Mayo v Personnel Review Bd. of Health & Hosps. Corp.
2009 NY Slip Op 06224 [65 AD3d 470]
August 18, 2009
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 30, 2009


Keith Mayo, Respondent,
v
Personnel Review Board ofthe Health and Hospitals Corporation et al., Appellants.

—[*1]Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Elizabeth S. Natrella ofcounsel), for appellants.

Koehler & Isaacs, LLP, New York (Mercedes M. Maldonado of counsel), forrespondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered January 22, 2008,which granted the petition, denied respondents' cross motion to dismiss, and remanded forpetitioner's reinstatement to his position with respondent New York City Health and HospitalsCorporation (HHC), modified, on the law, the directive that respondents reinstate petitioner tohis position vacated, the matter remanded to respondents for further proceedings consistentherewith, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner was employed by HHC as a supervisor of stock workers. As a result of analtercation between petitioner and one of his subordinates, HHC preferred two charges againstpetitioner. The first charge stated "[t]hat on or about March 8, 2005 at approximately 8:30 a.m.you assaulted" the subordinate; the second charge stated "[t]hat on or about March 8, 2005, yourconduct was unbecoming and unprofessional of a corporate employee and supervisor when youassaulted" the subordinate. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge determined that,although the altercation occurred, HHC failed to establish that petitioner initiated or willinglyparticipated in it, and she recommended that the charges be dismissed. HHC rejected theconclusion of the ALJ that petitioner did not initiate the fight, determined that petitioner didinitiate it and assaulted the subordinate, and terminated petitioner's employment.

On petitioner's administrative appeal to respondent Personnel Review Board of the HHC (thePRB), HHC's decision to terminate petitioner's employment was sustained. The PRB, however,did not base its determination on a finding that petitioner initiated the altercation or assaulted thesubordinate. Rather, the PRB concluded that petitioner had a duty to report immediately theincident to the HHC police (or his superiors). Finding that he failed to report immediately theincident, the PRB upheld HHC's decision to terminate petitioner's employment.

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the PRB'sdetermination and to be reinstated to his position with HHC. Petitioner asserted that the PRBviolated his due process rights by upholding HHC's decision to terminate his employment on aground of misconduct that was never charged—failing to report immediately thealtercation. Respondents, the PRB and HHC, moved to dismiss the proceeding. Supreme Courtfound that [*2]the PRB's determination was founded onuncharged misconduct and therefore violated petitioner's due process rights. The court annulledthe PRB's determination and remanded the matter to the PRB to dismiss the charges againstpetitioner and reinstate him to his position. The court stated that

"[t]he determination of the [PRB] . . . [that] upheld the termination of[petitioner] as an employee of [HHC] is annulled, as it was based on an uncharged offense,namely a failure to report the incident of March 8th, 2005 and therefore, denied [petitioner] hisconstitutional right to be confronted with the charges and thus, was arbitrary and capricious.

"Further, since the PRB otherwise accepted the [ALJ]'s findings of fact and credibility,which concluded that the sole charge against [petitioner], that of assault was not proved, andrecommended dismissal of the charge, the penalty imposed of termination is shocking anddisproportionate.

"[S]ince HHC rule[ ] 7.5.6 precludes removal or disciplinary proceedings from beingcommenced more than 18 months after the occurrence of the alleged misconduct, except foractions which would constitute a crime, which this finding of no—of not reporting wouldnot be, and it should be noted here all criminal charges relating to the assault charge weredismissed, and here, the events occurred on March 8th, 2005, almost three years ago.

"I am remanding this matter to the PRB and directing they [sic] act vis-à-visdismissal of the charges and reinstatement of Petitioner, in all ways consistent with this Court'sDecision and Order granting the petition."

We agree with Supreme Court that petitioner's due process rights were violated because thePRB affirmed HHC's decision to terminate petitioner's employment based on unchargedmisconduct. As the Court of Appeals has observed: "The first fundamental of due process isnotice of the charges made. This principle equally applies to an administrative proceeding foreven in that forum no person may lose substantial rights because of wrongdoing shown by theevidence, but not charged . . . A public employee has a claim to due process and hemay assume that the hearing will be limited to the charges as made. His lawyer is likewiseentitled to prepare for the hearing in reliance that, after the hearing is concluded, the charges willnot be switched. Any other course is a violation of the employee's right to be treated withelemental fairness" (Matter of Murray v Murphy, 24 NY2d 150, 157 [1969] [citationsomitted]). Notably, "[w]here we are involved with such a fundamental constitutional right as theright to be put on notice of the charges made, prejudice will be presumed" (id.).

