| Matter of Tosha Rests., LLC v New York State Div. of HumanRights |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 09054 [79 AD3d 1337] |
| December 9, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Tosha Restaurants, LLC, Doing Business as Denny's,Petitioner, v New York State Division of Human Rights,Respondent. |
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Egan Jr., J. Proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 (transferred to this Court by orderof the Supreme Court, entered in Warren County) to review a determination of respondent which foundpetitioner guilty of an unlawful discriminatory practice based on disability.
Shane A. Fuller was hired in January 2007 for a part-time dishwasher position by petitioner, whichoperated a Denny's Restaurant located in the Town of Queensbury, Warren County. In addition towashing dishes, Fuller's duties included cleaning the rest rooms and taking out the garbage. He wasscheduled to work approximately 10 to 15 hours per week. Shortly after accepting this part-timeposition, Fuller was also hired to work full time at a Lowe's Home Improvement store in Queensbury.
In late February 2007, Fuller was terminated from his position with petitioner. Thereafter, in April2007, Fuller filed a complaint with respondent alleging that petitioner terminated his employment as aresult of his disability, specifically psoriasis and cellulitis affecting the back of his head, a condition fromwhich Fuller has suffered continuously since 1986. Respondent investigated the complaint, determinedthat it had jurisdiction over the matter and that probable cause existed to believe that petitioner engagedin an unlawful discriminatory practice. A hearing was conducted in May 2008 before an AdministrativeLaw Judge (hereinafter ALJ), who determined that Fuller established a violation of Executive Law§ 296 (1) (a) when petitioner terminated Fuller. Specifically, the ALJ found that Fullerestablished his prima facie case for discrimination and that petitioner's explanations for Fuller'stermination were either not legitimate or were pretexts for illegal discrimination. The ALJ recommendedthat Fuller be awarded damages for lost pay and reimbursement for counseling services in the amountof $4,776, and compensatory damages for pain and suffering in the amount of $10,000, with interest. InMarch 2009, the Commissioner of Human Rights issued a final order incorporating the ALJ'srecommendation in its entirety. Petitioner commenced the instant proceeding seeking to annul thedetermination, and respondent cross-petitioned for review and enforcement of the order. Pursuant toExecutive Law § 298, Supreme Court transferred the matter to this Court for review.
"The Human Rights Law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees due to adisability" (Matter of New York State Dept.of Correctional Servs. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 57 AD3d 1057, 1058-1059[2008], citing Executive Law § 296), and an employer must provide a reasonableaccommodation for a disability (see Executive Law § 296 [3] [a]). However, "adisability that prevents an employee from performing the job requirements in a reasonable manner is nota protected disability within the meaning of the statute; the Human Rights Law should not be interpretedto prevent termination of a worker who is unable to perform his or her duties even with reasonableaccommodation" (Matter of RegalEntertainment Group v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 61 AD3d 1102, 1104 [2009],lv dismissed 13 NY3d 893 [2009]).
Upon filing a claim with respondent, a complainant bears the burden of demonstrating a prima faciecase of discrimination by showing that "he [or she] suffers from a disability, he [or she] was discharged,he [or she] was qualified to hold the position, and the discharge occurred under circumstances givingrise to an inference of discrimination based on his [or her] disability" (id. [internal quotationmarks and citations omitted]; see Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, 558 [1994]; Matter of Harrison v Chestnut Donuts, Inc.,60 AD3d 1130, 1131 [2009]). If a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to theemployer "to rebut the presumption of discrimination by presenting evidence of legitimate, independent,and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its employment decision" (Matter of Harrison v ChestnutDonuts, Inc., 60 AD3d at 1131-1132 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; seeRainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 NY2d 326,330 [2003]), or that the complainant's disability prevented him or her from "performing the duties of thejob in a reasonable manner" (Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d at 558; see Matter ofState Div. of Human Rights [Granelle], 70 NY2d 100, 106 [1987]). If this is accomplished, thenthe burden shifts back to the complainant to establish that these reasons are " 'merely a pretext fordiscrimination by demonstrating both that the stated reasons were false and that discrimination was thereal reason' " (Matter of Harrison v Chestnut Donuts, Inc., 60 AD3d at 1132, quoting Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; accord Matterof Suleman v State of N.Y. Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 27 AD3d 1040, 1042 [2006]).Respondent's "determinations are entitled to considerable deference due to its expertise in evaluatingdiscrimination claims" (Matter of Harrison v Chestnut Donuts, Inc., 60 AD3d at 1131 [internalquotation marks and citations omitted]), and our review is limited to whether respondent's findings aresupported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Pageau v Tolbert, 304 AD2d 1067, 1068[2003]). Thus, where the record contains conflicting evidence, we may not substitute our own judgmentfor that of respondent (see Matter of State Div. of Human Rights [Granelle], 70 NY2d at 106;Matter of Bracci v New York State Div. ofHuman Rights, 62 AD3d 1146, 1149 [2009], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 865[2010]).
