| Matter of Melber v New York State Educ. Dept. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01723 [71 AD3d 1216] |
| March 4, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Joseph Melber et al., Appellants, v New YorkState Education Department et al., Respondents. |
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Mercure, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Donohue, J.), enteredNovember 26, 2008 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioners' application, in a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, to, among other things, review a determination of respondentDepartment of Education denying petitioner Joseph Melber's request to withdraw his resignationfrom his former position.
Petitioner Joseph Melber was employed by respondent Department of Education (hereinafterrespondent). On October 31, 2007, Melber became upset and left work early after concerns wereexpressed as to his mental health. He sent an e-mail to his supervisor a few hours later in whichhe resigned his position, effective November 1, 2007. Melber sought to withdraw his resignationon November 2, 2007, minutes after respondent had accepted it. Respondent denied that requestand Melber filed a grievance, alleging that his resignation was invalid under the terms of theapplicable collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter CBA). The grievance ultimatelyproceeded to arbitration and resulted in an award holding that Melber's resignation was validunder the terms of the CBA and applicable regulations.
While the grievance process was ongoing, petitioners also commenced this CPLR [*2]article 78 proceeding, alleging that respondent's acceptance of, andsubsequent refusal to permit Melber to rescind, the resignation were arbitrary and capricious.Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that petitioners were precluded from raisingissues already decided by the arbitrator, and petitioners now appeal.
Petitioners concede that they cannot relitigate the issues regarding the CBA and applicableregulations resolved by the arbitrator; they do argue, however, that Supreme Court erred inholding that their other arguments were barred by the arbitration award. Inasmuch as thosearguments were not before the arbitrator and, in fact, were beyond the scope of his authorityunder the terms of the CBA, we agree (see Rembrandt Indus. v Hodges Intl., 38 NY2d502, 504 [1976]; North Shore-Long Is.Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v Aetna US Healthcare, Inc., 27 AD3d 439, 440-441 [2006];Corcoran v Corcoran, 114 AD2d 881, 881 [1985], lv denied 67 NY2d 601[1986]). The record adequately allows us to determine the merits of petitioners' remainingclaims, however, and we will do so in the interest of judicial economy (see Matter of Williams v Travis, 20AD3d 622, 623 [2005]).
First, petitioners contend that respondent improperly accepted Melber's resignation givenlanguage in its employee handbook stating that "[t]he use of electronic mail is not an acceptablemethod of notification [of a resignation] unless a hard copy, signed by the employee is alsoreceived."[FN*]In order for this language to effectively limit respondent's ability to accept Melber's resignation,however, petitioners were obliged to "demonstrate reliance upon [the employee handbook's]terms and resulting detriment" (Rajagopalan v Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 2 AD3d 232 [2003]; seeMatter of De Petris v Union Settlement Assn., 86 NY2d 406, 410 [1995]). Petitioners failedto make such a showing here, inasmuch as the record is devoid of proof that Melber was awareof this policy at the time that he submitted his resignation. In any event, Melber refused tocomply with it, stating in his resignation that he would not return to the building and that thee-mail message would "have to serve as [his] official letter." Nor did Melber rely upon the policywhen he sought to withdraw his resignation, admitting in an e-mail that respondent had "everyright to say no" to his request and that he was "prepared for the consequences of" his decision toresign.
Petitioners further assert that respondent should not have accepted Melber's resignationgiven the questions regarding his mental health. Melber is presumed to have been competent atthe time he resigned and the burden rests on petitioners, as the parties arguing to the contrary, toprove otherwise (see Sears v FirstPioneer Farm Credit, ACA, 46 AD3d 1282, 1284-1285 [2007]; Matter of Boucher vRegan, 88 AD2d 1066, 1066 [1982]; see also Civil Service Law § 72 [1]).While Melber was upset at the time he tendered his resignation, petitioners provide no evidenceto show that he could not understand the consequences of his actions (see Sears v FirstPioneer Farm Credit, ACA, 46 AD3d at 1284-1285). In any event, respondent did notprocess Melber's resignation until his welfare had been confirmed, and its decision to accept theresignation was a [*3]rational one.
Nor did respondent, as petitioners argue, improperly reject Melber's request to rescind hisresignation. Respondent's decision in that regard is a discretionary one that will be disturbed onlyif it constituted an abuse of discretion or was otherwise arbitrary or capricious (see 4NYCRR 5.3 [c]; Matter of Pishotti vNew York State Thruway Auth., 38 AD3d 1122, 1123 [2007]; Matter of Martinez vState Univ. of N.Y., 294 AD2d 650, 650 [2002]). Given Melber's prior conflicts with hiscoworkers and his admissions to them that he had contemplated harming his wife, himself andothers, we cannot say that such an abuse occurred here.
Spain, Malone Jr., Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote *: Although issues regardingMelber's resignation, as opposed to respondent's refusal to permit him to rescind it, wouldordinarily be beyond our review (see Matter of Quaranta v Jacobson, 250 AD2d 544,545 [1998]), exceptions exist where, as here, the resignation was allegedly ineffective andinvoluntary (see e.g. Matter of Petrella v Siegel, 73 NY2d 846, 849 [1988]; Matter ofSmith v Ravitch, 121 AD2d 639, 640 [1986]).