| People v Montes |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 08680 [67 AD3d 586] |
| November 24, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v OmarMontes, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York (Matthew C. Williams of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Edwin Torres, J.), rendered May 10, 2006,convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree,and sentencing him to a term of seven years, affirmed.
On June 3, 2004, in response to a 4:00 a.m. radio communication of "shots fired," policefound Robinson "Tito" Lopez dead behind a building at 1952 Second Avenue. The medicalexaminer found that Lopez had died from multiple gunshot wounds that had perforated his vitalorgans.
Eyewitness testimony established that, immediately before the shooting, Lopez was involvedin an argument with two women, his ex-girlfriend Loraine Ceballo and her friend TamikaTaylor. During the argument, Lopez made insulting remarks about Charles Gonzalez, Ceballo'scurrent boyfriend. In response to a telephone call from Ceballo, Gonzalez arrived on the sceneabout 10 minutes later accompanied by defendant. After the two men located Lopez in theparking lot in the back of the building, a confrontation erupted. Shortly thereafter, Lopez wasshot and killed.
Investigation of the scene revealed one deformed bullet and nine .380 caliber shell casings.Ballistics testing established that, of the nine shell casings, six had been fired by one gun and theremaining three by another gun. All four recovered bullets—the deformed bullet recoveredat the scene and the three bullets recovered during the autopsy—were found to have beenfired by the same gun. However, officers were unable to link the bullets to the shell casings.
At trial, Ceballo testified that she followed Gonzalez and defendant to the back of thebuilding. Although her view of Lopez was blocked, she watched Gonzalez and defendantapproach Lopez's car. There, according to Ceballo, she saw both Gonzalez and defendant raisetheir hands "in a fist form," and saw that they were holding something in their hands. AlthoughCeballo said at trial that she could not identify the objects in the men's hands, she had tolddetectives who interviewed her that she saw them holding guns, and had testified similarly in hergrand jury testimony.
Ceballo further testified that after she heard three gunshots, she immediately ran back [*2]towards the building, and that Gonzalez and defendant ran rightpast her, through the lobby. Notably, Ceballo testified that she did not see anything in eitherGonzalez's or defendant's hands as they ran.
According to evidence read into the record by the People, during the trial, after Ceballotestified, she and Taylor were brought back to the prosecutor's office and reinterviewed. Taylor,who had not yet testified, denied being present during the shooting. However, after Ceballo leftthe room, Taylor admitted to the prosecutor that she had been present during the shooting.Taylor added that Gonzalez put a gun or guns in Ceballo's purse after the shooting.
After Ceballo returned to the room, Taylor confronted her about whether Gonzalez had put agun in her purse. At that point, Ceballo acknowledged that Gonzalez had in fact placed a gun orguns in her purse. Ceballo went "back and forth" on whether she received one or two guns, andsaid that she did not know.
The next day, Taylor testified that, immediately after the shooting, Gonzalez and defendantran to the back entrance of the building, and she and Ceballo ran into the building with the twomen. According to Taylor, Gonzalez put at least one gun in Ceballo's purse. As Gonzalez anddefendant fled through an exit door, Ceballo boarded the elevator with Taylor and asked, "Whatam I going to do with the guns? . . . I don't want this in my house."
Following Taylor's testimony, defense counsel asked to recall Ceballo but was told that shewas no longer available because she had suffered a breakdown and had attempted suicide.Defendant moved for a mistrial or, alternatively, to strike Ceballo's testimony, on the groundsthat he was denied his right to confront Ceballo regarding the gun or guns.
The trial court denied defendant's motion, finding that the issue of whether Ceballo wasgiven one or more guns was a minor portion of her testimony. The next day, the court made thefollowing record explaining its decision:
"[T]wo days ago, the witness Loraine Ceballo was subjected to a consummately skillful andexhaustive cross-examination. All encompassing, grueling, scathing, and repeatedly reduced herto tears and the breaking point. Add to this the palpable abject terror she communicated, thelethal factions this most reluctant, this fine young woman finds her in the middle of. Theculmination? Loraine Ceballo had a psychotic breakdown that night, attempting suicide twice.Through nobody's fault, she is unavailable for further examination by either side. The end resultis that Tamika Taylor's testimony will remain uncontroverted, and this, it appears, in no wayindisposes the defense, either tactically or strategically.
