| Matter of Kayla KK. (Tracy LL.) |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 08917 [68 AD3d 1207] |
| December 3, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Kayla KK., a Child Alleged to be PermanentlyNeglected. Otsego County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Tracy LL.,Appellant. |
—[*1] Steven E. Ratner, Otsego County Department of Social Services, Cooperstown, forrespondent. Robert Gouldin, Law Guardian, Oneonta.
Kavanagh, J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Otsego County (Ghaleb, J.),entered January 5, 2009, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toSocial Services Law § 384-b, to adjudicate Kayla KK. a permanently neglected child, andterminated respondent's parental rights.
Petitioner filed an emergency petition seeking the removal of Kayla KK. from respondent'scare soon after she had given birth to Kayla in 2007 on the grounds that a prior finding had beenentered that respondent had neglected another daughter and that respondent continued to remainin an abusive relationship with Kayla's father.[FN1] More than one year after [*2]Kayla was removed fromrespondent's care and placed with petitioner, this proceeding was commenced alleging that Kaylawas a permanently neglected child and that the parental rights of respondent and Kayla's fathershould be terminated.[FN2] After a fact-finding hearing, Family Court adjudicated Kayla to be a permanently neglectedchild and, at the conclusion of the dispositional hearing that followed, terminated respondent'sparental rights. Respondent now appeals and we affirm.
Respondent does not dispute the finding that she permanently neglected Kayla. Her onlycontention is that Family Court, instead of immediately terminating her parental rights, shouldhave issued a suspended judgment to give her another opportunity to develop her parental skillsso that she could ultimately be reunited with Kayla. A suspended judgment may be issued if it isin the best interests of the child to allow the parent additional time to improve parenting skillsand demonstrate his or her fitness to care for the child (see Family Ct Act § 631[b]; Matter of Carlos R., 63 AD3d1243, 1246 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 704 [2009]; Matter of Faith R., 56 AD3d 982,984 [2008]; Matter of Isaiah F., 55AD3d 1004, 1006 [2008]; Matterof Angelica VV., 53 AD3d 732, 733 [2008]; Matter of Raine QQ., 51 AD3d 1106, 1106-1107 [2008], lvdenied 10 NY3d 717 [2008]; Matter of Joshua BB., 27 AD3d 867, 869 [2006]). Here, althoughregularly visiting and interacting appropriately with Kayla while she was in petitioner's charge,respondent has not, as found by Family Court, made measurable progress in addressing theparental deficiencies that put Kayla at risk and led to the child's removal from her care. In fact, asFamily Court aptly noted, there was simply no indication from the evidence presented during thehearings that respondent could ever "cope with day-to-day parenting." In that regard, during thetwo years that Kayla has been in petitioner's care, respondent, despite being provided with amyriad of services designed to address the difficulties that she routinely encountered as a parent,has made little appreciable progress in developing or improving her skills as a parent. Inaddition, her residence has often been found to be in an unsanitary condition due, in part, torespondent's failure to properly care for pets that she insists on keeping on the premises. Theapartment, as a result, is often in such a state of disarray that it is not a suitable abode for ayoung child.
As important, respondent continued to have contact with Kayla's father and allowed him tolive in her apartment even though he has a history of engaging in abusive and assaultivebehavior. Respondent's insistence on maintaining this relationship is even more disturbing giventhe repeated warnings she has received that such contact could jeopardize any possibility shemight have to be reunited with her child. Finally, it is impossible in the context of thisproceeding to ignore the fact that Kayla, by all accounts, appears to be thriving in the care of herfoster family, who has expressed an interest in adopting her. For these reasons, we are of theview that Family Court's determination that termination of respondent's parental rights was inKayla's best interests has a sound and substantial basis (see Matter of Laelani B., 59 AD3d 880, 882 [2009]; Matter ofAngelica VV., 53 AD3d at 733; Matter of George M., 48 AD3d 926, 929 [2008]; Matter of Jayde M., 36 AD3d1168, 1170 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 809 [2007]; Matter of Joshua BB., 27AD3d at 869).
Peters, J.P., Rose, Kane and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote 1: Respondent has four children:three daughters, the oldest of whom was previously freed for adoption, and a son, who now liveswith his paternal grandparents.
Footnote 2: Kayla's father voluntarilysurrendered his parental rights on July 14, 2008.