| People v Rivera |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01383 [70 AD3d 1177] |
| February 18, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alberto J.Rivera, Also Known as A.J. Rivera, Appellant. |
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Kavanagh, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (Jacon, J.),rendered March 23, 2007, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in thesecond degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession ofa weapon in the third degree (two counts).
Defendant was charged with causing the October 2005 death of the victim by shooting herafter she had been lured into an alleyway near where she was residing. According to the People,defendant committed this crime because he believed that the victim was an informant and hadtold the police that he and Charles Smith had recently set fire to a nearby building. Defendantwas subsequently charged by indictment with murder in the second degree, criminal possessionof a weapon in the second degree and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the thirddegree.[FN1]After a trial by jury, defendant was convicted as charged and was sentenced [*2]to an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life, plus various periodsof postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.
Initially, defendant takes issue with County Court's ruling on his Sandoval motionthat permitted the People to cross-examine him if he testified at trial regarding his participationin an insurance fraud scheme involving his mother's automobile. While a defendant may not, as ageneral rule, be cross-examined regarding unrelated criminal charges that are actually pending atthe time of trial (see People v Bennett, 79 NY2d 464, 468 [1992]; People v Betts,70 NY2d 289, 292 [1987]), here, defense counsel represented to the court that defendant hadentered into a cooperation agreement with law enforcement authorities and, as a result, wouldnot be prosecuted for any crimes that he may have committed in regard to that matter. Given thatrepresentation and the obvious relevance defendant's involvement in such a scheme would haveon his credibility as a witness, we do not agree that County Court abused its discretion byallowing him to be cross-examined regarding this matter if he elected to testify at trial (seePeople v Hayes, 97 NY2d 203, 207 [2002]; People v Lemke, 58 AD3d 1078,1078-1079 [2009]; People v Carter,50 AD3d 1318, 1322-1323 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 957 [2008]).
Next, defendant claims that County Court improperly denied challenges for cause that hemade to prospective jurors during voir dire. One challenge was made in regard to responsesprovided by prospective juror No. 227, after she was asked by defense counsel if it would bedifficult for her to arrive at a verdict if she heard only one side of the story. The juror initiallystated, "how could you be fair and impartial if you had no evidence to the contrary of what wasbeing presented," and then later during voir dire said, "Actually, I think it would make the jobquite easy." While defendant claims that these answers indicate that the juror would not be fair,each answer, when viewed in its proper context, represented an honest and appropriate responseto the question as asked and did not serve to establish that this particular juror had "a state ofmind that [was] likely to preclude [her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon theevidence adduced at the trial" (CPL 270.20 [1] [b]). We note that even defense counselrecognized that the questions as posed were somewhat problematic and the juror was notdeclaring that "she would require a defense" before she could vote to acquit defendant of thecharges contained in the indictment. When measured against other assurances given by the jurorthat she could be fair and there being no evidence in the record that she would not comply withthe court's legal instructions, we cannot conclude that, as a result of these statements, CountyCourt abused its discretion by denying defendant's challenge for cause (see People v Wilson, 52 AD3d941, 942 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 743 [2008]; People v Johnson, 40 AD3d 1011, 1012 [2007], lv denied9 NY3d 923 [2007]).
Similarly, we can find no abuse of discretion in County Court's denial of defendant'schallenge for cause to prospective juror No. 159, who acknowledged being previouslyprosecuted by the District Attorney's office for driving while intoxicated. Initially, we note thatsince the juror ultimately entered a guilty plea to these charges, any bias that might emanatefrom this [*3]prosecution would not appear, on the surface, to bedirected against defendant.[FN2]In addition, we cannot agree that such a remote prosecution occurring over 20 years agoinvolving personnel from the District Attorney's office not in any way connected to this trialserves to establish an implied bias on the part of the juror that "is likely to preclude [the juror]from rendering an impartial verdict" (CPL 270.20 [1] [c]; see People v Provenzano, 50NY2d 420, 424 [1980]; People v Culhane, 33 NY2d 90, 104 n 2 [1973]; see alsoPeople v Arnold, 96 NY2d 358, 362-364 [2001]).
