| Matter of Clifton ZZ. (Latrice ZZ.) |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 05826 [75 AD3d 683] |
| July 1, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Clifton ZZ. and Another, Permanently NeglectedChildren. Schenectady County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Latrice ZZ.,Appellant. |
—[*1] Kevin A. Burke, Schenectady County Department of Social Services, Schenectady, forrespondent. Diane Herrmann, Schenectady, attorney for the children.
Peters, J.P. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Schenectady County (Assini, J.),entered July 10, 2009, which, among other things, granted petitioner's application, in aproceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, to revoke a suspended judgment, andterminated respondent's parental rights.
Respondent is the mother of Clifton ZZ. (born in 1999) and Sone ZZ. (born in2000),[FN1]both of whom were placed in petitioner's care in 2002. In November 2007, respondent admitted[*2]to permanently neglecting the children, in that she had beenincarcerated on at least three occasions since the children were placed with petitioner. FamilyCourt issued a six-month suspended judgment and informed respondent that her failure tocomply with the conditions of that judgment could result in an order terminating her parentalrights. Prior to its expiration, petitioner moved to extend the suspended judgment and, later, torevoke it and terminate respondent's parental rights, alleging that respondent had violated certainconditions of the judgment. After a trial, Family Court found that respondent had failed tocomply with many of the mandated terms and conditions of the suspended judgment, grantedpetitioner's motion to revoke the suspended judgment and terminated respondent's parentalrights.[FN2]Respondent now appeals, and we affirm.
The purpose of a suspended judgment is to provide a parent who has been found to havepermanently neglected his or her child with "a brief grace period within which to become a fitparent with whom the child can be safely reunited" (Matter of Elias QQ. [Stephanie QQ.], 72 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2010][internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Gracie YY., 34 AD3d 1053, 1054 [2006]). Duringthis grace period, the parent must comply with the terms of the suspended judgment (seeMatter of Elias QQ. [Stephanie QQ.], 72 AD3d at 1166) and, if a preponderance of theevidence establishes the parent's noncompliance, Family Court may revoke the judgment andterminate that party's parental rights (see Matter of Leala T., 55 AD3d 997, 998 [2008]; Matter of Edward GG., 35 AD3d1144, 1144-1145 [2006]). We defer to a court's findings on these matters so long as theyhave a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Elias QQ. [StephanieQQ.], 72 AD3d at 1166).
Family Court's determination that respondent violated the terms and conditions of thesuspended judgment is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The judgment required,among other things, that respondent maintain a safe and stable residence, meet with all serviceproviders regularly as directed, attend all of the children's medical appointments, attend allvisitation with the children, attend to the children's medical needs during visitation and notifypetitioner immediately upon any change of address. During the final weeks of the originalsix-month period of suspension—which lasted from November 2007 until May2008—respondent, whose sole source of income at that time was public assistance,experienced problems affording her apartment. As a result, she shortened a double overnightvisit with the children because she believed that she would have to move and cancelled thefollowing two overnight visits to shop, unpack and gather money for rent. She also failed toattend a mental health appointment for Clifton, who is autistic, was late to three mandatorymeetings, failed to attend one meeting and, during an overnight visit, failed to give the childrentheir prescribed medications.
We reject respondent's argument that Family Court should have extended the suspendedjudgment for an additional period because she substantially complied with its conditions duringthe initial term. The initial period of suspension was tolled by petitioner's motion to extend theperiod of suspension (see Family Ct Act § 633 [e]). Even given this additionaltime to establish her fitness as a parent, respondent increasingly failed to comply with thesuspended judgment. Respondent moved five times—once as a result of aneviction—between July 2008 and the time of the trial and notified petitioner of her changeof residence only once. Respondent also permitted the father of her youngest child to move backin with her despite a prior incident of [*3]domestic violencebetween them. In addition, during the extended period of the suspended judgment, respondentcancelled numerous visits with her children, missed at least 10 of the children's medical andtherapy appointments and missed a number of scheduled appointments with her serviceproviders. Although respondent provided excuses for her failure to comply, including that theconditions were too onerous and that petitioner thwarted her efforts to comply, respondent didnot request a modification of the terms and conditions of the suspended judgment. Moreover,many of respondent's violations were wholly unjustified and demonstrate her inability to put herchildren's needs before her own. Thus, we find a sound and substantial basis for Family Court'sfinding that respondent violated the terms and conditions of the suspended judgment (seeMatter of Leala T., 55 AD3d at 998; Matter of Gracie YY., 34 AD3d at 1055-1056).
We also find sufficient support in the record for Family Court's conclusion that it was in thebest interests of the children to terminate respondent's parental rights. The children have been infoster care for most of their young lives and are residing in preadoptive homes. Respondent'sfailure to comply with the terms and conditions of the suspended judgment does not compel thetermination of her parental rights, but is strong evidence that termination is, in fact, in the bestinterests of the children (see Matter of Amber AA., 301 AD2d 694, 697 [2003]).Although by the last day of trial respondent had obtained employment and was making efforts tosecure permanent housing, given her inability to comply with the terms and conditions of thesuspended judgment, even after the six-month grace period was extended and despite laudableefforts by petitioner, it was unlikely that she would be able to show that she was a fit parent whocould meet the children's needs and provide them with a stable home if given an additional graceperiod. Under these circumstances, we decline to disturb Family Court's determination thattermination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of the children (seeMatter of Elias QQ. [Stephanie QQ.], 72 AD3d at 1167; Matter of Jayde M., 36 AD3d 1168, 1170 [2007], lvsdenied 8 NY3d 809 [2007]; compare Matter of Audrey I., 57 AD3d 1172, 1175 [2008], lvdenied 12 NY3d 704 [2009]).[FN3]
We have considered respondent's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Rose, Malone Jr., Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote 1: Respondent also has a youngerdaughter who is not a subject of this proceeding.
Footnote 2: Family Court dismissed as mootpetitioner's motion to extend the suspended judgment.
Footnote 3: We also reject respondent'scontention that Family Court erred by failing to conduct further fact-finding to determinewhether extending the suspended judgment—rather than terminating her parentalrights—would be in the best interests of the children (see Matter of Darren V., 61 AD3d 986, 988 [2009], lvsdenied 12 NY3d 715 [2009]).