| Matter of Giblin v Village of Johnson City |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 06133 [75 AD3d 887] |
| July 15, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of William Giblin et al., Respondents, v Village ofJohnson City, Appellant. |
—[*1] Hinman, Howard & Kattell, L.L.P., Binghamton (Paul T. Sheppard of counsel), forrespondents.
McCarthy, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Lebous, J.), entered October6, 2009 in Broome County, which granted petitioner's application, in a combined proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to annul a determination ofrespondent denying health insurance benefits to petitioner Patricia Giblin, and (2) from thejudgment entered thereon.
Petitioner William Giblin (hereinafter petitioner) was employed by respondent as afirefighter. When he retired, he received family coverage health insurance benefits for himselfand his then-wife pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter CBA) in effectbetween respondent and petitioner's firefighters' union. The relevant provision of the CBAprovided that "[a]ll present retirees of the Fire Department and all members who retire in thefuture shall continue to receive Blue Cross, Blue Shield Major Medical Insurance coverage forthemselves and their dependents (or comparable coverage as may then be in effect)." OnFebruary 26, 2009, petitioner and his ex-wife were divorced. Coverage for the ex-wifeautomatically terminated upon divorce and respondent terminated petitioner's family healthinsurance plan, switching him to an individual coverage plan. On March 15, 2009, petitionermarried petitioner Patricia Giblin (hereinafter Giblin). When petitioners requested that Giblin beenrolled in respondent's health insurance plan as petitioner's dependent, respondent informed[*2]them that petitioner no longer had family coverage and wasnot entitled to change his plan to family coverage.
Petitioners commenced this combined action and CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking,among other things, to annul respondent's determination and a declaration that respondent wasrequired to provide health insurance coverage to Giblin. Supreme Court, considering only theseportions of the action and proceeding, annulled respondent's denial of petitioners' request anddirected respondent to extend health insurance benefits to Giblin. Respondent appeals from theorder and judgment entered thereon.[FN*]
Although petitioners are challenging an action by a municipality, because they are seekingdamages flowing from a breach of contract, "the claim must be resolved through the applicationof traditional rules of contract law" rather than under CPLR article 78 (Abiele Contr. v NewYork City School Constr. Auth., 91 NY2d 1, 8 [1997]; see Matter of Gooshaw v City of Ogdensburg, 67 AD3d 1288,1289 [2009]; Sims v State of NewYork, 30 AD3d 949, 949-950 [2006]). Therefore, the petition should have beendismissed and petitioners were entitled to a declaration under the declaratory judgment portionof the action.
Respondent breached its contractual obligation to provide health insurance benefits toGiblin. "When parties set forth an agreement in a clear and unambiguous document, that writingshould be read as a whole and enforced according to its terms" (Baldo v Patton, 65 AD3d 765,766 [2009] [citations omitted]). The CBA here is clear and there is no need to resort to extrinsicevidence, including the insurance certificate and respondent's past practices regarding otherretirees, to interpret the meaning of that contract (see Matter of Bower v Board of Educ., Cazenovia Cent. School Dist.,53 AD3d 967, 969 [2008], lv dismissed 11 NY3d 837 [2008]; Odorizzi v OtsegoN. Catskills Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 307 AD2d 490, 492 [2003]).
The CBA states that petitioner, as a retiree, "shall continue to receive" health insurancecoverage for himself and his dependents. Although respondent relies heavily on the word"continue," when the whole sentence is read in context it says that insurance coverage willcontinue for retirees and their dependents, not that retirees will continue to receive the same typeof coverage (family or individual). Nothing in the agreement freezes benefits so as to limitcoverage to people who are dependents of a retiree at the time of retirement (see Matter ofBower v Board of Educ., Cazenovia Cent. School Dist., 53 AD3d at 969; compareOdorizzi v Otsego N. Catskills Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 307 AD2d at 491-492). Nor doesthe agreement specifically prohibit retirees from changing their enrollment from individual tofamily coverage or vice versa. While petitioner's ex-wife was no longer eligible for coverage atthe time of their divorce, petitioner did not request a change to individual coverage and, when heremarried, he merely desired to continue receiving family coverage as he had at the time of hisretirement. Based upon the plain language of the CBA, petitioners were entitled to a declarationthat respondent must provide health insurance benefits to Giblin.
Cardona, P.J., Rose, Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order and judgment aremodified, on the law and the facts, without [*3]costs, bydismissing the CPLR article 78 petition and declaring that respondent must provide healthinsurance benefits to petitioner Patricia Giblin pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement;and, as so modified, affirmed. [Prior Case History: 25 Misc 3d 1210(A), 2009 NY Slip Op52024(U).]
Footnote *: Although the notice of appealfrom the judgment appears to have been filed prematurely, this Court may treat the notice asvalid (see CPLR 5520 [c]).