| Green Harbour Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v Ermiger |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07918 [67 AD3d 1116] |
| November 5, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Green Harbour Homeowners' Association, Inc., Respondent, vKenneth Ermiger, Appellant. (And a Third-Party Action.) |
—[*1] Poklemba & Hobbs, L.L.C., Malta (Gary C. Hobbs of counsel), for respondent.
Kane, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Krogmann, J.), entered July 16, 2008in Warren County, which, among other things, granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminaryinjunction.
Third-party defendants, the sponsors of the Green Harbour subdivision, conveyed certainlots in the subdivision to defendant. Plaintiff commenced this action seeking a declaration that itwas the true owner of some of those lots and for damages due to defendant's trespass on thoselots.[FN*][*2]
As relevant to this appeal, defendant constructedtownhouses on certain lots that he owned. After plaintiff rejected defendant's request to trimtrees on plaintiff's property to improve the view from the newly-constructed townhouses,defendant's contractor cut 26 trees on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff moved for a preliminaryinjunction preventing defendant from entering plaintiff's property or cutting trees withoutpermission, for leave to amend the complaint to include an additional claim for trespass arisingfrom the tree removal, and for other relief. Supreme Court partially granted the motion, bygranting leave to serve the amended complaint and preliminarily enjoining defendant or hisagents from cutting any trees which do not lie within his property or a utility line easement, anddenied the other relief sought. Defendant appeals.
Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction. To obtain apreliminary injunction in its favor, plaintiff was required to "demonstrate a probability of successon the merits, danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction and a balance ofequities in its favor" (Nobu Next Door,LLC v Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]; see CPLR 6301; Cooperstown Capital, LLC v Patton,60 AD3d 1251, 1252 [2009]). As an owner of at least three lots not purchased for occupancyby himself or his family, defendant falls within the regulatory definition of a sponsor(see 13 NYCRR 22.1 [c] [1]). Defendant contends that language in the declaration ofprotective covenants, restrictions, easements, charges and liens (hereinafter the declaration)entitles him, as a sponsor of the subdivision, to cut the trees at issue. In section 4.07 (d) of thedeclaration, the sponsors reserved "an easement over, across, through, on and under [plaintiff'sp]roperty, and the Lots for the purposes of completing construction of the Units . . .and doing all things necessary or desirable relating thereto." A factual question exists as towhether the cutting of trees not located on the townhouse lots to provide a lake view constitutes"completing construction" or an activity which is "necessary or desirable relating" to thecompletion of construction, so as to fall within the easement granted by the declaration (seeAlford v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 115 AD2d 924, 924 [1985], lv denied 67NY2d 607 [1986]; see also Albrechta v Broome County Indus. Dev. Agency, 274 AD2d651, 651-652 [2000] [addressing standard for determining extent of easement]). Notwithstandingthis question of fact, the court properly determined that plaintiff established a probability ofsuccess on the merits (see Cooperstown Capital, LLC v Patton, 60 AD3d at 1252-1253).
Further, plaintiff established the risk of irreparable harm as well as the balance of equities inits favor. The threatened removal of large trees constitutes irreparable harm (see GramercyCo. v Benenson, 223 AD2d 497, 498 [1996]; Sforza v Nesconset Fire Dist., 184AD2d 631, 632 [1992]; Wiederspiel v Bernholz, 163 AD2d 774, 775 [1990]). Whiledefendant contends that he is prejudiced because he will not be able to sell the townhouseswithout lake views, there is no record proof of that assertion. As there is no proof of prejudiceand the injunction preserves the status quo, the equities balance in favor of plaintiff (seeGramercy Co. v Benenson, 223 AD2d at 498; see also Wiederspiel v Bernholz, 163AD2d at 775). Thus, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in preventing defendant fromcutting trees on plaintiff's property during the pendency of this action (see Karabatos v Hagopian, 39 AD3d930, 931-932 [2007]; Walsh v St. Mary's Church, 248 AD2d 792, 793-794 [1998]).
Supreme Court also did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff leave to amend the [*3]complaint. Plaintiff added a cause of action seeking treble damagesfor timber trespass (see RPAPL 861). This cause of action was consistent with the priortrespass claims and could not have been added earlier because the timber was not removed untilafter the original complaint was filed. Accepting as true the facts alleged and drawing allreasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, plaintiff sets forth a cause of action that has merit (see Shelton v New York State Liq.Auth., 61 AD3d 1145, 1149 [2009]). Because defendant has not demonstrated anyprejudice, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff leave to amend (seeid. at 1149; Leclaire v Fort HudsonNursing Home, Inc., 52 AD3d 1101, 1102 [2008]).
Peters, J.P., Spain, Rose and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Footnote *: The parties have previouslybeen before this Court not only in this action (50 AD3d 1199 [2008]), but in many relatedmatters (see Black v Green HarbourHomeowners' Assn., Inc., 37 AD3d 1013 [2007]; Black v Green Harbour Homeowners' Assn., Inc., 19 AD3d 962[2005]; Green Harbour Homeowners'Assn., Inc. v G.H. Dev. & Constr., Inc., 14 AD3d 963 [2005]; Matter of Green Harbour Homeowners'Assn. v Town of Lake George Planning Bd., 1 AD3d 744 [2003]; Green HarbourHomeowners' Assn. v G.H. Dev. & Constr., 307 AD2d 465 [2003], lv dismissed 100NY2d 640 [2003]).