| Matter of Singer v New York State & Local Employees' RetirementSys. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00055 [69 AD3d 1037] |
| January 7, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Renee Feldman Singer, Appellant, v New YorkState and Local Employees' Retirement System et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (William E. Storrs of counsel), forrespondents.
Stein, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McNamara, J.), entered October 30,2008 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, grantedrespondents' motion to dismiss the petition.
Petitioner was wrongfully denied membership in respondent New York State and LocalEmployees' Retirement System and her records were later lost, resulting in her being deprived ofan opportunity to "buy back" her time. An initial hearing was held in 2003 to determinepetitioner's status in the Retirement System but, for various reasons, the hearing was adjournedseveral times before it was finally held on January 8, 2008. Prior to the hearing on that date,petitioner's attorney submitted an affirmation of actual engagement (see 22 NYCRR125.1) and requested an adjournment. At the hearing—at which petitionerappeared—the Hearing Officer denied the request for an adjournment and granted theRetirement System's motion to dismiss the case based on petitioner's failure to proceed.Petitioner's attorney received the order of dismissal on February 4, 2008 and petitioner receiveda [*2]copy of the order on February 6, 2008.[FN*]On June 6, 2008, petitioner commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking reversal of theorder of dismissal. Supreme Court granted respondents' preanswer motion to dismiss theproceeding on the basis that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner now appealsand we affirm.
A party seeking to challenge an administrative determination must do so within four monthsof the decision becoming final and binding (see CPLR 217). Generally, the statute oflimitations begins to run when the party receives oral or written notice, or when the party knowsor should have known, of the adverse determination (see Matter of Biondo v New York StateBd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]; Matter of Feldman v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 14AD3d 769, 770 [2005]). However, where, as here, a party is represented by counsel, thestatute of limitations does not begin to run until the attorney receives the required notice in theproper form (see Matter of Bianca v Frank, 43 NY2d 168, 173 [1977]; Matter ofDoolittle v County of Broome, 276 AD2d 863, 865 [2000]).
In this case, the record reflects that petitioner clearly articulated, and all parties understood,that she was represented by counsel on January 8, 2008, notwithstanding the Hearing Officer'srefusal to adjourn the hearing on that date. In addition, petitioner unequivocally stated at thehearing that she wanted all documents emanating therefrom to be sent to her attorney. Thus, thestatute of limitations began to run when her counsel received the written order of dismissal onFebruary 4, 2008 (see Matter of Bianca v Frank, 43 NY2d at 173), more than fourmonths before she commenced this proceeding. Accordingly, Supreme Court properly grantedrespondents' motion to dismiss.
Petitioner's remaining contentions have been considered and are either academic orunavailing.
Peters, J.P., Rose, Malone Jr. and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote *: It is not clear from the recordbefore us whether this copy of the order was forwarded to petitioner by her attorney or by theRetirement System.