| Matter of Richard JJ. |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07535 [66 AD3d 1152] |
| October 22, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Richard JJ., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent. Andrew S. Moses, as Assistant St. Lawrence County Attorney, Appellant; RichardJJ., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Adam RR., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent. Andrew S. Moses, as Assistant St. Lawrence County Attorney, Appellant;Adam RR., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 2.) In the Matter of Markus SS., a Person Alleged to bea Juvenile Delinquent. Andrew S. Moses, as Assistant St. Lawrence County Attorney, Appellant;Markus SS., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 3.) |
—[*1] A. Michael Gebo, Ogdensburg, for Richard JJ., respondent. Marcia L. LeMay, Canton, for Adam RR., respondent. Nicholas Pignone, Potsdam, for Markus SS., respondent.
Kane, J. Appeals from three orders of the Family Court of St. Lawrence County (Potter, J.),entered June 23, 2008, which, in three proceedings pursuant to Family Ct Act article 3, grantedrespondents' motions to dismiss the petitions.
On September 7 and 8, 2007, respondents (all born in 1992) engaged in an extensivecampaign of vandalism, destruction of property and theft. Police interviewed respondents andtook statements from them within a few days, then arrested them on numerous charges onOctober 1, 2007. The Probation Department referred the matter to petitioner later in October2007. Petitioner did not file petitions commencing these juvenile delinquency proceedings untilApril 21, 2008. Respondents each moved to dismiss the respective petition based on petitioner'sdelay in filing. Family Court granted the motions and dismissed the petitions. Petitioner appeals.
Family Court properly dismissed the petitions. The statutory speedy trial provisions relatingto juvenile delinquency proceedings only apply after a petition has been filed (seeFamily Ct Act § 310.2; see also Family Ct Act §§ 320.2, 340.1).Prepetition delay, however, may result in an unconstitutional denial of due process (seeMatter of Benjamin L., 92 NY2d 660, 667-669 [1999]; cf. People v Staley, 41 NY2d789, 791 [1977]). To determine whether a respondent's due process rights were violated by adelay in filing, the court must engage in a balancing of factors, including the extent of the delay,the reasons for the delay, the nature of the charges, the extent of the prefiling detention,prejudice to the defense due to the delay, any special mental or emotional needs of the juvenile,and the need for and possibility of success of rehabilitation (see Matter of Benjamin L.,92 NY2d at 668-669; People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]; Matter ofHershel L., 182 Misc 2d 507, 510 [1999]). No one factor or combination of factors isdeterminative; courts must consider each case in light of all of the applicable factors (seePeople v Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 445). When applying this balancing test, "courts mustremain acutely cognizant of the goals, character and unique nature of juvenile proceedings"(Matter of Benjamin L., 92 NY2d at 668). "[T]he central goal of any juvenileproceeding—rehabilitation of the [*2]juvenile throughprompt intervention and treatment—can seem trivialized when a presentment agencydelays the filing of a petition" (id. at 670; see Matter of Joseph O., 305 AD2d743, 745 [2003]).
Here, the petitions were not filed until more than seven months after the alleged behaviorunderlying the charges, more than six months after respondents' arrests[FN*]and more than six months after the matter was referred to petitioner following a completeinvestigation. The charges were serious, including multiple felony and misdemeanor counts, andinvolved the theft or destruction of property owned by numerous individuals and the local schooldistrict. While respondents were not detained prior to filing of the petitions and did not assertany actual prejudice to their defenses, petitioner failed to establish a legitimate reason for thedelay (see Matter of Benjamin L., 92 NY2d at 670). The police had completed the entireinvestigation before the file was turned over to petitioner in October 2007. Petitioner contendedthat delay was attributable to his need to obtain certain additional documents from theinvestigating police agency and to consult with the District Attorney's office. The documents,while perhaps necessary for a fact-finding hearing, were not required to file a petition. Althoughthis case may have been complex, petitioner offered no explanation for waiting several months tocontact the District Attorney's office for assistance or why petitions were not filed until severalmonths after contacting that office. Weighing all of the factors, while also considering theultimate goal of promptly treating and rehabilitating juvenile offenders, the unjustified delayhere violated respondents' due process rights. Thus, Family Court correctly granted their motionsto dismiss the petitions.
Peters, J.P., Rose, Lahtinen and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders are affirmed,without costs.
Footnote *: Had respondents been adults inthe criminal court system, the time period between arrest and filing would have mandateddismissal (see CPL 30.30; Matter of Hershel L., 182 Misc 2d at 511).