| Matter of Sweet v Sweet |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 05854 [75 AD3d 744] |
| July 1, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Joann Sweet, Respondent, v Daniel B. Sweet,Appellant. |
—[*1] James A. Carlucci, Hudson, for respondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Columbia County (Pulver, Jr., J.),entered August 3, 2009, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toFamily Ct Act article 4, to direct respondent to pay spousal support.
Petitioner and respondent were married in 1978 and are the parents of one adult son.Respondent left the marital residence in August 2007. He returned briefly in October 2007 butleft again in January 2008. Petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding seeking spousalsupport. Following a hearing at which both parties testified, the Support Magistrate rendered anaward of support. Respondent filed certain objections and, in April 2009, Family Court remittedthe matter to the Support Magistrate for recalculation. The Support Magistrate then rendered areduced award, and both parties filed objections. Family Court denied the objections andaffirmed the order in August 2009. Respondent appeals.
In its April 2009 order, Family Court found that the Support Magistrate had made somecomputational errors in determining petitioner's income, and remitted with specific directions forfurther calculations. The Support Magistrate initially performed these calculations, but rejectedthe results, and thereafter engaged in further computations leading to the revised award.Respondent contends that the Support Magistrate misinterpreted Family Court's directions,arguing that a correct calculation would [*2]have resulted in asignificantly lower award. We find respondent's argument regarding the recalculation wellfounded. Nonetheless, in consideration of the circumstances presented, we do not find reductionof the spousal support award appropriate.
Family Ct Act § 412 provides: "A married person is chargeable with the support of hisor her spouse and, if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means, may be requiredto pay for his or her support a fair and reasonable sum, as the court may determine, having dueregard to the circumstances of the respective parties." Such an award is to be based upon "adelicate balancing of each party's needs and means . . . and is dependent upon all ofthe circumstances, including . . . [respondent's] means, the duration of the marriage,and the needs and ability of [petitioner] to support . . . herself" (Matter of Fuller v Fuller, 11 AD3d775, 777 [2004] [internal quotation marks, citations and brackets omitted]; see Matter ofShreffler v Shreffler, 283 AD2d 679, 680-681 [2001]; see also Domestic RelationsLaw § 236 [B] [6] [a]; Matter ofYarinsky v Yarinsky, 36 AD3d 1135, 1139-1140 [2007]).[FN*]
Determination of an award of spousal support under Family Ct Act § 412 is notformulaic; instead, "[e]ach case presents unique circumstances that must be balanced to reach anequitable result" (Matter of Manzano vManzano, 2 AD3d 1168, 1169 [2003]). As noted by the Support Magistrate, this matterinvolves a marriage of long duration in which respondent has always acted as the primarybreadwinner and earned considerably more than petitioner, and can be expected to continue to doso in the future. This income disparity is properly taken into account in fashioning a spousalsupport award (see Matter of Shreffler v Shreffler, 283 AD2d at 680; Matter of Stoltzv Stoltz, 257 AD2d 719, 720 [1999]). Moreover, although petitioner's current earnings aresignificantly lower than in her previous employment, she left her prior employment for healthreasons and with respondent's agreement. She testified that her previous position is no longeravailable to her and that, as a result of economic conditions, her current earnings have beenconsiderably lower than either party had anticipated. While her potential earning capacity isamong the factors to be taken into account (see Matter of Burke v White, 126 AD2d 838,840 [1987]), nothing in the record suggests that she is likely to return to her previous earningcapacity in the near future given her age, health, education, and employment background.
Although respondent argues that the amount of support awarded is excessive, such an awardneed not be limited to the amount required to cover basic expenses (see Matter of Stoltz vStoltz, 257 AD2d at 720). Instead, the parties' prior standard of living is properly considered(see Matter of Yarinsky v Yarinsky, 36 AD3d at 1140). In this regard, petitioner testifiedthat she and respondent previously enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle in which his income wasmore than sufficient to cover living expenses, leaving her earnings available for vacations andother discretionary expenditures. Further, the record reveals that the sum awarded is well withinrespondent's means and capacity to pay (see Family Ct Act § 412; Matter ofLiebman v Liebman, 229 AD2d 778, 780 [1996]).[*3]
This Court's authority to render the appropriate judgmentis as broad as that of the trial court (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. vTown of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; McAuliffe v McAuliffe, 70 AD3d 1129, 1135 [2010]). Applyingthe appropriate standards and taking all the circumstances into account (see Matter ofYarinsky v Yarinsky, 36 AD3d at 1140), we find the amount of spousal support awarded bythe Support Magistrate and affirmed by Family Court was "fair and reasonable" (Family Ct Act§ 412) and need not be disturbed.
Spain, J.P., Lahtinen, Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote *: The factors established in theDomestic Relations Law relative to maintenance may be considered in an application under theFamily Court Act, though such analysis need not specifically address each statutory factor(see Matter of Burke v White, 126 AD2d 838, 839 [1987]).