Defendant also claims that County Court, by excluding his wife from the courtroom,deprived him of the right to a public trial. Considering that his wife was identified by defendantas a potential alibi witness and defense counsel never unequivocally represented that he wouldnot call her as a witness, County Court did not abuse its discretion by directing that she beexcluded from the courtroom during the trial (see People v Baker, 58 AD3d 1069,1070-1071 [2009], lv granted 12 NY3d 851 [2009]; People v Nevarez, 245AD2d 173 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 943 [1998]; compare People v Ortiz, 6 AD3d 731, 732 [2004]).[FN3]
Defendant also challenges various evidentiary rulings made by County Court during the trial.In particular, he argues that the court committed reversible error by allowing the City of TroyFire Chief to testify to the existence of a suspicious fire that occurred in a house near where thevictim was killed in the week prior to the shooting. Defendant argues that there was no credibleevidence linking him to this fire and any reference to it should have been excluded at trial.However, evidence was presented that defendant had made admissions to a third party that heand Smith had decided to murder the victim because they believed that she was cooperating withthe authorities in the investigation of a suspicious fire and feared that she would tell the policethat they were responsible. Even though, as defendant claims, no evidence was presentedimplicating him in the fire referred to by the Fire Chief in his trial testimony, the fact that anarson had been perpetrated at that time and place constituted compelling corroboration of thiswitness's testimony and provided support for the People's theory as to why defendant decided toattack the victim and ultimately kill her (compare People v Arafet, 13 NY3d 460, 465-468 [2009]; see People v Giles, 11 NY3d 495,498-500 [2008]).
Defendant also argues that County Court erred by not admitting into evidence prior writtenand oral statements made by Smith regarding what had occurred on the evening of the shooting.Smith, who was at the scene when police arrived minutes after the attack, essentially told thepolice that he and the victim were set upon by two black males with dreadlocks and that, duringthe attack, they shot her. Defendant offered these statements into evidence after it wasdetermined that Smith would not testify and, if called, would invoke his right againstself-incrimination (see People v Thomas, 51 NY2d 466, 472, 473 [1980]). While Smithwas clearly [*4]unavailable to testify based on his assertion of hisconstitutional right, his statements would only be admissible if they constituted admissionsagainst his penal interest (see People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154, 167 [1978]). Thesestatements, as attributed to Smith, do not in any way implicate him in the attack of the victim andcannot, when fairly viewed, be said to be at odds with his penal interest. As such, County Courtcorrectly found that they were not admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay (see People v Strong, 27 AD3d1010, 1013 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 763 [2006]). While we recognize that this rulein this context should not be rigidly applied, especially where the statement as offered " 'forms acritical part of the defense' " (People vOxley, 64 AD3d 1078, 1084 [2009], quoting People v Darrisaw, 206 AD2d 661,664 [1994]), Smith's recitation as to what transpired at the time of the attack was so dramaticallyinconsistent with other evidence introduced at trial as not to be credible (see People vSettles, 46 NY2d at 167; People v Strong, 27 AD3d at 1013). Therefore, CountyCourt did not err in refusing to admit these statements as offered by defendant into evidence.
Defendant also claims that County Court erred by allowing a witness to testify todischarging firearms with defendant on a prior occasion that was totally unrelated to the murderof the victim. While the relevance of this testimony is subject to question and, in our view, itshould not have been admitted into evidence at trial, we note that another prosecution witnessgave similar testimony for which there was no objection by defendant. Under the circumstances,and given that " 'the proof of . . . defendant's guilt, without reference to the error, isoverwhelming' " and there is no " 'significant probability . . . that the jury wouldhave acquitted . . . defendant had it not been for the error,' " we conclude that it wasnot reversible error to have admitted this testimony into evidence at trial (People vArafet, 13 NY3d at 467, quoting People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242[1975]).
Defendant also claims that County Court improperly allowed the People to elicit testimonyfrom a witness that suggested that defendant had, at the time of the shooting, been involved inthe illegal sale of drugs. In that regard, two sisters called by the People testified that, shortlybefore the shooting, they were in the alley with defendant when he pulled a gun from thewaistband of his trousers and displayed it to them. The witnesses, both of whom admitted tobeing addicted to crack cocaine, testified that defendant showed them the firearm as part of anoffer to help them if they ever had any problems while they were buying or selling drugs.Defendant argues that this testimony indirectly communicated to the jury that he was involved inthe illegal drug trade, and that he was therefore profoundly prejudiced by its admission intoevidence. However, testimony that defendant was at the scene of the crime armed with a firearmshortly before the shooting occurred, while prejudicial, is undoubtedly relevant in establishinghis identification as the victim's killer. In addition, a full explanation as to why defendant would,under the circumstances, display a handgun to these witnesses was necessary to put theirtestimony in its proper context (seePeople v Resek, 3 NY3d 385, 389 [2004]; People v Till, 87 NY2d 835, 837[1995]; People v Williams, 28AD3d 1005, 1008 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 819 [2006]; People v Tarver, 2 AD3d 968, 969[2003]).
