Matter of New York Constr. Materials Assn., Inc. v New York StateDept. of Envtl. Conservation
2011 NY Slip Op 03165 [83 AD3d 1323]
April 21, 2011
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 8, 2011


In the Matter of New York Construction Materials Association,Inc., et al., Appellants, v New York State Department of Environmental Conservation et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Gilberti, Stinziano, Heintz & Smith, P.C., Syracuse (Kevin G. Roe of counsel), forappellants.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Lisa M. Burianek of counsel), forrespondents.

Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Williams, J.), entered April 26,2010 in Saratoga County, which dismissed petitioners' application, in a combined proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to, among other things, declareECL 19-0323 to be unconstitutional and annul certain regulations promulgated by respondentDepartment of Environmental Conservation.

In August 2006, the Legislature enacted the Diesel Emissions Reduction Act (hereinafterDERA) to address the public health threat posed by diesel fuel combustion (see L 2006,ch 629, §§ 1, 2; ECL 19-0323). Under DERA, diesel powered heavy duty vehicles"owned by, operated by or on behalf of, or leased by" state agencies and certain public authoritiesare required to use ultra low sulfur diesel fuel (hereinafter ULSD) and the best available retrofittechnology (hereinafter BART) in order to reduce the emission of air pollutants (ECL 19-0323[2], [3]). Among other things, DERA established a three-year timetable by which affectedvehicles were to be phased into compliance (see ECL 19-0323 [3]) and authorizedrespondent Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) to promulgateregulations[*2]"necessary and appropriate to carry out [DERA's]provisions" (ECL 19-0323 [4]). When DEC promulgated these regulations on June 30, 2009(see 6 NYCRR parts 248-1.1—248-11.1), the first of three compliance deadlinesestablished by DERA had passed, and only 18 months remained of the phase-in period.

Petitioners, individual producers of construction materials and providers of services thatcontract with the New York State University Construction Fund and the not-for-profit tradeassociation that represents their interests, commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceedingand action for a declaratory judgment, seeking, among other things, to annul the regulationspromulgated by DEC. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and petitioners appeal.

Petitioners first contend that DEC's interpretation of the DERA language imposing dieselemission controls on vehicles operated "on behalf of" respondent State of New York exceeds itsauthority (ECL 19-0323 [2], [3]).[FN1]DEC's regulations define "on behalf of" to mean "to provide, by a contractor, labor, services,materials and/or equipment to a regulated entity which are integral to the performance ofregulated entity work by a regulated entity" (6 NYCRR 248-1.1 [b] [20]). A contractor is definedas "any person or entity that contracts directly or indirectly with a regulated entity to providelabor, services, materials and/or equipment on behalf of the regulated entity. Contractor includesbut is not limited to prime contractor, subcontractor, and any contractor(s) hired by suchsubcontractor" (6 NYCRR 248-1.1 [b] [10]). A prime contractor is defined as "any person orentity which contracts directly with a regulated entity and who is responsible for the completionof the contract with the regulated entity" (6 NYCRR 248-1.1 [b] [23]), and a subcontractor as"any person or entity that performs for and takes from the prime contractor a specific part of thelabor or material requirements of the prime contract; which definition shall include, withoutlimitation, any contractor(s) hired or retained by said subcontractor while performing under theprime contract" (6 NYCRR 248-1.1 [b] [28]). While petitioners concede that the Legislatureintended some privately-owned vehicles to be covered by DERA, they assert that nothing in thestatute indicates a legislative intent to regulate such a broad segment of the private sector byincluding subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, and others who did not contract directly with thestate.

Our initial inquiry is whether DEC's interpretation of the statutory language is entitled tojudicial deference. Deference is required when technical expertise or specialized knowledge ofoperational practices is required to interpret statutory language, but no such expertise is requiredto construe the phrase "on behalf of" (see Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d451, 459 [1980]; Matter of Judd v Constantine, 153 AD2d 270, 272 [1990]). Further,nothing in DERA indicates that deference should be accorded on the ground that the Legislaturedelegated "comprehensive, interpretive and subordinate policy-making authority" (Matter ofJudd v Constantine, 153 AD2d at 273) to DEC on the subject of diesel emission controls invehicles used for state work. DERA was not enacted "in broad outline," with details left to DECto arrange, nor is it evident that the Legislature found it difficult to lay down definite andcomprehensive rules (Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510, 515 [1976]). On thecontrary, DERA lays out detailed requirements, defines several technical terms and specifies,among other things, a precise timetable for compliance, particular grounds on which DEC maygrant waivers, [*3]and details that the agency must include inannual reports (see generally ECL 19-0323). Relative to the statute's applicability, DERAprecisely defines those vehicles for which compliance is required and provides an extensive listof vehicles to be excluded, such as those used for agriculture, mowing or snow plowing,"harvesters, wood chippers, forwarders, log skidders" and certain emergency response vehicles(ECL 19-0323 [1] [b]). Given such specificity and the lack of any language in DERA thatexplicitly confers policy-making authority on DEC, DERA's direction to DEC to "promulgateregulations as necessary and appropriate to carry out [DERA's] provisions" (ECL 19-0323 [4])cannot be read to confer authority on that agency to make policy determinations as to the scopeof the statute's coverage.

