motion to suppress granted, and matter remitted to the County Court of UlsterCounty for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.
Footnote *: Although our review of CountyCourt's suppression decision is based only on the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing, wenote that at trial the officer in charge of the investigation testified that he did not transport defendant tothe police station because he did not have a secure vehicle. Rather, defendant was placed in a secondpolice vehicle equipped with a back seat cage and doors that could not be opened from the inside.Defense counsel did not seek to reopen the evidence on the suppression motion based upon thistestimony.