Habib v Habib
2010 NY Slip Op 07441 [77 AD3d 1103]
October 21, 2010
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 15, 2010


Helayne Habib, Respondent, v Gerald Habib,Appellant.

—[*1]Seligman & Seligman, Kingston (Delice Seligman of counsel), for appellant.

Law Office of Stephen Franzman, Kingston (Stephen Franzman of counsel), forrespondent.

Cardona, P.J. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Work, J.), enteredSeptember 18, 2009 in Ulster County, upon a decision of the court in favor of plaintiff, and (2)from a judgment of said court, entered December 17, 2009 in Ulster County, which grantedplaintiff's motion for a supplemental counsel fee award.

Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1987 and have two children (born in 1987 and 1991).In 2005, the parties entered into a separation agreement. Thereafter, plaintiff commenced thisaction in 2008 to enforce certain provisions of the separation agreement, alleging that defendantfailed to make the required maintenance and child support payments, failed to pay his share ofthe children's unreimbursed healthcare expenses, refused to cooperate in the sale of the maritalhome and did not execute and maintain a will or purchase an annuity in accordance with theagreement. Plaintiff, among other things, sought a money judgment and counsel fees. Defendantanswered and counterclaimed seeking a downward modification of his child support andmaintenance obligations, as well as a judgment of divorce.

Following a trial, Supreme Court found, among other things, that defendant was in arrearswith respect to his maintenance obligation but that he was entitled to a downward modificationof his support obligations retroactive to March 31, 2008, the date that defendant filed his answerand counterclaim. The court issued a judgment for $18,100 in maintenance arrears for the periodprior to the modification date. The court also denied defendant's [*2]application for a judgment of divorce given his breach of variousprovisions of the separation agreement and awarded plaintiff counsel fees for legal servicesincurred to enforce the agreement. Thereafter, a separate judgment to that effect was entered.These appeals ensued.

Initially, inasmuch as the terms of the separation agreement did not address the issue ofretroactivity with regard to a modification of support and/or maintenance obligations,[FN*]we find no error in Supreme Court's determination that the effective date of the downwardmodification was March 31, 2008—the date that defendant filed his answer and interposeda counterclaim seeking such modification (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][9] [b]; Colyer v Colyer, 26 AD3d303, 304 [2006]). Contrary to defendant's contention, neither the 2007 modification petitionhe filed in Family Court (which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction) nor his2007 divorce action seeking a downward modification (which summons and complaint wasnever served on plaintiff) provide good cause warranting adjustment of the arrears date (seee.g. Hawley v Hawley, 247 AD2d 806, 808 [1998]; Lloyd v Lloyd, 226 AD2d 816,818 [1996]).

Furthermore, Supreme Court properly denied defendant's request for a divorce. A party isentitled to a conversion divorce when the parties have lived separate and apart for more than oneyear pursuant to a separation agreement and the party seeking the divorce has substantiallycomplied with the terms of the agreement (see Domestic Relations Law § 170 [6];Berman v Berman, 72 AD2d 425, 428-429 [1980], affd 52 NY2d 723 [1980]).Here, notwithstanding defendant's proffered reasons for maintenance arrears, the recorddemonstrates that he did not comply with other provisions of the agreement, including paymentof his share of unreimbursed medical expenses, execution of a will with specific bequests andpurchase of an annuity.

Finally, we are unpersuaded by defendant's contention that Supreme Court abused itsdiscretion in granting plaintiff counsel fees. The separation agreement expressly provides for therecovery of "any and all costs, expenses and attorney fees resulting from or made necessary bythe bringing of any suit or other proceeding to enforce any of the terms or conditions of [the]agreement." Inasmuch as the record clearly establishes that defendant defaulted on variousprovisions contained in the separation agreement, the award of counsel fees was appropriate (see Matter of Milark v Meigher, 56AD3d 1018, 1021 [2008]).

Mercure, Spain, Lahtinen and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgments are affirmed,without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote *: With respect to modifications ofchild support and maintenance, the separation agreement stated that "[n]o such modification shallbe deemed to be in effect, regardless of grounds, except by court order or written agreementsigned by both parties."


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