Here, petitioner was charged with two counts of misconduct: (1) "[t]hat on or about March 8,2005 at approximately 8:30 a.m. you assaulted" the subordinate; and (2) "[t]hat on or aboutMarch 8, 2005, your conduct was unbecoming and unprofessional of a corporate employee andsupervisor when you assaulted" (emphasis added) the subordinate. Respondents maintain[*3]that the second charge provided petitioner with sufficientnotice of a charge of failing to report the altercation because it "addressed the unprofessional andunbecoming misconduct relating to the fight, which encompassed petitioner's failure to report theincident." However, as Supreme Court aptly observed, "Any reasonable person hearing that[charge], any reasonable . . . lawyer hearing that [charge], would construe that tomean that this was all about the assault." And, as Supreme Court noted, both the ALJ and HHCbelieved that the two charges preferred against petitioner related solely to the assault itself. Thus,the second charge did not afford petitioner with notice of a charge of failing to report theincident (see id.; Matter of Tartaglione v Board of Commrs. of Police Dept. of Vil. ofBriarcliff Manor, 301 AD2d 655 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 513 [2003]; Matterof Brown v Saranac Lake Cent. School Dist., 273 AD2d 785 [2000]; Whitbread-Nolan,Inc. v Shaffer, 183 AD2d 610 [1992]).

Contrary to respondents' assertion, the admission of testimony regarding petitioner's failureto report the incident does not mean that the failure to provide petitioner with notice of a chargeof failure to report can be overlooked. Petitioner and his attorney were entitled to assume that thehearing would be limited to the charges as made. By switching the basis of the charges after thehearing (and the first layer of administrative review) the PRB violated petitioner's "right to betreated with elemental fairness" (Murray, 24 NY2d at 157); because the right to notice ofthe charges is a fundamental constitutional right, prejudice will be presumed where, as here, thatright is violated (id.).

In addition to annulling the determination of the PRB, Supreme Court remanded the matterto respondents and directed them to dismiss the charges against petitioner and reinstate him tohis position. Specifically, Supreme Court remanded the "matter to the PRB and direct[ed] they[sic] act vis-à-vis dismissal of the charges and reinstatement of Petitioner, in allways consistent with th[e] Court's Decision and Order granting the petition." The court's positionin the decision and order seems quite clear—the PRB's determination is annulled andpetitioner is to be reinstated to his position. Moreover, the court also made clear that the PRB isprecluded from taking any further action against petitioner based on the events surrounding theassault. Thus, the court wrote that "HHC rule[ ] 7.5.6 precludes removal or disciplinaryproceedings from being commenced more than 18 months after the occurrence of the allegedmisconduct, except for actions which would constitute a crime, which this finding ofno—of not reporting would not be, and it should be noted here all criminal chargesrelating to the assault charge were dismissed, and here, the events occurred on March 8th, 2005,almost three years ago."[FN*]Accordingly, only ministerial action—dismissal of the charges and reinstatement ofpetitioner—is "consistent with [Supreme] Court's Decision and Order granting thepetition." For the reasons stated below, the court should not have addressed the issue of whetherthe PRB is precluded under HHC rule 7.5.6 from taking any further disciplinary action againstpetitioner, and consequently the court's directive limiting the action that the PRB can take withrespect to the matter was erroneous. [*4]Because the court statedthat PRB is precluded from taking any further action against petitioner based on the eventssurrounding the assault, the dissent is wrong in asserting that "there is nothing in SupremeCourt's decision that precludes respondents from pursuing any appropriate and timely chargesagainst petitioner."

The PRB did not pass on the issue of whether HHC personnel rule 7.5.6 bars respondentsfrom taking further administrative action against petitioner. Thus, there was no determination bythe PRB with respect to that issue for Supreme Court to review. Given the limited function of acourt in reviewing an administrative determination, the court should not have provided whatamounted to an advisory opinion that respondents are barred from taking further administrativeaction against petitioner; that question is for the PRB in the first instance.

