| Matter of County of Schuyler (Solomon Fin. Ctr., Inc.) |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 02987 [83 AD3d 1243] |
| April 14, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Foreclosure of Tax Liens by County ofSchuyler. County of Schuyler, Respondent; Edward Solomon Jr., Respondent, and SolomonFinancial Center, Inc., Appellant. Margaret E. Starbuck, as County Treasurer of the County ofSchuyler, et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] James P. Coleman, County Attorney, Watkins Glen (Dennis James Morris of counsel), forMargaret E. Starbuck, respondent. Robert L. Halpin, Montour Falls, for Village of Montour Falls, respondent. Harris Beach, P.L.L.C., Ithaca (Mark B. Wheeler of counsel), for Elmira Savings Bank, FSB,and another, respondents. Pope & Schrader, L.L.C., Binghamton (Kurt D. Schrader of counsel), for Montour FallsHouse, L.L.C., respondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (O'Shea, J.), entered December 15,2009 in Schuyler County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 11, denied a motionby respondent Solomon Financial Center, Inc. to vacate a default judgment of foreclosure.
The subject of this dispute is a piece of real property located in the Village of Montour Falls,Schuyler County. The property was acquired by respondent Edward Solomon Jr. in September2000. Executed simultaneously with the deed to Solomon was a mortgage in favor of respondentSolomon Financial Center, Inc. (hereinafter respondent) in the amount of $35,000. This mortgagewas recorded with the Schuyler County Clerk in September 2000 and listed respondent, asmortgagee, with the address of 564 Hammond Road, NE, Atlanta, Georgia. Solomon failed topay the real property taxes due and owing as of January 1, 2005 and, in November 2006,petitioner commenced this foreclosure proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 11. Despitepetitioner's efforts to notify respondent of the pending foreclosure proceedings, respondent neveranswered the petition or otherwise sought to rectify the tax delinquency. Thus, in August 2007, adefault judgment of foreclosure of petitioner's tax lien was entered and Margaret Starbuck, asCounty Treasurer of the County of Schuyler, executed a deed conveying the property topetitioner.[FN1]Approximately two years later, in August 2009, respondent moved by order to show cause to,among other things, vacate the default judgment, contending that it did not receive notice of theproceedings "as required by [the] applicable laws." Supreme Court denied respondent's motionand respondent now appeals.[FN2]
We affirm. "According to RPTL 1131, '[a] motion to reopen [a default judgment offoreclosure] may not be brought later than one month after entry of the judgment' " (Matter of County of Sullivan [Fay], 79AD3d 1409, 1410 [2010], quoting Matter of County of Sullivan [Spring Lake Retreat Ctr., Inc.], 39 AD3d1095, 1095 [2007]; see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 8 [2003]; Matter of County of Clinton[Bouchard], 29 AD3d 79, 81 [2006]). Here, the judgment was entered in August 2007,yet respondent did not move to vacate until August 2009. Thus, Supreme Court properly deniedrespondent's motion as untimely.
Respondent's assertion that the limitations period applicable to motions to vacate nevercommenced running because it was not given adequate notice under RPTL 1125 is unavailing.[*2]At the time that the foreclosure proceeding was commenced,the RPTL required petitioner to direct notice of the proceeding to "each owner by certified mailand any other person by ordinary first class mail whose right, title, or interest was a matter ofpublic record as of the date the list of delinquent taxes was filed, which right, title or interest willbe affected by the termination of the redemption period, and whose name and address arereasonably ascertainable from the public record" (RPTL 1125 [former (1) (a)], as amended by L2006, ch 415, § 1 [eff Nov. 23, 2006]). In the real property context, a reasonable search ofthe public record includes a search of land records contained in the offices of the County Clerkand Surrogate (see Hudson Deepwater Dev. v City of Troy, 299 AD2d 801, 803 [2002]),but does not necessarily require either an Internet search (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100NY2d at 10) or a search of records of the Supreme Court or County Court (see HudsonDeepwater Dev. v City of Troy, 299 AD2d at 803).
