| Olivaria v Lin & Son Realty Corp. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 03655 [84 AD3d 423] |
| May 3, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Cynthia Olivaria et al., Respondents, v Lin & Son RealtyCorp., Appellant, and 922 Third Avenue, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Pollack Pollack Isaac & DeCicco, New York (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), forrespondents.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J.), entered February 8, 2010, whichdenied defendant Lin & Son Realty Corp.'s motion to vacate the default judgment entered againstit, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and the motion granted.
Plaintiff Cynthia Olivaria was allegedly injured by carbon monoxide fumes that emanatedfrom a portable heater at her workplace. The premises, consisting of two floors of office space,had been leased by Lin to the injured plaintiff's employer under a written instrument.
Upon bringing this negligence action, plaintiffs served Lin by delivery of copies of thesummons and complaint to the Secretary of State pursuant to Business Corporation Law §306. By order entered on February 4, 2003, Supreme Court (Janice L. Bowman, J.) grantedplaintiffs' motion for a default judgment against Lin. Following an inquest, the court (LucindoSuarez, J.) directed the Clerk to enter judgment by order dated August 11, 2009. Thereupon, theClerk entered a money judgment in favor of plaintiffs against Lin on August 20, 2009. InNovember 2009, Lin moved for an order vacating the default judgment and permitting it tointerpose an answer. The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that Lin was not entitled torelief under CPLR 5015 (a) (1) because it had not made the requisite showing of a reasonableexcuse for its default. The court also found that relief under CPLR 317 was unavailable becauseLin's motion was untimely.
Relief under CPLR 5015 (a) (1) was properly denied. The record shows that Lin did notreceive process because it failed to maintain a current address on file with the Secretary of Statefor 18 years (see On Assignment vMedasorb Tech., LLC, 50 AD3d 342 [2008]; Business Corporation Law § 408).
The Supreme Court should not have concluded, however, that Lin's request for relief underCPLR 317 was untimely. The statute permits a defendant who has been "served with a summonsother than by personal delivery" and has not appeared to defend the action upon a finding of thecourt that the defendant "did not personally receive notice of the summons in time [*2]to defend and has a meritorious defense" (CPLR 317). A defendantso served may be allowed to defend the action "within one year after [such defendant] obtainsknowledge of entry of the judgment, but in no event more than five years after such entry"(id.).[FN*]In making a CPLR 317 motion, a defendant does not have to come forward with a reasonableexcuse for its default (see Pena v Mittleman, 179 AD2d 607, 609 [1992]).
By regarding the February 4, 2003 order as an entered judgment, the court reached theconclusion that the statutory five-year period had expired. This was error. "A judgment is enteredwhen, after it has been signed by the clerk, it is filed by him" (CPLR 5016 [a]). Unlike the 2003order, the 2009 judgment was duly signed and entered by the County Clerk. Accordingly, themotion was timely because August 20, 2009 is the date of entry from which Lin's time is to bemeasured.
The lease between Lin and the injured plaintiff's employer provided for heating throughperimeter ducts and made no mention of portable heaters. Lin's president states by affidavit thatthe company had no knowledge of the tenant's use of portable heaters. Thus, Lin hasdemonstrated, prima facie, that it has a meritorious defense to plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, itdoes not appear that Lin deliberately attempted to avoid notice of this action (see e.g. EugeneDi Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 143 [1986]). In the exercise ofdiscretion, we therefore grant Lin's motion to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR 317.Concur—Sweeny, J.P., Moskowitz, DeGrasse, Freedman and Richter, JJ.
Footnote *: Plaintiffs do not challenge Lin'sassertion that it did not learn of this action until three months after the judgment had beenentered.