| Matter of Russo v City of Albany Zoning Bd. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 07845 [78 AD3d 1277] |
| November 4, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Kenneth M. Russo, Appellant, v City of Albany ZoningBoard et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] John J. Reilly, Corporation Counsel, Albany (Jeffrey V. Jamison of counsel), forrespondents.
Peters, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Devine, J.), entered July 15, 2009 inAlbany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78,to review a determination of respondent City of Albany Zoning Board denying petitioner's request foran area variance.
Petitioner owns residential property located at 573 Morris Street, also referred to as 571 MorrisStreet,[FN*]in the City of Albany. Since approximately 1978, he has parked his vehicle on his front lawn. Petitionercontends that, around that time, he applied for and obtained from respondent City of Albany an areavariance and/or a permit for a curb-cut enabling him to use his front lawn for parking. In September2007, he received a cease and desist order from the City notifying him that his front-yard parkingviolated the City's zoning ordinance. Shortly thereafter, petitioner applied to respondent City of AlbanyZoning Board for an area variance. After the [*2]Board denied hisapplication, petitioner commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging that determination. In anAugust 2008 order, Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the decision and remanded thematter, finding that the Board "left open questions as to any permits or variances for 571 Morris Streetand did not fully address how allowing front yard parking would produce an 'undesirable change' or anaesthetic detriment."
After a rehearing, the Board again denied petitioner's application. Petitioner then commenced thisCPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the Board's denial of his application and a determinationthat he is entitled to the variance or, alternatively, that the matter be remanded to the Board for anotherreconsideration. Petitioner also requested that Supreme Court find the Board in contempt for failing tocomply with its August 2008 order. Upon review, Supreme Court determined that the Board hadproperly reconsidered petitioner's application in accordance with its earlier decision and acted rationallyin denying petitioner an area variance. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition, prompting thisappeal by petitioner.
The law is well settled that "[l]ocal zoning boards have broad discretion in considering applicationsfor variances, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the action taken by the board wasillegal, arbitrary or an abuse of discretion" (Matter of Ifrah v Utschig, 98 NY2d 304, 308[2002]; see Matter of Vomero v City of NewYork, 13 NY3d 840, 841 [2009]; Matter of Bivona v Town of Plattekill Zoning Bd. ofAppeals, 268 AD2d 877, 879 [2000]). Thus, a zoning board's determination will not be disturbedif it has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence in the record (see Matter of Pecoraro v Board of Appeals ofTown of Hempstead, 2 NY3d 608, 613 [2004]; Matter of Ifrah v Utschig, 98 NY2dat 308; Matter of Stewart v Ferris, 236 AD2d 767, 767-768 [1997]). In determining whetherto grant an area variance, a zoning board must weigh the benefit to the applicant against the detriment tothe health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood or community if the variance is granted and must alsoconsider five statutory factors (see Town Law § 267-b [3]; Matter of Pecoraro vBoard of Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 2 NY3d at 612-613; Matter of Ifrah v Utschig,98 NY2d at 307-308).
Initially, we find that the record supports the Board's conclusion that a permit or variance permittingpetitioner to use his front lawn for parking was never issued. Upon reconsideration of the issue pursuantto Supreme Court's August 2008 decision, the Board indicated that it had investigated—both atthe time of petitioner's initial application and again upon remand—whether a variance or otherpermit had been filed for 571 or 573 Morris Street and found that no such approval for front-yardparking had been granted. This conclusion is supported by the affidavit of Bradley Glass, a planner forthe City's Department of Development and Planning, who averred that his office maintains recordsrelating to the issuance of variances and permits within the City and that a search of those recordsrevealed no approval for front-yard parking for either address. Glass also averred that petitioner's useof his front yard for parking was not grandfathered in as a legal nonconforming use, as petitioner begandoing so after the City's zoning ordinance restricting front-yard parking had been adopted in 1968. Inlight of this proof, and petitioner's failure to submit any documentation to demonstrate that he had in factapplied for and received a permit or variance, the Board could rationally conclude that petitioner hadnot previously been granted the approval to park on his front lawn.
