| Dube-Forman v D'Agostino |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 03083 [61 AD3d 1255] |
| April 23, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Lisa M. Dube-Forman, Appellant, v Sheryl S. D'Agostino,Respondent. |
—[*1] James M. Brooks, Lake Placid (Mandy McFarland of Thorn, Gershon, Tymann & Bonanni,L.L.P., Albany, of counsel), for respondent.
Mercure, J.P. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Dawson, J.), entered September5, 2008 in Essex County, which denied plaintiff's motion for, among other things, partialsummary judgment.
In January 2007, defendant, a resident of Massachusetts, entered into an exclusive buyerrepresentation agreement with plaintiff, a real estate sales agent, for the purpose of purchasing ahome in the area of the Village of Lake Placid, Essex County. In late April 2007, defendantviewed plaintiff's own residence and made a verbal purchase offer, which plaintiff accepted.Plaintiff then arranged for a structural inspection of the home on defendant's behalf; plaintiffattended the inspection but defendant did not. Thereafter, the parties entered into a writtencontract, which contained a specific disclaimer clause stating that defendant had examined theproperty, was familiar with its physical condition and agreed to accept it "AS IS." Along with thecontract, defendant signed an agency disclosure form acknowledging that plaintiff was nowacting as a seller's agent.
On the day of closing, defendant went to the property for a final inspection and, uponentering the basement, viewed mold and standing water in an area of the basement that had beenobscured both when defendant first viewed the property and during the inspection. Immediately,[*2]defendant contacted her attorney, who came to the house andalso viewed the mold infestation. The next day, defendant terminated the contract.
Plaintiff then commenced the instant action, alleging breach of contract and seeking specificperformance or, in the alternative, damages. Defendant answered, asserting several affirmativedefenses, including fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and various counterclaims. Plaintiffmoved for summary judgment on the matter of defendant's liability, seeking specificperformance and the dismissal of defendant's counterclaims, which Supreme Court denied.Plaintiff appeals, and we now affirm.
Initially, we note that plaintiff demonstrated prima facie entitlement to summary judgment,establishing that she was ready, willing and able to perform her obligations under the parties'signed contract, which defendant unilaterally terminated (see Alba v Kaufmann, 27 AD3d 816, 818 [2006]; Rebh v LakeGeorge Ventures, 218 AD2d 829, 830-831 [1995]; Marine Midland Bank v Cafferty,174 AD2d 932, 934 [1991]). We agree with Supreme Court, however, that defendant has raisedquestions of fact on her claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
To establish fraud, defendant must demonstrate that plaintiff knowingly misrepresented amaterial fact for the purpose of inducing reliance upon it, that there was, in fact, justifiablereliance thereon, and that damages resulted (see State of New York v Industrial Site Servs., Inc., 52 AD3d1153, 1157 [2008]; Tanzman v LaPietra, 8 AD3d 706, 707 [2004]). Here, defendant asserts that plaintiff had knowledgeof mold in the basement, and that she committed fraud and breached a continuing fiduciary dutyto defendant by concealing the mold during the inspection and making oral misrepresentationsduring the inspection that defendant relied upon, i.e., that a previously existing moisture problemhad been alleviated. In response, plaintiff contends that the specific disclaimer clause in the realproperty contract served as a bar to admitting parol evidence of any such oral misrepresentationsand, as such, is sufficient to defeat defendant's claims (see Danann Realty Corp. v Harris,5 NY2d 317, 320-323 [1959]; Janian v Barnes, 294 AD2d 787, 788 [2002]; Cetnar vKinowski, 263 AD2d 842, 843 [1999], lv dismissed 94 NY2d 872 [2000]). Plaintiffargues further that it was incumbent upon defendant to make use of available means, such as thehome inspection, to ascertain the true physical condition of the property (see Janian vBarnes, 294 AD2d at 788; Cetnar v Kinowski, 263 AD2d at 844; Long vFitzgerald, 240 AD2d 971, 973-974 [1997]).