DEC further contends that it retains policy-making authority in this arena pursuant to otherstatutes giving the agency general authority to regulate air quality (see ECL 3-0301,19-0301), but the degree of precision and detail contained in DERA plainly indicates theLegislature's intent to withdraw such policy determinations from the agency with regard to dieselemissions in vehicles used for state work (see Matter of Gruber [New York City Dept. ofPersonnel—Sweeney], 89 NY2d 225, 232 [1996]). Thus, no deference is required, and"the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurateapprehension of legislative intent" (Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d at 459;see Matter of Grella v Hevesi, 38AD3d 113, 116 [2007]).

In determining legislative intent, the statute is to be construed according to its unambiguouslanguage or, if necessary, by reference to the legislative history (see Matter of Yellow Book of N.Y., Inc. vCommissioner of Taxation & Fin., 75 AD3d 931, 932 [2010], lv denied 16NY3d 704 [2011]; see also Matter of Gruber [New York City Dept. ofPersonnel—Sweeney], 89 NY2d at 231-232). DERA does not define the phrase "onbehalf of." When a statutory term is undefined, it must "be given its precise and well settled legalmeaning in the jurisprudence of the state" (Matter of Yellow Book of N.Y., Inc. vCommissioner of Taxation & Fin., 75 AD3d at 932 [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]). Prior legal usage does not support DEC's broad construction. The phrase "on behalfof" is legislatively used to connote a direct representative or agency relationship (see e.g.Agriculture and Markets Law § 120 [5] [pertaining to "action(s) brought by thecommissioner of environmental conservation on behalf of the people of the state of New York"];CPLR 215 [4] [permitting the attorney general and district attorneys to commence certain actions"on behalf of the state"]; Education Law § 355 [2] [a], [j], [x] [authorizing state universitytrustees to take certain actions "on behalf of" the state and others]). Petitioners assert that theirlegal research revealed more than 2,900 uses of the term "on behalf of" in New York legislationin which the term routinely connoted a representative, agency, or proxy relationship. Furthersupporting such a construction, an agent is defined, in part, as one who acts on behalf of aprincipal (see 2A NY Jur 2d, Agency and Independent Contractors § 1). Thus,DEC's interpretation of the term to mean a class including but not limited to prime contractors,subcontractors and sub-subcontractors extends well beyond the phrase's commonly acceptedlegal meaning.[FN2][*4]

If the Legislature did intend to extend DERA'sapplicability to such a broad class, language making such an intention explicit was available inprior legislation mandating diesel emission controls in privately-owned vehicles performingpublic work. When the Legislature decided to impose BART and ULSD requirements on certainprivate diesel vehicles engaged in redevelopment efforts in lower Manhattan, it did so, not byusing the phrase "on behalf of," but by explicitly directing public agencies to include therequirements in agreements with their "contractors and subcontractors" (L 2004, ch 231, §1 [e]). Similarly, in imposing BART and ULSD requirements on certain other privately-owneddiesel vehicles, the Administrative Code of the City of New York required public workscontracts and solicitations to specify that "all contractors" were subject to the requirements(Administrative Code of City of NY § 24-163.3 [c] [1], [2]). Notably, the AdministrativeCode of the City of New York contains other provisions separately imposing BART and ULSDrequirements on diesel vehicles "owned by, operated by or on behalf of, or leased by" cityagencies—language identical to that in DERA, but not, apparently, understood toencompass contracted private vehicles (Administrative Code of City of NY § 24-163.3 [b][1], [2]). In enacting DERA, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of such priorlegislation on this subject and to have chosen the statutory language accordingly (seeMcKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 222).

We find nothing in the language of DERA, construed as a whole (see Friedman v Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.Co., 9 NY3d 105, 115 [2007]), indicating that the Legislature intended it to extendbeyond prime contractors. The statute's grandfathering provision refers to "vehicle[s] subject to alease or public works contract" (ECL 19-0323 [3]), but makes no reference to subcontractors orother private suppliers with indirect relationships to the state. DERA similarly limits DEC'sreporting requirements to vehicles "owned or operated" by state agencies and authorities (ECL19-0323 [7]). The statute's legislative findings refer to vehicles that the state "owns or operatesthrough contract" (L 2006, ch 629, § 2). Reference to the statute's legislative history furthersupports a construction of the phrase "on behalf of" that does not extend beyond privately-ownedvehicles under direct contract with the state (see generally Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch629).[FN3][*5]

Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature did notintend to impose DERA's requirements on vehicles other than those used by prime contractorsunder direct contract with state agencies and public authorities, as defined in 6 NYCRR 248-1.1(b) (23). "[A]n administrative agency may not promulgate a regulation that adds a requirementthat does not exist under the statute" (Kahal Bnei Emunim & Talmud Torah Bnei SimonIsrael v Town of Fallsburg, 78 NY2d 194, 204 [1991]). The definitions of "on behalf of,""contractor," and "subcontractor" in 6 NYCRR 248-1.1 (b) (10), (20) and (28) impose DERA'srequirements on a larger class of private vehicles than the Legislature intended and must beannulled as in excess of DEC's authority (see Riccelli Enters., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 30 Misc 3d 573, 584-585 [2010]).

