UBS Sec. LLC v Red Zone LLC
2010 NY Slip Op 07668 [77 AD3d 575]
October 28, 2010
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 15, 2010


UBS Securities LLC, Appellant-Respondent,
v
Red Zone LLC,Respondent-Appellant.

—[*1]O'Melveny & Myers LLP, New York (Daniel L. Cantor of counsel), forappellant-respondent.

Quinn Emmanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, New York (Robert L. Raskopf of counsel), forrespondent-appellant.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara R. Kapnick, J.), entered January 5, 2010,which denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on its first cause of action, unanimouslyreversed, on the law, with costs, the motion granted, and the matter remanded for further proceedings,including the calculation of expenses payable under the parties' agreement and interest. Cross appealfrom same order, to the extent it denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint, unanimously dismissed, without costs, for failure to perfect in the proper manner.

This appeal calls for the interpretation of an agreement by which plaintiff UBS, an investment bank,was engaged to act as the exclusive financial advisor to defendant Red Zone in the latter's effort toacquire control of Six Flags, Inc., a Delaware corporation. In 2004, Red Zone purchasedapproximately 8.76% of Six Flags' voting stock for $34.5 million. Daniel Snyder, Red Zone's managingmember, believed Six Flags was operated poorly, and that his experience with other enterprises gavehim insight into improving the company's performance. Accordingly, in September 2004, Snyder andDavid Pauken, another Red Zone member, met with Six Flags' nonmanagement directors to presentideas for managerial and operational changes. At the meeting, Red Zone asserted that Six Flags should(1) appoint Snyder and two other nominees to its seven-person board of directors, (2) name Snyder asSix Flags' chair, (3) permit Snyder to select a CEO with marketing expertise and (4) adopt certainoperational changes modeled on those Snyder had successfully employed as the chair and principalowner of a major sports franchise. Six Flags' directors, however, rejected all of these proposals forimproving the business. Following the directors' rejection and some disappointing financial results, RedZone decided to end its investment in Six Flags. The company's low stock price and trading volume,however, made it impossible for Red Zone to dispose of its sizeable stake in Six Flags on favorableterms. As a result, Red Zone decided to explore its own ways of fixing Six Flags.

In April 2005, Red Zone met with UBS to discuss its Six Flags investment. The parties consideredseveral options, including seeking to influence Six Flags' board to take steps to maximize stock value,seeking Red Zone's representation on the board, or encouraging a sale of [*2]assets or a business combination such as Red Zone's acquisition of SixFlags. In May 2005, Snyder told Andrew Sriubas, a UBS managing director, that Red Zone "wouldlike to control the board." On June 7, 2005, the parties entered into the advisory agreement that is thesubject of this action.

The agreement designated UBS as Red Zone's exclusive financial and capital markets advisor inconnection with a potential Six Flags "acquisition transaction," which provided for Red Zone's paymentof UBS's expenses in addition to three separate fees. These fees included a transaction fee of $10million, payable at the closing of an acquisition transaction, net of fees already paid. The transaction feewas payable if an acquisition transaction occurred within 18 months of the agreement's execution, i.e.,by December 7, 2006. The term "acquisition transaction" was defined as follows: "As used in thisAgreement, the term 'Acquisition Transaction' means, whether effected directly or indirectly or in onetransaction or a series of transactions: (a) any merger, consolidation, reorganization or other businesscombination pursuant to which [Red Zone] and [Six Flags] and/or all or a significant portion of theirrespective businesses, divisions or product lines are combined, or (b) the acquisition by [Red Zone] of50% or more of the capital stock or assets of [Six Flags] by way of tender or exchange offer, option,negotiated purchase, leveraged buyout, minority investment or partnership, joint or collaborativeventure or otherwise, or (c) the acquisition by [Red Zone] of control of [Six Flags], through a proxycontest or otherwise."

By August 16, 2005, Red Zone had purchased additional shares, increasing its equity stake in SixFlags to 11.7%. At that time, however, Six Flags' bondholders would have had the right to demand theimmediate repayment of approximately $2.6 billion in debt and preferred stock if Red Zone hadmerged with Six Flags or otherwise acquired more than 34.9% of its shares. Due to this "poison debt"and other factors, Red Zone concluded that absent a negotiated transaction with Six Flags, raisingcapital to finance an acquisition of the company would have been prohibitively expensive. Red Zonefurther ruled out a friendly negotiated transaction with Six Flags in light of its board's past intransigence.

