| Matter of Griffiss Local Dev. Corp. v State of N.Y. Auth. BudgetOff. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 05150 [85 AD3d 1402] |
| June 16, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Griffiss Local Development Corporation,Appellant, v State of New York Authority Budget Office et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Paul Groenwegen of counsel), forrespondents. J. Wade Beltramo, New York State Conference of Mayors & Municipal Officials, Albany,for New York State Conference of Mayors & Municipal Officials, amicus curiae. Harris Beach, P.L.L.C., Pittsford (Shawn M. Griffin of counsel), for New York StateEconomic Development Council, amicus curiae.
Stein, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lynch, J.), entered December 21,2009 in Albany County, which, among other things, dismissed petitioner's application, in acombined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to reviewa determination of respondent Authority Budget Office requiring petitioner to comply with thePublic Authorities Accountability Act of 2005.[*2]
Respondent Authority Budget Office (hereinafterrespondent)[FN1]made a preliminary determination that petitioner—a not-for-profit local developmentcorporation whose sole purpose is the redevelopment of the former Griffiss Air Force Base in theCity of Rome, Oneida County—was a public authority and, as such, was subject to thePublic Authorities Accountability Act of 2005 (see L 2005, ch 766 [hereinafterPAAA]).[FN2]After considering petitioner's arguments in opposition to its preliminary determination,respondent reaffirmed its position and rendered a final determination that petitioner was subjectto the PAAA. When its further protests were unsuccessful, petitioner commenced this combinedCPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking, among other things, toannul respondent's determination that it was required to comply with the PAAA and a declarationthat the PAAA has no applicability to petitioner. Finding that petitioner "was created by OneidaCounty with the cooperation of the City of Rome and [a predecessor organization]," SupremeCourt determined that petitioner was a " 'local authority,' " issued a declaration that petitioner issubject to the PAAA and dismissed the petition. Upon petitioner's appeal, we now affirm.
We agree with Supreme Court's well-reasoned determination that petitioner is a localauthority, subject to the provisions of the PAAA. The intention of the Legislature in enacting thePAAA was to "improve oversight, accountability, and transparency [with respect to] publicauthorities, thereby strengthening public confidence in their important work" (Senate IntroducerMem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2005, ch 766, at 7). Toward that end, the PAAA defines a localauthority as "a not-for-profit corporation affiliated with, sponsored by, or created by a county,city, town or village government" (Public Authorities Law § 2 [2] [b], as amended by L2005, ch 766, § 2).
Initially, we reject petitioner's contention that such definition is unconstitutionally vague."Legislative enactments enjoy a 'presumption of constitutionality, imposing a heavy burden on aparty trying to overcome it' " (State ofNew York v Dennin, 17 AD3d 744, 747 [2005], lv dismissed 5 NY3d 824[2005], quoting Matter of Carpenter Tech. Corp. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin.,295 AD2d 830, 834 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 501 [2002]; see People v Taylor, 9 NY3d 129,150 [2007]). "A statute withstands an attack for vagueness if it contains sufficient standards toafford a reasonable degree of certainty so that a person of ordinary intelligence is not forced toguess at its meaning and to safeguard against arbitrary enforcement" (Salvatore v City ofSchenectady, 139 AD2d 87, 89 [1988] [citation omitted]). It is not necessary that allstatutory terms be defined (see Matter of Flow v Mark IV Constr. Co., 288 AD2d 779,780 [2001]; Matter of Addei v State Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct, 278 AD2d 551,552 [2000]). In our view, a plain reading of Public Authorities Law § 2 (2) (b) by a personof ordinary intelligence gives fair notice of what the statute means and to whom it applies with areasonable degree of certainty (see Foss v City of Rochester, 65 NY2d [*3]247, 253 [1985]), and the terms set forth therein, althoughundefined, are sufficiently clear to prevent unfettered discretion in determining whichnot-for-profit corporations are subject to the PAAA (see generally People v Stuart, 100NY2d 412, 430 [2003, Kaye, Ch. J., concurring]; Matter of Morrissey v Apostol, 75 AD3d 993, 996 [2010];Salvatore v City of Schenectady, 139 AD2d at 89).