Contrary to plaintiff's arguments, however, a specific disclaimer clause cannot serve todefeat a claim of fraud if the seller owes the buyer a fiduciary duty but nonetheless breaches thatduty by failing to "disclose any information that could reasonably bear on [the buyer's]consideration of [the transaction]" (Dubbs v Stribling & Assoc., 96 NY2d 337, 341[2001]; see Salm v Feldstein, 20AD3d 469, 470 [2005]; Blue Chip Emerald v Allied Partners, 299 AD2d 278,279-280 [2002]; see also Littman vMagee, 54 AD3d 14, 17 [2008]; cf. Rector v Calamus Group, Inc., 17 AD3d 960, 961 [2005];Slavin v Hamm, 210 AD2d 831, 832 [1994]). Under such circumstances, the contract ofsale itself—including the specific disclaimer clause—would be voidable because "afiduciary cannot by contract relieve itself of the fiduciary obligation of full disclosure bywithholding the very information the beneficiary needs in order to make a reasoned judgmentwhether to agree to the proposed contract" (Blue Chip Emerald v Allied Partners, 299AD2d at 280).
Here, the parties signed the exclusive agency agreement—pursuant to which plaintiffwas acting as defendant's buyer agent—in January 2007. At the earliest, this relationshipwas [*3]dissolved upon the signing of the agency disclosure onMay 9, 2007. Therefore, up until that date, plaintiff owed defendant a fiduciary duty (seeDubbs v Stribling & Assoc., 96 NY2d at 340); plaintiff accordingly owed such duty at theMay 5, 2007 inspection, during which plaintiff was present as defendant's agent.[FN*]During this period, it was plaintiff who was obligated to provide defendant with full disclosureof any information she may have had, including the existence of moisture and mold in thebasement, that could reasonably bear upon defendant's consideration of whether to enter into thecontract of sale (see Dubbs v Stribling & Assoc., 96 NY2d at 340-341; Blue ChipEmerald v Allied Partners, 299 AD2d at 279-280; see also Worldnet Real Estate, Inc. v Suchow, 19 AD3d 982, 984[2005]).
In our view, there are questions of fact regarding whether plaintiff knew of and activelyconcealed the mold problem. While plaintiff submitted proof that there was no mold in thebasement, defendant presented evidence that the mold was obscured by furniture and boxes, bothat the time of defendant's initial viewing of the property, as well as during the structuralinspection. Plaintiff's assertion that she would have moved the storage items had she been askedcannot be countenanced inasmuch as she was acting as defendant's agent during the inspectionand, thus, was under an affirmative obligation to move the items if she had knowledge of themold or moisture (see Dubbs v Stribling & Assoc., 96 NY2d at 340-341; Blue ChipEmerald v Allied Partners, 299 AD2d at 280). Moreover, defendant submitted an affidavitstating that plaintiff impeded her access to the property for inspection after the items had beenmoved, frustrating her ability to use available means to ascertain the true physical condition ofthe property. Finally, defendant and her attorney averred that on the day of the closing, theyobserved mold in the basement and suffered adverse physical effects after a short period ofexposure, and defendant's expert opined that extensive mold conditions were present.Accordingly, in light of the conflicting proof submitted by the parties, we conclude that SupremeCourt properly denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (see Klotz v Warick, 53 AD3d976, 978 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 712 [2008]; Steuhl v Home Therapy Equip., Inc., 51 AD3d 1101, 1104 [2008]).
The parties' remaining contentions have been examined and have been determined to bewithout merit or rendered academic by our holding.
Rose, Lahtinen, Malone Jr. and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,with costs.
Footnote *: Additionally, there arequestions of fact regarding whether the fiduciary relationship of the parties continued subsequentto the signing of the contract and the agency disclosure. Defendant alleges that plaintiffmaintained that the signing of the disclosure was a mere "formality" and that plaintiff wouldcontinue to represent defendant in the transaction, a contention that plaintiff disputes.