| People v Waddell |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 08016 [78 AD3d 1325] |
| November 10, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Leo E. Waddell Jr.,Respondent. |
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Spain, J. Appeal from an order of the County Court of Broome County (Cawley, J.), enteredMarch 11, 2009, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.
Defendant was charged in an indictment with assault in the second degree and criminal possessionof a weapon in the third degree. As part of a subsequent omnibus motion, defendant sought dismissal ofthe indictment on the basis of perceived defects in the grand jury proceeding. Following its examinationof the grand jury minutes, County Court agreed that the integrity of the grand jury proceeding wasimpaired and dismissed the indictment (see CPL 210.20 [1] [c]; 210.35 [5]). Specifically,County Court found that defendant was prejudiced by the People's failure to advise the grand jury thatit was the prosecution's burden to disprove a potential justification defense. Although County Courtgranted the People's request to reconsider that determination, it nonetheless adhered to its original rulingin a second decision.[FN1]The People appeal and we reverse.
"[A] [g]rand [j]ury need not be instructed with the same degree of precision that is [*2]required when a petit jury is instructed on the law" (People v Calbud,Inc., 49 NY2d 389, 394 [1980]). Rather, it is sufficient that the grand jury be provided withenough information for it to intelligently decide whether a crime has been committed and whether legallysufficient evidence exists to establish the material elements of that crime (see id. at 394-395)."[W]here the evidence suggests that a complete defense such as justification may be present, theprosecutor must [also] charge the grand jurors on that defense, providing enough information to enablethem to determine whether the defense, in light of the evidence, should preclude the criminalprosecution" (People v Goetz, 68 NY2d 96, 115 [1986]).
As relevant here, the complainant and a witness—who were both guests in defendant'sapartment when the alleged crime occurred—testified before the grand jury. Whereas thecomplainant stated that defendant struck her with an object on the back of the head three times as shewas peacefully exiting his apartment, the witness indicated that the complainant was the initial aggressorwho, unprovoked, began punching defendant and scratching him in the face.[FN2]Accordingly, after instructing the grand jury on the elements of the charged crimes, the prosecutoradvised the grand jurors as to the possible applicability of a justification defense. In doing so, theprosecutor utilized language consistent with Penal Law § 35.15 (1), then stated: "Only if you findthat the defendant . . . was not justified in using deadly physical force against thecomplainant and only if you further find that all the elements of the crime of assault in the second degreeare established by legally sufficient evidence and reasonable cause to believe, you may return a true bill.Does everybody understand that? There's a circumstance when you can use physical force and you'rejustified in that, and there's a time when you can use deadly physical force and you're justified in that.You need to determine which force [defendant] used in this and if he was justified in using under thecircumstances [sic] . . . Does anybody have any questions with regard to any ofthese charges or any of the definitions I've read to you?" The grand jury made an unrelated inquiry withrespect to the criminal possession of a weapon charge, but was otherwise silent; following deliberations,it voted to indict defendant.
While the foregoing lacks any express reference to the People's burden of disproving a justificationdefense beyond a reasonable doubt, it nonetheless implicitly conveyed this obligation and satisfied theprosecution's duty as legal advisor to the grand jury (see CPL 190.25 [6]; People vCalbud, Inc., 49 NY2d at 395 n 1; People v Lopez, 113 AD2d 475, 478-479 [1985],lv denied 67 NY2d 946 [1986]). Indeed, " '[a]t the accusatory stage, legally sufficient evidenceis prima facie evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt' " (People v Lopez, 113 AD2dat 479, quoting People v Porter, 75 AD2d 901 [1980]; see People v Mayo, 36 NY2d1002, 1004 [1975]). Accordingly, as the grand jury is not responsible for determining an accused'sultimate [*3]guilt or innocence, the People's instructions providedadequate guidance for the grand jury to carry out the role it is called upon to fulfill—determiningwhether a prima facie case exists (see People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d at 394, 396;People v Valles, 62 NY2d 36, 37-38 [1984]; People v Cannon, 210 AD2d 764,766-767 [1994]). Simply put, the grand jury received sufficient instruction on the proper standard forindictment (see People v Lopez, 113 AD2d at 479).
Peters, J.P., Lahtinen, Kavanagh and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on thelaw, motion denied and indictment reinstated.
Footnote 1: Both of County Court's decisionsauthorized the People to re-present the charges to a new grand jury.
Footnote 2: Both individuals offered detailedtestimony regarding their respective versions of the events that transpired. We reach no conclusionswith respect thereto.