| Matter of Shannon v Village of Rouses Point Zoning Bd. ofAppeals |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 02708 [72 AD3d 1175] |
| April 1, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of William Shannon et al., Appellants, v Village ofRouses Point Zoning Board of Appeals et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Stafford, Piller, Murnane, Plimpton, Kelleher & Trombley, Plattsburgh (Thomas M.Murnane of counsel), for Village of Rouses Point Zoning Board of Appeals, respondent. O'Connell & Aronowitz, Plattsburgh (Dean C. Schneller of counsel), for Montgomery PostNo. 912, Inc., American Legion, respondent.
McCarthy, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ryan, J.), entered August 6,2009 in Clinton County, which dismissed petitioners' application, in a combined proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to review determinations ofrespondent Village of Rouses Point Zoning Board of Appeals granting certain variances andother relief to respondent Montgomery Post No. 912, Inc., American Legion, Rouses Point, NewYork.
Respondent Montgomery Post No. 912, Inc., American Legion, Rouses Point, New York(hereinafter respondent) owns real property in the Village of Rouses Point, Clinton County. Theparcel is comprised of two portions: one that fronts Pratt Street, lies in a commercial zoningdistrict and is improved by respondent's current facilities, and a smaller portion that fronts StateStreet and lies in a residential zoning district. Petitioners own residential property adjacent torespondent's property. Respondent desired to extend its facilities onto the State Street portion ofits property, but membership clubs are not permitted to operate in residential zoning districts.[*2]
In 2007, respondent applied to respondent Village ofRouses Point Zoning Board of Appeals for several variances and relief pursuant to Village ofRouses Point Zoning Law § 120-8. That ordinance provides: "If a lot lies in two or moreland use districts, each portion of the lot shall be governed by the regulations of the district inwhich it lies. Upon special authorization of [the Zoning Board] and after a public hearing, theprovisions of the less restricted portion of the lot may be extended up to 30 feet into the morerestricted portion. An extension of more than 30 feet shall require a variance or mapamendment." The Zoning Board denied respondent's application seeking to extend respondent'sfacilities 36 feet into the residential district.
In 2008, respondent made a similar application seeking to extend its facilities onlyapproximately 28 feet into the residential district. The Zoning Board granted the requested reliefunder Village of Rouses Point Zoning Law § 120-8, granted several variances and adopteda negative declaration of environmental significance under the State Environmental QualityReview Act (see ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]). Petitioners commenced this combinedproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment to challenge theZoning Board's determination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition/complaint, promptingpetitioners' appeal.
Respondent was not entitled to relief under Village of Rouses Point Zoning Law §120-8. That ordinance applies to a single "lot [that] lies in two or more land use districts." Thezoning law defines "lot" as "[a]ny parcel of land which individually or as part of a subdivision ofland has been recorded in the County Clerk's office" (Village of Rouses Point Zoning Law§ 120-41 [B]). While courts generally accord deference to a zoning board's interpretationof a local ordinance, deference is not required when reviewing a pure legal interpretation ofterms in an ordinance (see Matter of Raritan Dev. Corp. v Silva, 91 NY2d 98, 102-103[1997]; Matter of Mack v Board ofAppeals, Town of Homer, 25 AD3d 977, 980 [2006]). Under the plain language of theordinance, respondent's property did not qualify as one lot. Although listed as one parcel on a taxmap, the commercial portion and residential portion were separately deeded to respondent asseparate lots.[FN*]There is no proof that respondent's parcel is recorded, as one piece of property, in the CountyClerk's office. Hence, respondent's property is composed of two lots. Under the ordinance, whichonly applies to a single lot, the Zoning Board could not grant respondent the requested extension.
Further, the minimal information in the record concerning the Zoning Board's SEQRAdetermination fails to establish that the Zoning Board took the required "hard look" at any areasof environmental concern or "made a 'reasoned elaboration' of the basis for its determination"(Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v PlanningBd. of Town of Southeast, 9 NY3d 219, 231-232 [2007], quoting Matter of Jacksonv New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 417 [1986]). We therefore must reverseSupreme Court's judgment and annul the Zoning Board's determinations.[*3]
Cardona, P.J., Peters, Kavanagh and Egan Jr., JJ., concur.Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs, petition granted, determinationsof respondent Village of Rouses Point Zoning Board of Appeals annulled, and it is declared thatVillage of Rouses Point Zoning Law § 120-8 is inapplicable to the two lots owned byrespondent Montgomery Post No. 912, Inc., American Legion, Rouses Point, New York.
Footnote *: Although the deeds were notproperly part of the record on appeal because they were not before the Zoning Board, the surveymap attached to respondent's application listed two reference deeds that conveyed property torespondent. Other record information shows that respondent has operated its facilities in thecommercial zone for years, but only recently acquired the residential portion of its property.