Ciarelli v Lynch
2010 NY Slip Op 00039 [69 AD3d 1008]
January 7, 2010
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 10, 2010


George M. Ciarelli et al., Appellants, v Christopher Lynch et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Roemer, Wallens & Mineaux, L.L.P., Albany (Matthew J. Kelly of counsel), forappellants.

The Ayers Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Palatine Bridge (Laura E. Ayers of counsel), forrespondents.

Mercure, J.P. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), entered January9, 2009 in Schoharie County, which, among other things, partially granted defendants' motionfor summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.

This appeal marks the third occasion that the present action has been before us, and theunderlying facts are more fully set out in our prior decisions (Ciarelli v Lynch, 46 AD3d 1039 [2007]; Ciarelli v Lynch, 22 AD3d 987[2005]). Briefly put, this action involves a dispute as to whether defendants are entitled to use aroad that traverses property owned by plaintiffs in the Town of Gilboa, Schoharie County.Defendants assert that the road is a public highway or, in the alternative, that they have aneasement over it.

A trial was held in the matter and, upon the initial appeal, we reversed the denial by SupremeCourt (Malone Jr., J.) of defendants' motion to set aside the verdict and remitted for furtherproceedings (22 AD3d at 988-990). As the date for the retrial loomed, defendants moved andplaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment. The parties then stipulated that, in lieu of a retrial,the trial court would decide the motions and resolve any disputed factual issues in "a trial bysubmission" using the original trial transcript. Supreme Court (McDonough, J.) granteddefendants' motion to the extent of dismissing the complaint and awarding them judgment oncertain of their counterclaims, and plaintiffs appeal.[*2]

While Supreme Court's determination resolved theparties' summary judgment motions, it amounted to a nonjury trial on the papers before it, giventhe parties' stipulation; thus, we will independently review the evidence presented and grantjudgment as warranted by the record (see Sherwood v Brock, 65 AD3d 738, 738-739 [2009]; Haber v Gutmann, 64 AD3d 1106,1107 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 711 [2009]). No deference is due to Supreme Court'scredibility determinations in this case, as such were based solely upon submitted papers ratherthan live testimony (see Wolf vHolyoke Mut. Ins. Co., 3 AD3d 660, 660 [2004]; Bauer v Goodrich & SherwoodAssoc., 304 AD2d 957, 958 [2003]). Nevertheless, we agree with Supreme Court that theroad constitutes a public highway.

Defendants produced the affidavit and testimony of Steven Sibbern, a surveyor whoconducted an extensive review of available maps and deeds, as well as a field investigation, in aneffort to identify the road in question. Sibbern found that deeds of nearby parcels containednumerous references to a road named Lansing Turnpike and related features such as a tollhouseand tollgate, and he additionally noted the turnpike's presence on various maps from the 1850sonward. Sibbern opined that the road running over plaintiffs' parcel was Lansing Turnpike andthat, given the above facts and the evident quality of the road's construction, it was a publichighway that had existed for at least 150 years. Another surveyor, who had surveyed an adjacentparcel bounded by the road, noted its existence and stated that, in his opinion, the road'sconstruction was consistent with that of a public highway in the 1800s. Plaintiffs' title expert alsoadmitted that the road may have been a public highway at one point, and their predecessor in titlebelieved that it had been a toll road.[FN1]This evidence amply established that the road running over plaintiffs' parcel was a publichighway.

Plaintiffs also contend that the road was abandoned through nonuse. A public highway willbe deemed abandoned if it has not "been traveled or used as a highway for six years" (HighwayLaw § 205 [1]; see Curtis v Townof Galway, 50 AD3d 1370, 1371 [2008]). The burden of demonstrating abandonmentrests with plaintiffs, as "it has long been settled that once a road becomes a public highway, 'it ispresumed to continue until it is shown to exist no longer' " (Curtis v Town of Galway, 50AD3d at 1371, quoting City of Cohoes v Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 134 NY 397,407 [1892]; see Matter of Smigel v Town of Rensselaerville, 283 AD2d 863, 864[2001]). While the Town does not consider the road to be a Town highway and has notmaintained it, "a municipality's intention regarding a road is irrelevant and its failure to maintaina road does not mean that the road ceases to be a highway" (Matter of Smigel v Town ofRensselaerville, 283 AD2d at 864 [citation omitted]; see Daetsch v Taber, 149AD2d 864, 865 [1989]). Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether travel on the road, whether byvehicle or on foot, continued to occur "in forms reasonably normal, along the lines of an existingstreet" (Town of Leray v New York Cent. R.R. Co., 226 NY 109, 113 [1919]; seeMatter of Smigel v Town of Rensselaerville, 283 AD2d at 865; Matter of Faigle vMacumber, 169 AD2d 914, 916 [1991]).

Photographs of the road show it to be in relatively good condition, and it would be [*3]readily accessible had plaintiffs not obstructed its path (seeMatter of Smigel v Town of Rensselaerville, 283 AD2d at 864-865). The road has beenrepaired or maintained by various individuals over the years to ensure that vehicles could use it,and the Town installed a culvert along it. It has also routinely carried both motorized andpedestrian traffic for logging, hiking, camping and hunting. Plaintiffs claim that the entrance tothe road was frequently blocked and attempted to minimize the use of the road as permissive.The frequency with which the road was actually blocked by a locked gate or cable, however, isopen to question. Indeed, plaintiffs' predecessor in title admitted that the gate was so rotted that itrepeatedly fell down of its own accord.[FN2]She further stated that individuals had used the road without her permission over the years,sometimes breaking the lock on the gate or cable to do so, that others could have used the roadwithout her knowledge given her occasional occupancy of the premises, and that she did nothingto physically prevent defendants from accessing their property despite her belief that they weretrespassing. Supreme Court thus appropriately determined that plaintiffs had failed to meet theirburden of showing that the road had been abandoned.

As the evidence established that the road was a public highway, we need not reach thevarious arguments advanced by the parties regarding the existence of a private easement over it.

Peters, Lahtinen, Kavanagh and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withcosts.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: A toll road or turnpike,privately owned or not, is a public highway if the general public has a right of passage over it(see Sun Print. & Publ. Assn. v Mayor of City of N.Y., 152 NY 257, 265-266 [1897];Fox v Union Turnpike Co., 59 App Div 363, 366-367 [1901]; see also People vCounty of Westchester, 282 NY 224, 228 [1940]).

Footnote 2: The actions of plaintiffs'predecessor in title are vital to their abandonment argument, as this action was commenced lessthan two months after they acquired the property.


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