"To vitiate all her testimony as proposed by defense counsel is too drastic a measure. . . akin to throwing out the baby with the bath water."
Later in the trial, defendant made a request for a missing witness charge for Ceballo,asserting that he was being denied his confrontation rights, especially with respect to the issue ofwhether one gun or two were dropped into Ceballo's purse. After the court denied the missingwitness charge, defendant and the People entered a stipulation with respect to Ceballo. Thestipulation stated in relevant part: "Loraine Ceballo was not honest when she testified in that shefailed to state that . . . Gonzalez . . . gave her the gun or guns when heran past her after the shooting occurred. When first confronted at the District Attorney's officethat Carlos [*3]Gonzalez placed weapons in her purse, LoraineCeballo had denied that this had occurred. When confronted by Tamika Taylor about this matter,Loraine Ceballo immediately stated that . . . Gonzalez shoved a weapon or weaponsinto her purse and that she took the purse containing the weapon or weapons up to her apartment.Loraine Ceballo is unavailable to be recalled by either side."
The jury acquitted defendant of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of aweapon in the second degree, but convicted him of criminal possession of a weapon in the thirddegree. (Penal Law § 265.02 [former (4)].) After the jury left, defendant moved to setaside the verdict as repugnant, which motion was denied.
At the sentencing proceeding, counsel presented letters from about 30 individuals from thecommunity attesting to defendant's good character. Defendant maintained his innocence andasked for leniency. The court expressed the view that defendant was a joint actor with Gonzalezin bringing about Lopez's death. Defendant was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to thestatutory maximum of seven years in prison, with five years of postrelease supervision.
On appeal, defendant claims that he was denied his constitutional right to confront Ceballopursuant to US Constitution Amendments VI and XIV, and NY Constitution article I, § 6.Specifically, he argues that he was deprived of the opportunity to recall Ceballo in order to bringher credibility into question and draw attention to her apparent role in the shooting. Additionally,defendant argues that Ceballo may have testified that she received only one gun, therebyproviding evidence supporting his innocence. Defendant also claims that his sentence wasexcessive and should be reduced. For the reasons set forth below, we find these argumentsunavailing and affirm the ruling of the trial court.
It is well established that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment protects acriminal defendant's right to question the witnesses against him. However, trial judges retainwide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such interactions (Delaware v Van Arsdall,475 US 673, 678-679 [1986]). " '[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunityfor effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and towhatever extent, the defense might wish' " (id. at 679, quoting Delaware vFensterer, 474 US 15, 20 [1985]).
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to recallCeballo, or in the alternative to strike the testimony. Defendant had already had a fullopportunity to cross-examine Ceballo. As the trial court stated in its decision on defendant'smotion, "Ceballo was subjected to a consummately skillful and exhaustive cross-examination."In particular, defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine Ceballo about Gonzalez's anddefendant's actions after the shooting including what they did as they were fleeing the scene.Thus, defendant's right to confront Ceballo was protected, since he was afforded the "opportunityto probe and expose . . . infirmities" in Ceballo's testimony (Delaware vFensterer, 474 US at 22; see People v Mercado, 237 AD2d 200 [1997], lv denied90 NY2d 895 [1997]). Ultimately, it was not Ceballo's testimony, but her friend Taylor's,that raised the question of how many guns were dropped into Ceballo's purse. Further, anotherwitness also testified as to conversations about two guns. In this respect, defense counsel hadample opportunity to engage in cross-examination of two witnesses on the issue. Moreover, bydrawing attention to the ambiguities in the two witnesses' testimony, as well as focusing onCeballo's dishonesty, the defendant, in his summation, "was afforded ample scope to present thetheory of defense to [*4]which the proffered evidencepurportedly related" (People v Isaacs, 272 AD2d 159 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d854 [2000]).
Furthermore, defendant was able to bring his arguments before the jury by means of astipulation providing that Ceballo was dishonest and that she was unclear as to whether one ortwo guns were placed into her purse. Indeed, by this stipulation, the issue of Ceballo's credibilitywas resolved entirely against the People, and this, in itself, weighs heavily against a finding of aconstitutional violation (see People vAlicea, 33 AD3d 326, 328 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 923 [2006]).
