| People v Walker |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 00047 [80 AD3d 793] |
| January 6, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v DayvonWalker, Appellant. |
—[*1] P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Kenneth C. Weafer of counsel), forrespondent.
Kavanagh, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Herrick, J.),rendered June 17, 2009, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal possessionof a controlled substance in the fourth degree and criminal use of drug paraphernalia in thesecond degree.
After defendant was released from prison in 2007, he was placed on parole under thesupervision of parole officer Sarah Donlon.[FN*]While on parole, defendant was prohibited from possessing any drug paraphernalia orunauthorized controlled substances and had agreed as a condition of parole that his paroleofficers had the right to search his person and residence to ensure that he was complying with theterms of his parole.
In May 2008, Donlon and her partner went to defendant's residence to perform anunannounced home visit and curfew check. When defendant admitted the parole officers into hisresidence, they observed, on a table in plain view, four pills of an unknown origin and a box for adigital scale. When asked about the pills, defendant admitted that they were painkillers and hedid not have a prescription for them. After placing defendant in handcuffs, the officers proceededto [*2]search his residence. In a closet, they recovered shotgunshells and, from a dresser drawer, seized a digital scale as well as a bag containing crack cocaine.Defendant was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in thefourth degree and criminal use of drug paraphernalia in the second degree. After his motion tosuppress the digital scale and cocaine was denied, a trial was conducted at which defendant wasconvicted as charged and subsequently sentenced as a second felony offender to 4½ yearsin prison to be followed by three years of postrelease supervision for the felony conviction andtime served for the misdemeanor conviction. Defendant now appeals.
In claiming that the search of his residence was unlawful, defendant argues that the discoveryof the four pills on the table provided the parole officers with all the evidence they needed tocharge him with violating the terms of his parole and that a more extensive search of hisresidence was not reasonably related to the execution of their official duties. While on parole,defendant still retains the constitutional right to be free from "unreasonable searches andseizures" (People v Huntley, 43 NY2d 175, 181 [1977]; see People v Hale, 93NY2d 454, 459 [1999]). However, once he agreed as a condition of parole that a search may beconducted of his residence, such a search may be performed by his parole officer if it "wasrationally and reasonably related to the performance of the parole officer's duty" and wasperformed "to detect and to prevent parole violations for the protection of the public from thecommission of further crimes" (People v Huntley, 43 NY2d at 181; see People v Burry, 52 AD3d 856,858 [2008]). Here, defendant's parole officers went to his residence to ensure that he wascomplying with the conditions of his parole. When the officers entered the premises, they sawwhat appeared to be drug-related items lying in plain view on a table. Moreover, defendantadmitted to the officers that he did not have a prescription for the pills. These observations,coupled with defendant's admission regarding the pills, justified a more extensive search of hisresidence to determine the true extent of his violations of parole and, as such, was reasonablyrelated to the parole officers' efforts to supervise defendant while on parole (see People v Johnson, 49 AD3d1244, 1245 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 865 [2008]; People v Lownes, 40 AD3d 1269,1270 [2007]).
Nor did County Court err by allowing the prosecution to elicit testimony at the trial that hewas a parolee at the time of his arrest and that a condition of his parole barred his possession ofany drugs or drug paraphernalia. "Defendant's status as a parolee, and thus the conditions of [his]parole subjecting him to these . . . searches . . . by his parole officer,were indisputably necessary to complete the narrative and inextricably intertwined with the factsof the charged offense so as to permit the jury to be informed of his status" (People vChestnut, 254 AD2d 525, 526 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 871 [1999] [citationsomitted]; see People v Lownes, 40 AD3d at 1270). Moreover, any prejudice that mayhave arisen from the admission of this evidence was undermined by the limiting instructionsprovided to the jury (see People v Lownes, 40 AD3d at 1270; People v Chestnut,254 AD2d at 526).
Cardona, P.J., Spain, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote *: Defendant was previouslyconvicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.