Addressing the merits of petitioner's application for an area variance, our review of the recordreveals that the Board properly applied the balancing test and considered the relevant factors inreaching its determination. The record supports the Board's conclusion that the proposed variance forfront-yard parking would produce an undesirable change in the character [*3]of the neighborhood. Evidence was presented that, although other housesin the surrounding area had front-yard parking, this constituted the overwhelming minority of theproperties. Furthermore, Glass noted that, compared to those few properties, petitioner's usedrastically differed in that his parking area is in the very middle of the lot, as opposed to on the side ofthe residence, and caused his vehicle to be parked over the City sidewalk. In finding that petitioner'sfront-yard parking would present an aesthetic detriment, the Board also relied upon a letter submittedby the neighborhood association indicating that allowing a variance for front-yard parking would not bein keeping with the rest of the homes in the neighborhood. Additionally, the Board was entitled toconsider that permitting petitioner to utilize his front yard for parking would undermine existing zoningregulations by encouraging further deviations where no unique hardship exists and set a poor precedentfor other property owners in the neighborhood (see Matter of Pecoraro v Board of Appeals ofTown of Hempstead, 2 NY3d at 615).
As further determined by the Board, the variance would have detrimental impacts on theneighborhood and is substantial in nature. William Trudeau, the City's traffic engineer, stated that, whenparked in his front yard, petitioner's vehicle was encroaching on the public sidewalk and right-of-way.Evidence was also presented to the Board that petitioner had been involved in an accident as a result ofhis front-yard parking, providing further support for its finding that the proposed variance wouldcompromise public safety. Given that the variance would result in a constant impediment to the City'sright-of-way and create potential safety issues to other drivers on Morris Street as well as pedestriansusing the sidewalk in front of petitioner's home, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Board todetermine that the substantial nature and negative impact of such a variance weighed against granting it.
The Board also considered petitioner's need for the variance. Petitioner argued that it wasnecessary for him to have front-yard parking due to health reasons, but the record indicates that otherfeasible alternatives to the variance were available, such as on-street parking spaces and the reservationof a handicapped spot in front of his property. Moreover, the Board properly concluded that the needfor the variance was self-created. It is undisputed that petitioner constructed a driveway on his frontlawn and began parking there with full awareness of the applicable zoning regulations prohibiting suchuse. Even assuming that he had, in fact, been granted a permit for the curb cut, this would not obviatethe need to apply for and receive a variance from the Board, since issuance of such a permit would notconfer the authority to use the property in a manner prohibited by the City's zoning laws (see Matterof Conte v Town of Norfolk Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 261 AD2d 734, 737 [1999]). Based on theforegoing, we are unable to conclude that the Board's denial of the area variance was irrational,arbitrary or an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Ifrah v Utschig, 98 NY2d at 309; Matter of Johnson v Town of QueensburyZoning Bd. of Appeals, 8 AD3d 741, 742-743 [2004]).
Finally, we are unpersuaded that Supreme Court erred in denying petitioner's request to holdrespondents in contempt. "Civil contempt requires a showing of, among other things, disobedience of 'alawful judicial order expressing an unequivocal mandate' " (Quick v ABS Realty Corp., 13 AD3d 1021, 1022 [2004], quotingMcCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216, 226 [1994]; see Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v Mills, 25AD3d 952, 954 [2006]). In its August 2008 order, Supreme Court remanded the matter to theBoard "to render a determination in accordance with the statute [i.e., Town Law § 267-b (3)]and in conformity with the decision rendered herein." Upon remand, the Board did just that. Althoughpetitioner takes issue with the fact that the Board chose to conduct a rehearing, inasmuch as the August2008 order did not specify the precise manner in which it was to reconsider petitioner's application, thecourse taken here by the Board cannot supply the basis of [*4]a findingof contempt (see Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v Department of Envtl.Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d 233, 240 [1987]; Matter of Posada v New York State Dept. of Health, 47 AD3d 1026,1027 [2008]).
Cardona, P.J., Rose, Malone Jr. and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote *: Although petitioner's legal address is573 Morris Street, the record reveals that respondents have, at times, referred to the property as 571Morris Street. This discrepancy apparently stems from the fact that, as noted in the deed, the propertyis listed on the tax roll as 571 Morris Street.