Turning to the merits, we begin with the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms. Themeaning of the word "create" is "to bring into existence" or "to produce or bring about by acourse of action" (Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/create [accessed June 10, 2011]). The term "sponsor" has been defined as "onewho assumes responsibility for some other person or thing" and "a person or an organization thatpays for or plans and carries out a project or activity" (Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary,http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sponsor [accessed June 10, 2011]). The term"affiliated" means "associated with" (Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary,http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affiliated [accessed June 10, 2011]; seeBlack's Law Dictionary 63 [8th ed 2004]). Ascribing the plain and ordinary meaning to thoseterms (see generally Friedman vConnecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 105, 115 [2007]), we are of the view thatpetitioner was created by, sponsored by and/or affiliated with the local government within themeaning of the PAAA and, thus, qualifies as a "local authority" for purposes of the statute.
Griffiss Air Force Base, located in the City of Rome, Oneida County, was closed by thefederal government in the mid-1990s, leaving the base largely vacant. As a result, the areasuffered an economic downturn and local municipalities joined together in an attempt tomaintain, strengthen and expand the use of the former base and promote employment in order tomitigate the adverse economic impact of the closing. Petitioner's predecessor organization,Griffiss Redevelopment Planning Council (hereinafter GRPC), was established by OneidaCounty and the City of Rome in 1994 and the State Legislature appropriated funds to the StateUrban Development Corporation to "provide assistance . . . to a local developmentcorporation organized, with the cooperation of the [GRPC, the County and the City]" (L 1994, ch63, § 110). Petitioner's certificate of incorporation was filed later that same year.[FN3]Petitioner's stated "public/quasi-public purposes" include "lessening the burdens of governmentand acting in the public interest" and require that petitioner "cooperate and coordinate. . . with local governments in the City of Rome, Oneida County and the City ofUtica . . . and other state and local economic development organizations that maybe appropriate." Moreover, the certificate of incorporation provides that, upon its dissolution,petitioner's assets will be distributed to Oneida County and the City of Rome. Pursuant to itsbylaws and as specified by the funding legislation, petitioner's board of directors consists of 15directors, including the Mayor of the City of Rome, three mayoral appointees, the Oneida CountyExecutive and three of his or her appointees (see L 1994, ch 63, § 110). Thus, as acondition of the appropriation, a majority of petitioner's board is comprised of local officials.
In February 1995, the County entered into an agreement with petitioner outlining the termsupon which petitioner would succeed GRPC. The agreement explains that the [*4]Oneida County Legislature "authorized and approvedsponsorship of the Griffiss redevelopment effort by the County of Oneida throughapplication of a grant . . . from the Department of Defense, Office of EconomicAdjustment . . . and said resolution authorized and directed the [Oneida] CountyExecutive to execute any and all documents related thereto as may be necessary to effect suchgrant" (emphasis added). The County not only agreed to be the applicant for the federal funding,but also directly provided petitioner with funds to be used for the redevelopment efforts atGriffiss Air Force Base. The federal grant received by the County was administered by petitionerpursuant to its contract with the County. Additional financing for the project was obtained byissuing certain bonds and involved the assignment to petitioner by local taxing jurisdictions of aportion of payments in lieu of taxes. Overall, the record strongly reflects the close relationshipbetween petitioner and local governments, and persuades us that petitioner, whose purpose is toassist such municipalities in carrying out their redevelopment efforts, is the type of entity that theLegislature intended to subject to the provisions of the PAAA.[FN4]
Petitioner's remaining contentions, to the extent they are properly before us, have beenconsidered and are unavailing.
Mercure, J.P., Peters, Lahtinen and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs. [Prior Case History: 26 Misc 3d 815.]
Footnote 1: We recognize that, aftercommencement of this matter, a statutory change was made to respondent's name from"Authority Budget Office" to "Authorities Budget Office" (see L 2009, ch 506, §5).
Footnote 2: The PAAA imposes numerousrequirements on entities subject to its provisions including, among other things, audits, reportingduties and board member training (see Public Authorities Law §§2800-2806, 2824-2825).
Footnote 3: Apparently, GRPC's lack ofstatus as a legal entity was an impediment to the receipt of certain grants and the GRPC hadconsidered a variety of alternative structures that were determined to be unfeasible.
Footnote 4: Contrary to the contentions ofpetitioner and amici curiae, this conclusion does not signify that any not-for-profit corporationthat receives money from, provides a service for or has any relationship with local municipalities,however marginal, will be considered to be a "local authority" for purposes of the PAAA. Thedetermination here that petitioner is such an entity is based upon the totality of the circumstancesincluding, among other things, its establishment for a sole public/quasi-public purpose.