In any event, even if the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial or striking Ceballo'stestimony, we find that the error was harmless as the evidence amply established defendant'sguilt of criminal possession of weapon in the third degree. The forensics evidence demonstratedthat at the crime scene, there were nine discharged shell casings, all of which were fresh. Further,the evidence showed that six of the shell casings had been fired from one gun and the other threehad been fired from another gun, thus indicating that there were two guns, not one, at the scene.
As for defendant's challenge to his sentence, it is not disputed that defendant had a priorfelony conviction on his record, nor does defendant dispute that the crime for which he wasconvicted arose out of the shooting death of Tito Lopez. Thus, we do not find it necessary tosubstitute our discretion for that of the trial court to reduce the sentence.
Motion seeking leave to file pro se supplemental brief and related relief denied.Concur—Gonzalez, P.J., Tom, Catterson and Richter, JJ.
Abdus-Salaam, J., dissents in a memorandum as follows: I must respectfully dissent andwould reverse the conviction on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion in failing tostrike Ceballo's testimony. This error was a violation of defendant's constitutional rights underthe Confrontation Clause and under the circumstances was not harmless beyond a reasonabledoubt (see People v Goldstein, 6NY3d 119, 129 [2005], cert denied 547 US 1159 [2006]).
Contrary to the majority's conclusion that if the trial court erred, the error was harmlessbecause the evidence, even without Ceballo's testimony, amply established defendant's guilt ofcriminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, Ceballo was the sole individual who offeredeyewitness testimony indicating that defendant might have had a gun. She testified that althoughher view of the victim Lopez was blocked, she saw both Gonzalez and defendant raise theirhands "in a fist form," and saw that they were holding something in their hands, although shecould not identify the objects.
The only other person who offered an eyewitness account was Dominick Castro, whodescribed himself as a close friend of Lopez's and who was there in the parking lot when theshooting occurred. He testified that defendant did not have a gun in his hand and that onlyGonzalez had a gun. Castro testified that during the incident, defendant was standing in theparking lot with his hands crossed in front of him. According to Castro, Gonzalez confrontedLopez face to face, abruptly shot him and then ran after him and continued to shoot him, whiledefendant stood at a distance and watched. Thus, without Ceballo's testimony, there was noeyewitness testimony as to defendant's guilt, only eyewitness testimony to the contrary.
As noted by the majority, Ceballo testified that after the shooting, Gonzalez and defendantran right past her through the lobby. She made no mention before the jury of Gonzalez [*5]placing a gun or guns into her purse. This stunning and significantrevelation was made at the prosecutor's office after Ceballo had concluded her testimony, andonly because Ceballo's friend Tamika Taylor first admitted to prosecutors at that time that she,together with Ceballo, had been present during the shooting. Defendant was not able to recallCeballo because he was told that she was unavailable due to suffering a breakdown.
The question of whether Ceballo received one or two guns had evidentiary significance withrespect to whether defendant was armed. Ceballo and Castro gave sharply contradictory accountsof whether defendant was holding a gun or any object at all, and the jury had to determinewhether defendant was armed with a gun. In that regard, whether Gonzalez had given Ceballoone or two guns was important. Of course, had Gonzalez only given Ceballo one gun, that wouldnot have negated the possibility that defendant had also been armed with a gun. But it madesense in terms of the testimony that if Gonzalez and defendant had both come running into thebuilding after the shooting, and they both had guns, that both guns would have been handed toCeballo. She was the only witness who could answer that question based on personal knowledge,and defendant had a basic constitutional right to confront her about this matter throughcross-examination (People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22, 27 [1986]).
Defendant's inability to cross-examine Ceballo regarding this revelation about the gun orguns prevented defendant from questioning her about facts closely related to the crime (seegenerally United States v Cardillo, 316 F2d 606, 611 [2d Cir 1963], cert denied 375US 857 [1963]; People v Vargas, 88 NY2d 363, 380 [1996]). The fact that Gonzalez hadgiven Ceballo a gun or guns right after the shooting was not a collateral matter that had nothingto do with the incident (compare Peoplev Rodriguez, 24 AD3d 394 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 837 [2006] [the trial courtproperly exercised its discretion in refusing to strike the victim's testimony after he asserted aFifth Amendment privilege in response to a single question on cross-examination that related toa collateral matter pertaining only to credibility]).