Petitioners further argue that the regulations should be reformed to allow additional time forcompliance because of DEC's substantial delay in promulgating them. However, nothing inDERA established any set time limit by which DEC was required to implement the regulations(see Matter of Court Reporting Inst. v New York State Educ. Dept., 237 AD2d 1, 4[1997]; Matter of Schulz v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 200 AD2d 793,796 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 758 [1994]; compare Matter of Janus Petroleum vNew York State Tax Appeals Trib., 180 AD2d 53, 54-55 [1992]). Moreover, the BART andULSD requirements were established when DERA was enacted in 2006 and have remainedunchanged since then, placing private contractors with potentially-affected vehicles on notice.Finally, as previously noted, the compliance timetable in question was established by theLegislature as part of DERA's explicit provisions. DEC is not authorized to change such "clearand unambiguous terms of the law" (Kahal Bnei Emunim & Talmud Torah Bnei Simon Israelv Town of Fallsburg, 78 NY2d at 204 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), norshould this Court substitute its judgment for the Legislature's in determining how much time isrequired for compliance (see Matter of Taylor v Sise, 33 NY2d 357, 365 [1974]).

Finally, petitioners contend that DEC's regulations are unconstitutional in that they may beretroactively applied in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the US Constitution. Evenassuming that DERA and its regulations could be found to be so punitive in purpose or effect asto render the constitutional prohibition against retroactive punishment applicable (see Smith vDoe, 538 US 84, 92 [2003]; compare Hunter v Warren County Bd. of Supervisors, 21 AD3d622, 625 [2005]), no retroactive enforcement has occurred. After promulgating 6 NYCRRpart 248, DEC issued a letter indicating that, because of its delay in promulgating the regulations,it would exercise enforcement discretion and would not enforce the regulations as to violationsthat took place in 2008 or 2009, nor would it enforce the reporting requirements for thoseyears.[FN4][*6]Petitioners' contention that DEC could withdraw this promiseat any time is mere conjecture and, as retroactive enforcement may never occur, the question isnot ripe for judicial review (see Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v Barwick, 67 NY2d510, 518 [1986], cert denied 479 US 985 [1986]).

Mercure, J.P., Spain, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified,on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as declared that 6 NYCRR 248-1.1 (b)(10), (20) and (28) were promulgated in compliance with the Diesel Emissions Reduction Actand dismissed the petition on that ground; petition reinstated to that extent and annul 6 NYCRR248-1.1 (b) (10), (20) and (28); and, as so modified, affirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: Petitioners' challenge is focusedon the BART requirement, apparently because it is more onerous than the ULSD requirement,but the class of vehicles affected is identical.

Footnote 2: DEC's regulatory interpretationsin this record give rise to considerable uncertainty as to the scope of the agency's intendedregulation. For example, though DEC has asserted that the DERA regulations do not apply tovehicles supplying state agencies under ordinary purchase contracts, as opposed to public workscontracts, in its written responses to public comments, DEC indicated that it would enforce theregulations against trucks delivering heating and vehicle fuel under state-wide purchase contractsand to vehicles delivering office supplies to state buildings, when the deliveries were "integral"to its work. DEC's claim that the regulations would be applied only to vehicles providing servicesor materials "integral to the mission" of the contracting agency was similarly belied by DEC'swritten responses to public comments.

Footnote 3: The sponsor's memorandumindicated that the statute's requirements would extend to "the fleets of businesses doing work forthe state," but also stated that the bill was directed at state-owned vehicles and "vehicles undercontract with the state" (Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch 629, at 6). The report of the Division of theBudget stated that it would apply to the "State and its contractors" and would increase costs for"businesses with State contracts" (Budget Report on Bills, Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch 629, at 8-9).Other documents indicate that the Legislature had extensive information before it pertaining tothe economic impact that DERA's requirements would have on state-owned anddirectly-contracted vehicles, but gave little or no consideration to their economic impact onsubcontractors, sub-subcontractors and other private-sector businesses who participate indirectlyin state work.

Footnote 4: In December 2010, DEC alsoindicated that it would not enforce 6 NYCRR part 248 pending the outcome of this appeal(see Riccelli Enters., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 30 Misc 3d at584 n 3).


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