We do, however, agree with defendant that manslaughter in the second degree, on the factspresented, represented a reasonable view of the evidence introduced at trial and that CountyCourt erred by refusing his request that it be submitted to the jury as a lesser included offense tothe charge of murder in the second degree. It is now well established that, even thoughmanslaughter in the second degree requires proof that a defendant acted recklessly, it is a lesserincluded offense to an intentional murder (see Penal Law § 125.15 [2]; §125.25 [1]; People v Sullivan, 68 NY2d 495, 501 [1986]; People v Boyd, 60 AD3d 779, 780[2009], lv denied 12 [*5]NY3d 913 [2009]). As such, theissue presented is whether, on the evidence introduced at trial, it would have been reasonable forthe jury to conclude that defendant, at the time he discharged the weapon, acted recklessly asopposed to intentionally in causing the victim's death (see Penal Law § 15.05 [3];People v Boyd, 60 AD3d at 780).
While there is ample proof in the record to support the jury's conclusion that defendantintended to kill the victim when he shot her, evidence also exists that supports a finding that, atthe time defendant discharged the firearm, he did not deliberately intend to shoot the victim, butrather was acting recklessly in causing her death. In particular, evidence was presented thatdefendant had consumed alcohol on the night of the shooting and may have been intoxicatedwhen he confronted the victim in the alley.[FN4]In addition, a witness who lived in the area recalled talking to defendant about the shootingshortly after it had occurred and being told by defendant " '[i]t wasn't supposed to happen likethat, I was just supposed to scare her.' " Moreover, forensic evidence established that seven shotswere fired at close range during the attack, but only one—an apparentricochet—actually struck the victim. The remaining rounds were scattered throughout thevehicle and it was never conclusively established at trial that the victim was in the vehicle at thetime she was shot.
Shooting a victim at close range may be deemed reckless rather than intentional, especially ifthe " 'shooting itself appeared to have been sudden, spontaneous and not well-designed to causeimminent death' " (People v Baptiste, 306 AD2d 562, 564 [2003], lv denied 1NY3d 594 [2004], quoting People v Sanchez, 98 NY2d 373, 377 [2002]). Given that a"refusal to charge a lesser included crime is warranted only where every possible hypothesis butguilty of the higher crime [is] excluded" (People v Johnson, 45 NY2d 546, 549 [1978][internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Caruso, 6 AD3d 980, 983 [2004], lv denied 3NY3d 704 [2004]), we cannot conclude that the jury could not have found that defendant actedrecklessly at the time he fired the shot that resulted in the victim's death. Therefore, in our view,manslaughter in the second degree represented a reasonable view of the credible evidenceintroduced at trial and should have been submitted to the jury as a lesser included offense to thecharge of murder in the second degree (see People v Ryan, 55 AD3d 960, 963 [2008]; People v Richard, 30 AD3d 750,756 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 869 [2006]). As a result, defendant's conviction of murderin the second degree is reversed and a new trial is ordered on that charge.
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Malone Jr. and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment ismodified, on the law, by reversing defendant's conviction of murder in the second degree undercount one of the indictment and vacating the sentence imposed thereon; matter remitted to theCounty Court of Rensselaer County for a new trial on said count; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Footnote 1: Derrick Rosa was also chargedin the same indictment with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and relatedcrimes for having obtained the gun that defendant used to kill the victim. He eventually pleadedguilty to attempted criminal sale of a firearm and was sentenced to time served and five years ofprobation.
Footnote 2: We also observe that, duringvoir dire, defendant had refused to consent to individuals who had felony charges pending inRensselaer County or who had been recently prosecuted by the Rensselaer County DistrictAttorney's office being excused from jury service.
Footnote 3: Defendant's wife was also listedby the People as a witness, but the People stated at the outset of the trial that she would not becalled as a prosecution witness.
Footnote 4: While the People argue thatdefendant failed to preserve this claim, we disagree. Defendant specifically requested that thejury be given the option of considering manslaughter in the second degree as a lesser includedoffense to the murder charge and this request, as made, serves to preserve this issue for ourreview (see CPL 470.05 [2]).