The " 'ultimate question must be whether the defendant's inability to test the accuracy of thewitness' direct examination has been such as to create a substantial risk of prejudice'(McCormick, Evidence § 140, at 347 [3d ed]; see generally, Ann., 55 ALR Fed742)" (People v Chin, 67 NY2d at 28). The trial court's reasoning that whether or notCeballo took a gun or guns from Gonzalez was only "a minor portion of the totality of hertestimony" and that accordingly the motion to strike Ceballo's testimony should be denied, ispuzzling. The issue of the number of guns was obviously significant because both Gonzalez anddefendant had been with the victim in the parking lot and there was a jury question as to whetherthey had both possessed guns.
The majority's conclusion that defendant had already been afforded a full opportunity tocross-examine Ceballo misses the point that defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine herregarding the bombshell revelation about having been given the gun or guns. Furthermore, whilethe majority observes that defense counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine Ceballo'sfriend Tamika Taylor, as well as another witness, regarding conversations about two guns, thiswas no substitute for cross-examination of Ceballo, who was the only one with personalknowledge as to whether she had been given one or two guns. Taylor's testimony was confusedand inherently inconsistent with respect to whether there was one gun or there were twoguns.[FN1][*6]The other witness to whom the majority refers was CarlosPino, who was incarcerated for a drug conviction and who was brought downstate from prison totestify for the prosecution only after Ceballo made her surprise revelation about having beengiven the weapon(s).
Pino testified that he knew Taylor, who is his son's godmother, Ceballo, Gonzalez anddefendant. He testified that on the night of the shooting, he called Taylor, who told him thatGonzalez had shot Lopez. That same night, he received a phone call from defendant asking himto call Taylor to find out what "that girl did with them things," which Pino understood to meanCeballo and the guns. According to Pino, Taylor also told him that after the shooting, Gonzalezhad stuck the guns in Ceballo's bag. He was certain that Taylor had said "two" guns. Oncross-examination, defense counsel elicited from this prosecution witness that he had about fivemonths remaining on his prison term and that the detectives who had retrieved him from prisonand escorted him to the courthouse to testify had told him that he was a witness to a murder caseand that if he lied on the stand he could be penalized and "catch another case," that is be chargedwith another crime.
Defendant's opportunity to cross-examine these two witnesses, neither of whom had personalknowledge of whether Ceballo had been given one or two guns, was insufficient to cure theconsiderable prejudice created by defendant's inability to cross-examine Ceballo on this issue.
The stipulation that was read to the jury stating that Ceballo was not honest when shetestified in that she failed to state that Gonzalez had given her the gun or guns when he ran pasther after the shooting occurred, was no substitute for the right to confront Ceballo. As stated bythe Court of Appeals in People v Chin: "[S]tipulations cannot substitute forconfrontation, because confrontation envisions 'a personal examination and cross-examination ofthe witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection andsifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury inorder that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner inwhich he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief' (Mattox v United States,156 US 237, 242-243)" (67 NY2d at 30 n 3).
The majority's reliance on People vAlicea (33 AD3d 326 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 923 [2006]), for the propositionthat through this stipulation, the issue of Ceballo's credibility was resolved entirely against thePeople, and that this factor weighs heavily against finding a constitutional violation, ismisplaced. In Alicea, this Court found that the trial court had properly exercised itsdiscretion in denying defendant permission to recall one of the People's witnesses for furthercross-examination on newly acquired information. However, significantly, in Alicea,unlike here, the information had little impact on the witness's credibility, and defendant had the[*7]opportunity to acquire the information earlier in theproceeding (see also People vCrawford, 39 AD3d 426 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 864 [2007] [the courtproperly exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's request to recall the victim in order tolay a foundation to introduce a prior inconsistent statement which had minimal impeachmentvalue and which had been previously disclosed to the defense]).
In contrast, Ceballo's admission that she had hidden the weapon or weapons used to kill thevictim went to the heart of her credibility and was a surprise to both the prosecution and thedefense. While this Court concluded in Alicea that the defendant had been afforded a fullopportunity to impeach the witness and that there was no impairment of defendant's right ofconfrontation, the circumstances here are starkly different.