In conjunction with petitioner's foreclosure proceeding, Starbuck undertook a search of therecords of the Schuyler County Clerk and, based on the results, caused a combined notice offoreclosure and petition to be mailed by first class mail to the Atlanta, Georgia address as listedby respondent on the recorded mortgage. After the notice was returned marked "return tosender—not deliverable as addressed—unable to forward," petitioner, through itsdeputy treasurer, attempted to locate another address for respondent, and undertook an Internetsearch, which revealed a California entity entitled "Solomon Financial Mortgage" that was servedwith the combined notice of foreclosure and petition. The mailing to the California entity was notreturned. In addition, petitioner complied with the statutory posting and publication requirementsof RPTL 1124. We find that, based on these actions, petitioner's efforts were in compliance withRPTL article 11 (compare Matter ofHarner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]).
We also find that petitioner's efforts complied with the requirements of due process, whichare "satisfied where 'notice [is] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to appriseinterested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present theirobjections' " (Matter of County of Sullivan [Fay], 79 AD3d at 1411, quoting Matter ofHarner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d at 140; see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d at 9)."Due process does not require actual notice by the property owner, only reasonable efforts toprovide notice under the circumstances" (Matter of County of Sullivan [Fay], 79 AD3d at1411 [citation omitted]). Where, as here, petitioner complied with the notice requirements ofRPTL article 11 and there is no evidence that a further search of the public records would haverevealed any further information, including that respondent's address as listed on the mortgagewas no longer valid, "due process [did] not require petitioner to go to lengths beyond the inquiry,publication and posting measures taken here" (id.; see Matter of Harner v County ofTioga, 5 NY3d at 141; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d at 10). We are alsounpersuaded that because, prior to petitioner's foreclosure action, the Village initiated adeclaratory judgment action involving the same parcel of property and, in that action, causedrespondent to be served at an address in Hilton Head Island, South Carolina—an addressthat respondent claims it had moved to several years prior to petitioner's foreclosureproceeding—the knowledge of the Village is automatically imputed to petitioner (seeMatter of County of Sullivan [Spring Lake Retreat Ctr., Inc.], 39 AD3d at 1096). Likewise,the fact that the South Carolina address appeared on papers received by the County Attorney inthe Village's action does not demonstrate that the address listed on the mortgage was no longervalid or that Starbuck's search of the public record was insufficient (see Hudson DeepwaterDev. v City of Troy, 299 AD2d at 803). Furthermore, given the statutory presumption ofvalidity in tax lien foreclosure proceedings (see RPTL 1134; Kennedy v Mossafa,100 NY2d at 8; Matter of Village of Fleischmanns [Delaware Natl. Bank of Delhi], 77AD3d [*3]1146, 1147 [2010]; Sendel v Diskin, 277AD2d 757, 758 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 707 [2001]), we are unpersuaded thatrespondent's denial of service and conclusory allegations—that prior to September 2006,respondent's chief executive officer visited the County Treasurer's office and provided a "darkhaired woman" with respondent's forwarding address—rebut that presumption andnecessitates a hearing to determine if jurisdiction had been attained.
In light of this determination, we need not address respondent's remaining contentions,including the assertions that Supreme Court improperly found that respondent was obligated tonotify petitioner of its change in address pursuant to RPTL 1125 (1) (d) and improperlysuggested that respondent should have filed a declaration of interest pursuant to RPTL 1126.
Peters, J.P., Spain, Rose and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withoutcosts.
Footnote 1: Petitioner then conveyed theproperty to the Village, which, in turn, conveyed the property to Montour Falls House, LLC inexchange for its promise to restore and develop the property to certain specifications. OnceMontour Falls House received title, it, among other things, entered into lease, leaseback andmortgage agreements with the Schuyler County Industrial Development Agency and ElmiraSavings Bank, FSB.
Footnote 2: In 2007, Solomon, who is theson of respondent's chief executive officer, moved to vacate the default judgment, which motionwas denied by Supreme Court (O'Shea, J.). In 2008, Solomon commenced a CPLR article 78proceeding in Tompkins County seeking, among other things, an order vacating the defaultjudgment, which was dismissed by Supreme Court (Mulvey, J.).