Confidential Brokerage Servs., Inc. v Confidential PlanningCorp.
2011 NY Slip Op 04577 [85 AD3d 1268]
June 2, 2011
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 10, 2011


Confidential Brokerage Services, Inc., Respondent, v ConfidentialPlanning Corporation et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

—[*1]Costello, Cooney & Fearon, P.L.L.C., Syracuse (Christopher G. Todd of counsel), forappellants.

Aswad & Ingraham, Binghamton (Charles O. Ingraham of counsel), for respondent.

McCarthy, J. Appeals from an order and amended order of the Supreme Court (Tait, J.),entered February 19, 2010 and February 24, 2010 in Broome County, which, among other things,granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.

Defendant Confidential Planning Corporation (hereinafter CPC) is a financial servicescompany that specializes in investment and retirement plans for school system employees, amongothers. Plaintiff provides similar services. In 2002, the two entered into a billing servicesagreement where plaintiff would pay CPC to perform billing and remittance services for schooldistrict employees that plaintiff serviced. In 2006, defendant Pinnacle Holdings, LLC purchasedCPC as part of a stock purchase agreement. Defendant Confidential Planning I, LLC was formedas a subsidiary of Pinnacle's parent corporation. These three defendants (hereinafter collectivelyreferred to as defendants) shared an address and had several officers and partners in common.

In May 2008, CPC ceased providing remittance services to plaintiff. Thereafter, CPC sent amailing to solicit business from potential clients, some of whom were plaintiff's clients. In [*2]June 2008, principals of plaintiff and CPC met and signed anagreement whereby plaintiff agreed not to sue CPC for failing to give effective notice that it wasterminating the 2002 agreement, and CPC agreed not to solicit or contact plaintiff's clients for athree-year period. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff commenced this action alleging, as relevant here,that defendants breached the covenant not to compete. Plaintiff moved for a preliminaryinjunction seeking to enjoin defendants from contacting or soliciting its clients. Following ahearing, Supreme Court granted the preliminary injunction. Defendants appeal.[FN1]To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiff was required to establish "the likelihood of ultimatesuccess on the merits, irreparable injury and a balancing of equities in [its] favor" (UlsterHome Care v Vacco, 255 AD2d 73, 76 [1999]; accord Town of Elmira v Hutchison, 53 AD3d 939, 940 [2008]).The decision to grant or deny such a motion rests in the trial court's discretion and will bedisturbed only if that discretion was abused (see Cooperstown Capital, LLC v Patton, 60 AD3d 1251, 1252[2009]). Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion.

The June 2008 agreement provides that neither "CPC nor its affiliated companies will solicit,contact or pursue clients of [plaintiff] for which CPC previously provided common remittancefor purposes of soliciting said clients to become clients of CPC for a period of three (3) years."Defendants contend that no meeting of the minds occurred so as to form an enforceable contract.At the hearing, however, CPC's former president, who signed the agreement on CPC's behalf,testified that CPC did not intend to contact or solicit plaintiff's clients. Although he originallystated that plaintiff's clients included only those highlighted by plaintiff on a list provided byCPC in March 2008, he acknowledged that the client list was not clear or definite, and he knewthat the list was incomplete. He conceded that the term "clients" could include all those for whomCPC "previously" provided remittance services at any prior time on behalf of plaintiff. While theterm "clients" may need to be more clearly defined later in this action, Supreme Court found thatthe parties had a sufficient understanding of that term so as to determine that a valid contract wasentered into. The court issued a preliminary injunction limited to those clients whose names wereon a list submitted by plaintiff at the hearing, thereby creating a definite class, as opposed toincluding unknown clients, and making it clear who defendants were precluded from soliciting.While plaintiff's ultimate success is not guaranteed, a likelihood of success was established.

The loss of clients and goodwill could create irreparable harm (see Alside Div. ofAssociated Materials v Leclair, 295 AD2d 873, 874 [2002]). Plaintiff offered proof that CPCprovided remittance services for nearly all of plaintiff's clients, thereby giving CPC access toclients' contact and financial services information. While plaintiff did not have exclusivecontracts with those clients, and the clients could choose a new financial services provider at anytime, plaintiff would be harmed if CPC used the compiled contact information to solicit all ofplaintiff's clients. Plaintiff alleged that it had already lost 25 individual clients, some currentclients were confused by the solicitations from CPC and plaintiff would continue to sufferirreparable harm from further solicitation (see id.). Weighing this harm against thelimited [*3]prejudice to CPC if it is prevented from solicitingcertain clients for a three-year duration, the equities balance in plaintiff's favor. Accordingly,Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted plaintiff a preliminary injunction.

The June 2008 agreement prohibited CPC or "its affiliated companies" from contacting orsoliciting plaintiff's clients. Although Confidential Planning I and Pinnacle are separate corporateentities from CPC, based upon the interrelationship of those entities with CPC, it was reasonablefor Supreme Court to preliminarily enjoin them all as affiliated companies.

Prior to the issuance of a preliminary injunction, plaintiff was statutorily required to give anundertaking in an amount fixed by Supreme Court (see CPLR 6312 [b]; CooperstownCapital, LLC v Patton, 60 AD3d at 1253). The court did not set an amount for anundertaking. As an undertaking is a statutory requirement that cannot be waived, we must remitfor the court to set a proper amount (see Rourke Devs. v Cottrell-Hajeck, Inc., 285 AD2d805, 805-806 [2001]; Honeywell, Inc. v Technical Bldg. Servs., 103 AD2d 433, 434 n[1984]). We realize that this is largely an illusory victory for defendants because the three-yearperiod covered by the covenant not to compete ends on June 26, 2011. Plaintiff concedes that thepreliminary injunction will expire on that date.[FN2]Thus, although we are required to remit based upon Supreme Court's failure to order thestatutorily required undertaking, the practical effect of our decision will be minimal because thepreliminary injunction may expire before the parties are even able to appear in court on theremittal.

Mercure, J.P., Rose, Lahtinen and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order andamended order are modified, on the law, without costs, by adding a provision thereto thatplaintiff shall post an undertaking as provided in CPLR 6312 (b) in an amount set by SupremeCourt; matter remitted to the Supreme Court for that purpose; and, as so modified, affirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: Supreme Court issued anamended order correcting typographical errors. Defendants appeal from both the order andamended order.

Footnote 2: Had this appeal been decidedafter that date, we would have dismissed the appeal as moot (cf. General Elec. Co. v MetalsResources Group, 293 AD2d 417, 419 [2002]; Quandt's Wholesale Distribs. vGiardino, 89 AD2d 669 [1982]).


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