That the PRB should determine what action to take with respect to the matter based onSupreme Court's finding (which we affirm) that petitioner did not have sufficient notice of thefailure to report charge is supported by additional considerations. First, only rule 7.5.6 has beenprovided to us and we do not know what other rules, if any, are relevant in determining whetherrespondents may take further administrative action against petitioner. Second, the PRB mayinterpret rule 7.5.6 in a manner that does not bar it from pursuing further administrative actionagainst petitioner (see Matter of Herzog v Joy, 74 AD2d 372, 375 [1980], affd53 NY2d 821 [1981] [administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulations entitled to"the greatest weight"]). For instance, the PRB could take the position that the proceeding wascommenced timely with respect to the original charges and an amended charge, such as one forfailure to report, relates back to those timely-commenced charges. Third, in Murray, theCourt of Appeals determined that where a person was denied due process because of insufficientnotice of the nature of the administrative charges against the person, the appropriate remedy is anew hearing (Murray, 24 NY2d at 158 ["Having been denied due process, (petitioners)are entitled to a new hearing"]; see Matter of Rivera v Rozzi, 149 AD2d 514 [1989];Montrois v City of Watertown, 115 AD2d 298 [1985]; Cruz v Lavine, 45 AD2d720 [1974]). The dissent cites no authority to the contrary. Thus, a new hearing is generally theremedy afforded to a person in petitioner's position.

At bottom, no determination by the PRB is before us with respect to whether HHC personnelrule 7.5.6 bars respondents from taking further administrative action against petitioner, and thePRB should determine in the first instance what action to take with respect to the matter basedon Supreme Court's finding (which we affirm) that petitioner did not have sufficient notice of thefailure to report charge.

We find respondents' remaining arguments, including those related to the standard of reviewand statute of limitations, without merit. Concur—Friedman, McGuire and Moskowitz, JJ.

Andrias, J.P., dissents in part in a memorandum as follows: We all agree that the seconddisciplinary charge against petitioner did not specify a "failure to report," and that the courttherefore properly found that petitioner was denied the due process of adequate notice of thatalleged misconduct (see Matter of Murray v Murphy, 24 NY2d 150, 157 [1969];Matter of Benson v Board of Educ. of Washingtonville Cent. School Dist., 183 AD2d996, 997 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 756 [1992]).

However, to the extent the majority would remand the matter for a new hearing on the [*5]failure to report charge, it asserts that Supreme Court directed thatrespondents reinstate petitioner to his position. However, in its decision dictated on the record ofJanuary 16, 2008, after having permitted respondents to file an answer and submit responsivepapers as to the proper remedy, "[i]n other words, for me to reinstate Petitioner, or rather toremand," the court specifically stated: "I will remand, but with specific language." The courtthen stated that it was annulling the Personnel Review Board's April 17, 2007 determination,which upheld petitioner's termination, because it was based on the uncharged offense of failureto report the incident of March 8th, 2005 and that, since the Board otherwise accepted theAdministrative Law Judge's findings of fact and credibility, which concluded that the sole chargeof assault against petitioner was not proven, "the penalty imposed of termination is shocking anddisproportionate." The court further stated that respondent HHC's rule 7.5.6 precludes removal ordisciplinary proceedings from being commenced more than 18 months after the allegedmisconduct, except for actions that would constitute a crime, and noted that all criminal chargesrelating to the assault charge had been dismissed and that the events occurred on March 8th,2005, almost three years before.

The majority does not dispute the accuracy of any of the court's observations, but seeminglyadopts respondents' sole argument on the issue, namely, that "the PRB in the first instance shouldhave the opportunity to interpret and apply the rules." However, the court was simply stating theobvious, which is in accord with the well-settled principle that where an administrative rule isclear and unambiguous, there is no need for administrative interpretation. In any event, on theremand, there is nothing in Supreme Court's decision that precludes respondents from pursuingany appropriate and timely charges against petitioner. If there are no other charges brought orsustained, respondents will have to determine whether there is any basis for denying petitionerreinstatement to his position with back pay, which determination would be subject to furtherreview by the courts.

Accordingly, I would simply affirm the judgment appealed from.

Footnotes


Footnote *: HHC personnel rule 7.5.6 statesthat "[n]o removal or disciplinary proceeding shall be commenced more than eighteen (18)months after the occurrence of the alleged incompetency or misconduct complained or describedin the charges except where the incompetency and/or misconduct complained of and sodescribed would constitute a crime if proved in a court of appropriate jurisdiction."


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