Because the failure to strike Ceballo's testimony was an error that violated defendant'sconstitutional rights, the test for harmless error applies: that is, "[t]he People must show that anyerror was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Goldstein, 6 NY3d at 129). Inso deciding, this Court must "consider both the overall strength of the case against defendant andthe importance to that case of the improperly admitted evidence." (Id.)
As noted, Ceballo was the only eyewitness who indicated that she saw defendant holdingsomething in his hand before the victim was shot. If her entire testimony is struck, what remainsis the testimony of Castro, who testified that Gonzalez alone was the shooter, that defendant wasnot holding a gun and that defendant just stood there during the shooting; the testimony ofTaylor, who stated that she did not see the shooting and did not know whether Gonzalez hadgiven Ceballo one or two guns; and the testimony of Pino, the convicted felon, who related whathad been said to him about two guns by Taylor (who had lied to the prosecutor until the eleventhhour about not having been present during the shooting) and by defendant.
There was also evidence that one bullet and nine .380 caliber shell casings had beenrecovered and that six casings had been fired from one gun and the remaining three from anothergun. All of the shell casings were "fresh," meaning that they did not appear to have been therefor any length of time because they were not crushed or disturbed, but the People's witnessescould not tell how long the casings had been in the parking lot. There was testimony from afirearms analyst that the bullets found in the victim's body and the deformed bullet found at thescene had all come from the same gun, but that witness could not determine whether the bulletshad been fired from the same gun as the shell casings.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that even without Ceballo's testimony, the forensicevidence amply established defendant's guilt of criminal possession of a weapon in the thirddegree. The majority states that because the casings were fired from two guns, this indicates thatthere were two guns, not one at the scene. But while we know that there was at least one gun atthe scene at the time of the incident because the victim was shot and killed, the forensicevidence does not show that there were two guns at the scene at the time of the shooting,only that at some point, there was a gun fired in the parking lot that was different from the gunthat was used to shoot the victim.
The overall strength of the People's evidence against defendant was "far fromoverwhelming" (Brinson v Walker, 547 F3d 387, 396 [2d Cir 2008]; compare People v Johnson, 60 AD3d425 [2009] [although it was error to admit the nontestifying codefendant's plea allocution inthat this violated the Confrontation Clause, the error was harmless because there wasoverwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt]). The case against defendant is greatly diminishedin the absence of Ceballo's testimony that she saw defendant in the parking lot with [*8]Gonzalez and that both defendant and Gonzalez raised their hands"in a fist form" and were holding objects in their hands just before the victim was shot. Here, asin People v Goldstein (6 NY3d at 130), "[t]he People's case drew some significantsupport from the improperly admitted [evidence]." The People have failed to show beyond areasonable doubt that the failure to strike Ceballo's testimony was harmless error.
As was emphasized by the Court of Appeals in Goldstein (6 NY3d at 132), whilenoting the "unwelcome consequences"[FN2]of ordering a new trial, "the constitutional rules that guarantee defendants a fair trial must beenforced, and few such rules are more important than the one that guarantees defendants theright to confront the witnesses against them." The Supreme Court has "repeatedly reaffirmed theprinciple that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court mayconfidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond areasonable doubt" (Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 681 [1986]). I do not believethat this Court can confidently say that the constitutional error committed in this case washarmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the conviction should be reversed and the case remitted for a new trial.
Footnote 1: She testified that she sawGonzalez put something in Ceballo's purse and that when she and Ceballo were in the elevator,Ceballo remarked, "What am I going to do with the guns?" When asked by the court whether shesaw what was in the purse, Taylor responded, "No. She told me he put the gun in my purse," butshe also said, "I saw the gun." When the court asked how many guns she had seen, Taylor said,"I don't remember" and that "I did see one." She repeated that she saw one gun and did not knowif there was a second gun.
Footnote 2: This is the infamous KendraWebdale case. Defendant had pushed Ms. Webdale into the path of an approaching subway train.He was charged with murder in the second degree and his principal defense was insanity. Thefirst trial ended in a hung jury. The second jury convicted him of second degree murder.Although the Court of Appeals was troubled by "the tangible cost of a third trial, and by theintangible cost of the long delay in resolving [the] case" (6 NY3d at 132) as well as theknowledge that another trial would bring pain to the victim's family, it reversed the convictionand ordered a new trial because defendant's constitutional right under the Confrontation Clausewas violated when a psychiatrist who testified recounted statements made by people who werenot available for cross-examination.