At the hearing on this matter, Fuller offered medical documentation and photographs to illustratethe extent of his medical condition which causes hair loss and scarring to Fuller's scalp at the back of hishead. The condition is not observable when viewing Fuller from the front. Fuller testified that hiscondition had never been discussed prior to his termination, that he had never been disciplined for anyconduct nor had he received any complaints regarding either his medical condition or his jobperformance. In fact, Fuller testified that he had received positive feedback from management. Fullertestified that when he was terminated, he was informed by Susan Ellsworth, petitioner's restaurantmanager, that it was because of the scarring on the back of his head. The record also reflects that it wasonly after first observing Fuller's condition that petitioner's owner, Paul Amash, directed that he beterminated. Accordingly, Fuller presented a prima facie case of discrimination in that he was terminatedfrom a position that he was otherwise qualified to perform on the basis of a disability. In opposition,petitioner offered three explanations for Fuller's termination—(1) that customers and coworkershad complained about Fuller's appearance, (2) that permitting Fuller to continue working at therestaurant would be a "violation of health code" because it feared Fuller was contagious, and (3) thatbecause of a change in his schedule at Lowe's, Fuller's availability for his part-time job with petitionerwas constantly changing and "becoming a problem."
Initially, we find substantial evidence in the record to support the determination that petitioner's firstexplanation failed to rebut Fuller's prima facie case of discrimination. There is no evidence that Fullerwas unable to perform his job responsibilities because of his condition (see Matter of Miller vRavitch, 60 NY2d 527, 531-532 [1983]), and employers "may not discriminate on the basis oftheir customers' preferences" (Ames v Cartier, Inc., 193 F Supp 2d 762, 769 [SD NY 2002][internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).[FN*]
Petitioner's second explanation is also unavailing. While New York State Department of Healthregulations prohibit a person from working in a food service establishment "while afflicted with a boil orinfected wound" (10 NYCRR 14-1.70 [d]), petitioner never inquired into the specific nature of Fuller'scondition to determine whether it was indeed infectious. Furthermore, while petitioner had a policy foraddressing workers with open sores and other injuries by allowing them to go home until cleared by aphysician, the owner conceded that this option was never discussed with Fuller. In contrast, Fullerpresented a note from his physician that stated that his condition was not contagious and not a healthconcern while performing dishwashing duties. In according the appropriate deference to respondent(see Matter of Harrison v Chestnut Donuts, Inc., 60 AD3d at 1131), we find substantialevidence in the record for the determination that petitioner's second explanation was a pretext fordiscrimination.
Turning to petitioner's third explanation, Amash testified that Fuller's termination was based on hisunavailability to work for petitioner because of his shift change at Lowe's and not because of hismedical condition. However, Ellsworth testified that the condition of Fuller's head was, indeed, a factorconsidered. Amash also testified that he was surprised to see that Ellsworth [*2]had hired Fuller in light of his appearance, and he further stated that evenif Fuller had no scheduling difficulties, he might have dismissed Fuller because of the condition of hishead. The record also reflects that although Fuller held a full-time position at Lowe's and was scheduledto work 12 to 15 hours per week for petitioner, he routinely covered shifts for other employees andaveraged approximately 20 hours per week working for petitioner. During one week, Fuller workedapproximately 31 hours for petitioner. Fuller testified that he provided petitioner's scheduling managerwith his work schedule from Lowe's and his hours with petitioner would thereafter be scheduledaccordingly. While Fuller's change in shift at Lowe's required a change in his schedule with petitioner, itis undisputed that Fuller was never warned that he could be terminated based on his unavailability. Inaccording the appropriate deference to respondent (see Matter of Harrison v Chestnut Donuts,Inc., 60 AD3d at 1131), we find substantial evidence in the record for the determination thatpetitioner's third explanation was also a pretext for discrimination.
Finally, with respect to petitioner's challenge to the damages awarded to Fuller, respondent has"broad powers to adopt measures which [it] reasonably deems necessary to redress the injury" (Matter of New York State Energy Research &Dev. Auth. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 50 AD3d 1361, 1363 [2008] [internalquotation marks and citations omitted]), including awarding back pay and compensatory damages(see Executive Law § 297 [4] [c]). In reviewing the record, we find that the damagesawarded are "reasonably related to the wrongdoing and [are] supported by substantial evidence"(Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Muia, 176 AD2d 1142, 1144-1145 [1991]; see Matter of New Venture Gear Inc. v NewYork State Div. of Human Rights, 41 AD3d 1265, 1267 [2007]). The back pay awardedwas calculated based on Fuller's average salary while employed by petitioner times the number ofweeks he was unable to find comparable part-time employment. The award for compensatory damageswas based on petitioner's conduct that resulted in, among other things, suicidal thoughts and Fuller'sneed to attend counseling for nine months at an out-of-pocket cost of $200. In this regard, the awardfor emotional pain and suffering "does not deviate markedly from comparable awards for similarinjuries" (Matter of New York State Energy Research & Dev. Auth. v New York State Div. ofHuman Rights, 50 AD3d at 1363; seeMatter of Mohawk Val. Orthopedics, LLP v Carcone, 66 AD3d 1350, 1350 [2009]; Matter of Iroquois Nursing Home, Inc. v NewYork State Div. of Human Rights, 55 AD3d 1285, 1286 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d708 [2009]; Matter of City of Fulton v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 221 AD2d971, 971-972 [1995]).
Spain, J.P., Kavanagh, Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote *: "The standards for recovery underthe New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296) are the same as thefederal standards under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e etseq.)" (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d at 305 n 3 [citation omitted]; seeAmes v Cartier, Inc., 193 F Supp 2d at 767).