| Glenn Acres Tree Farm, Inc. v Town of Hartwick Historical Socy.,Inc. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 03934 [84 AD3d 1529] |
| May 12, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Glenn Acres Tree Farm, Inc., Appellant, v Town ofHartwick Historical Society, Inc., Respondent. |
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Spain, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Dowd, J.), entered November 12,2009 in Otsego County, upon a decision of the court in favor of defendant.
Plaintiff commenced this action to quiet title pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to a parcel of realproperty located in the Town of Hartwick, Otsego County, and to the historic schoolhouse whichimproves the property. In the complaint, plaintiff asserts that defendant "might unjustly claim" aninterest in the schoolhouse structure and, accordingly, plaintiff seeks a declaration that it is theabsolute owner of the parcel and its improvements. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment anddefendant cross-moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint based onplaintiff's failure to join a necessary party, namely plaintiff's grantor, Robert Myers. SupremeCourt denied both motions and determined that Myers was not a necessary party.
Following a brief nonjury trial, Supreme Court found that plaintiff had failed to establish bya preponderance of the evidence that it had any right to the schoolhouse or the lot on which itsits (hereinafter the property), and dismissed the complaint. Specifically, Supreme Courtrelied upon the following language in plaintiff's deed: "All that certain plot, piece or parcel ofland . . . situate . . . at South Hartwick, County of Otsego and State ofNew York, and bounded as follows, to wit: . . . excepting and reserving therefromthree several dwelling houses and the lands belonging to them, also one store and lot andblack-smith shop and lot, one school house and lot situated on said premises." Given this clearlanguage excepting the schoolhouse property from the land deeded to plaintiff, Supreme Courtfound that plaintiff had never taken title to the property and, thus, could not demonstrateownership to the lot or schoolhouse either by title or [*2]reversion. Accordingly, Supreme Court dismissed the complaint.Plaintiff appeals, asserting that Supreme Court erred in simply dismissing plaintiff's claim, ratherthan issuing a declaration concerning the validity of all parties' claims to the property, andarguing, in any event, that plaintiff's right to the property is superior to defendant's. We nowaffirm the dismissal of the complaint, but on different grounds, as we hold that the complaintshould have been dismissed for failure to join necessary parties other than Myers.
Initially, we note that had the action properly proceeded to the merits, plaintiff is correct inasserting that the dismissal of the complaint, without a declaration resolving each parties' interestin the property, was error. "RPAPL article 15 requires that judgments made pursuant thereto shalldeclare the validity or invalidity of 'any claim to any estate or interest established by any party tothe action' . . . As such, Supreme Court's order dismissing the complaint withoutmaking such a declaration was insufficient" (Keller v Village of Castleton-on-Hudson,173 AD2d 979, 979 [1991], quoting RPAPL 1521 [1]; see Orrino v Norbon Homes, 35AD2d 732, 732 [1970]). Here, however, because a review of the available proof leads us to theconclusion that title to the property cannot be ascertained on this record and that necessary partiesto the action were omitted, we conclude that the complaint was properly dismissed, but shouldhave been dismissed without prejudice.
A title search of the property conducted in 1985 by Lynn E. Green, Jr., the attorney for theCooperstown Central School District, suggested to Green that the school was built over a centuryand a half ago on land then owned by John Webb and Elizabeth Webb, predecessors in interest toplaintiff. When the Webbs conveyed their land, Green found that they excepted the property indispute here, creating the exception that now appears in plaintiff's deed. No deed was foundconveying the property to defendant's alleged predecessors in interest, School District No.10[FN*]In December 1985, the Town of Hartwick, the South Hartwick Community Club and apredecessor in interest to plaintiff, Glenn Myers, executed an agreement which provided that theTown would accept the schoolhouse building, the South Hartwick Community Club would payfor maintenance and other bills, and Glenn Myers would permit the building to continue on thesite, suggesting that the parties to the agreement at that time believed that Glenn Myers ownedthe land, but not the schoolhouse building. In July 2003, the Town passed a resolution grantingits interest in the schoolhouse to defendant. Glenn Myers died in 1993 and his son, Robert Myers,sold the property to plaintiff in 1995. At the time of purchase, plaintiff was informed that theschoolhouse building on the property belonged to the Town. Thereafter, plaintiff executed twoleases with the Town, both of which provided that plaintiff owned the property, the Town ownedthe building, and plaintiff would rent the schoolhouse for a year. Eventually, plaintiff came tobelieve that the Town did not own the schoolhouse and thereafter he refused to continue the leasearrangement and commenced this action.or to anyone else. If this information is correct, the Webbs' heirs have a potential claim to the[*3]property and should have been made parties to this action(see CPLR 1001 [a]; Hitchcock v Boyack, 256 AD2d 842, 844 [1998]; seealso Matter of J-T Assoc. v Hudson Riv.—Black Riv. Regulating Dist., 175 AD2d438, 440 [1991], lv denied 79 NY2d 753 [1992]).
Notably, the findings of fact submitted by defendant and adopted by Supreme Court suggestthat the property may not have belonged to the Webbs. Supreme Court refers to an 1828 deedfrom Riall Briggs to Samuel Remington and an 1836 deed from Samuel Remington and ContentRemington to John Webb, which were not included in the record on appeal. Contrary to Green'sconclusion that the Webbs owned the schoolhouse lot, Supreme Court's findings, based on themetes and bounds description found in the 1828 and 1836 deeds, imply that the property thereindescribed "goes around" the schoolhouse lot. Thus, the heirs of a predecessor in interest evenearlier than the Webbs may lay claim to the property and would be necessary parties to an actionto quiet title.
It is clear, though, that when the property plaintiff now owns was conveyed to John Myers in1879 from Huldah Manzer and Ephriam Manzer, predecessors in interest to plaintiff, theexception as it exists today appeared in that deed. Accordingly, Supreme Court did not err inholding that Robert Myers, John Myers' successor in interest and plaintiff's grantor, is not anecessary party to this proceeding. Further review of the pertinent deeds and other indicia ofownership not included in the record before us will be necessary to determine who the necessaryparties are in any new action.
Peters, J.P., Kavanagh, Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment ismodified, on the law, without costs, by adding that the dismissal of the complaint is withoutprejudice.
Footnote *: During the second half of thenineteenth and into the twentieth century, School District No. 10 apparently was in possession ofthe schoolhouse. In 1958, School District No. 10 was dissolved and eventually became part ofthe Cooperstown Central School District, but Green testified that the consolidation would notautomatically pass title to property owned by the former School District No. 10. Based on thisinformation, and in the absence of any proof to the contrary, Green opined that the school districtdid not own the property and need not continue to insure it. Nevertheless, in October 1985, theCooperstown Central School District resolved to pass any interest it may have had in theschoolhouse by quitclaim bill of sale to the Town of Hartwick[FN*]
Footnote *: This was accomplished byquitclaim bill of sale, dated January 31, 1886.