On August 17, 2005, Red Zone launched what turned out to be a successful proxy contest bywhich the shareholders approved the replacement of three of Six Flags' seven directors with Snyder,Dwight Schar (another Red Zone member) and Mark Shapiro (Red Zone's recently hiredCEO).[FN1]In November 2005, Six Flags' newly constituted board unanimously elected Snyder as its chair. OnDecember 13, 2005, the board was expanded to 10 members with the addition of the late Jack Kemp,Harvey Weinstein and Michael Kassan. Snyder knew Kemp socially and had done business withWeinstein and Kassan. That same month, Six Flags' CEO was replaced by Mark Shapiro, who alsocontinued to serve as Red Zone's CEO. At Shapiro's instance, Six Flags' board approved the hiring of11 people for executive positions within the company. Three of the new executives had been on RedZone's payroll when hired. On January 11, 2006, Six [*3]Flags' boardunanimously voted to replace three of its pre-Red Zone directors with Pauken, C.E. Andrews andMark Jennings. Pauken, as noted above, was a member of Red Zone and Andrews was nominated formembership on the board by Schar. Jennings held a membership interest in Red Zone through a limitedpartnership he controlled. Six Flags' board also approved the reimbursement of Red Zone's proxycontest expenses, which included Shapiro's compensation.

By this action, UBS seeks to recover a transaction fee on the ground that an acquisitiontransaction, consisting of Red Zone's acquisition of control of Six Flags, had occurred by January 11,2006, a date within the term of the agreement. Plaintiff's contention that control was acquired is basedupon the facts thatº Red Zone's nominees held 9 of 10 seats on Six Flags' board,[FN2]º over 50% of Six Flags' directors were Red Zone insiders,º Snyder, Red Zone's managing member, was Six Flags' chair, andº Shapiro, Red Zone's CEO, was also Six Flags' CEO.

Finding the advisory agreement ambiguous, the motion court denied plaintiff's motion for summaryjudgment on its contract cause of action. We now reverse.

The agreement manifestly provided for the payment of UBS's transaction fee upon Red Zone'sacquisition of control of Six Flags. The parties disagree as to whether Red Zone acquired the requisitecontrol of the company. This disagreement calls for interpretation of the term "control" as used in theagreement.

A contract is to be construed in accordance with the parties' intent, which is generally discernedfrom the four corners of the document itself (MHR Capital Partners LP v Presstek, Inc., 12 NY3d 640, 645 [2009]).A "written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced accordingto the plain meaning of its terms" (Greenfield v Philles Records, 98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002])."Control," according to Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed 2009), is the "direct or indirect power togovern the management and policies of a person or entity, whether through ownership of votingsecurities, by contract, or otherwise" (see also Business Corporation Law § 912 [a] [8];8 Del Code § 203 [c] [4]). Red Zone clearly controlled Six Flags once its insiders and nomineesconstituted the majority of the board and took over the company's management. It cannot be disputedthat Red Zone had seized the power to direct Six Flags' management and policies. We reject RedZone's argument that it did not control Six Flags simply because it did not obtain ownership of themajority of its voting shares. The argument is at odds with the inclusive definition of "control" as well asthe provisions of the advisory agreement. Moreover, the agreement provided that an acquisitiontransaction could have been brought about by way of a transaction in the nature of a merger, a stockacquisition or the acquisition of control "through a proxy contest or otherwise." Had the parties intendedto limit the definition of "control" to the acquisition of stock, the phrase "through a proxy contest orotherwise" would have no meaning. Red Zone's argument is thus flawed because a contract [*4]should not be interpreted so as to render any of its clauses meaningless(see Two Guys from Harrison-N.Y. v S.F.R. Realty Assoc., 63 NY2d 396, 403 [1984]). Inaddition, Red Zone's argument that the side agreement capped UBS's fee at $2 million is belied by areading of the document itself. Because the advisory agreement and the side agreement areunambiguous, we decline to consider Red Zone's purported extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent(see Greenfield, 98 NY2d at 569-570).

We are similarly unpersuaded by Red Zone's argument that UBS was somehow required to rebutthe presumption of good faith and loyalty on part of Six Flags' directors in order to establish control ofthe company on Red Zone's part. Here, Red Zone misplaces its reliance on Beam ex rel. MarthaStewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v Stewart (845 A2d 1040 [Del 2004]), a case that addresses theentirely distinct subject of demand futility in a derivative action. Taken to its logical conclusion, RedZone's unlikely position would be that the parties here bargained for UBS's transaction fee to bepayable upon, among other things, a breach of loyalty by at least some of Six Flags' directors.

We do not reach Red Zone's cross appeal because the record does not include the paperssubmitted with respect to its motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 5526). Meaningfulappellate review of the denial of that motion has thus been rendered impossible. Having failed in itsobligation to assemble a proper appellate record, Red Zone's cross appeal must be dismissed (seeMatter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Vargas, 288 AD2d 309 [2001]). Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P.,McGuire, DeGrasse, Freedman and Richter, JJ.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: As set forth in a side agreement ofthe same date, it was understood that this proxy contest was not to be considered an "acquisitiontransaction" within the meaning of the advisory agreement.

Footnote 2: As of January 18, 2006, Kassanresigned from the board without being replaced, leaving Red Zone's nominees with six of nine seats.


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