| People v Brown |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 04131 [62 AD3d 1209] |
| May 28, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Theodore J.Brown, Appellant. |
—[*1] Mark D. Suben, District Attorney, Cortland (Jerome M. Mayersak of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Cortland County (Ames, J.), renderedFebruary 26, 2008, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of endangering the welfareof a child and unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree.
After his conviction of endangering the welfare of a child and unlawfully dealing with achild in the first degree, defendant was sentenced to two terms of three years of probation to beserved concurrently. As part of his probation, defendant was required to, among other things,refrain from contact with children under the age of 18 and refrain from frequenting places wherechildren are likely to congregate without permission from the court or his probation officer. Hewas also required to successfully complete any form of counseling or treatment, including sexoffender treatment, directed by the court or his probation officer. Defendant now appeals,contending that County Court improperly imposed these conditions of probation.
We affirm. Conditions of probation are appropriate when the court determines that they are"reasonably necessary" to ensure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist himor her in doing so, or are "reasonably related" to his or her rehabilitation (Penal Law §65.10 [1], [2] [l]; see People v Page, 266 AD2d 733, 735 [1999]; People vGriffith, 239 AD2d 705, 706-707 [1997]; see also People v Rocco, 309 AD2d 882,882-883 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 601 [2004]). In addition, the court may impose anyother condition that it "shall determine to be necessary or appropriate to ameliorate the conductwhich gave rise to the offense or to prevent [*2]the incarcerationof the defendant" (Penal Law § 65.10 [5]; see People v Myatt, 248 AD2d 68, 71[1998]; see also People vWhindleton, 54 AD3d 422, 423 [2008]). Here, the first two conditions enumeratedabove clearly relate to both charges of which defendant was convicted, whether or not theyinvolved sexual activity. Moreover, the indictment for the count of endangering the welfare of achild of which defendant was convicted accused him of "engaging said child in sexualintercourse and by providing said child with an alcoholic beverage" (emphasis added).Inasmuch as that charge involved defendant engaging in sexual activity with the victim, wecannot say that County Court erred in imposing as a condition of defendant's probation that hecomplete sex offender treatment if directed by the court or his probation officer (see People vMyatt, 248 AD2d at 72).[FN*]
Cardona, P.J., Peters, Lahtinen, Malone Jr. and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgmentis affirmed.
Footnote *: The fact that defendant wasacquitted of the more serious charges of rape in the first degree and sexual abuse in the firstdegree was of no moment, inasmuch as his conviction for those charges necessitated a juryfinding that the victim was "incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless" (PenalLaw § 130.35 [2]; § 130.65 [2]).