Matter of Perez v Rhea
2011 NY Slip Op 06322 [87 AD3d 476]
August 25, 2011
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 28, 2011


In the Matter of Jacqueline Perez, Appellant,
v
John B.Rhea, as Chairman of the New York City Housing Authority,Respondent.

—[*1]Reisman, Peirez & Reisman LLP, Garden City (Marc Sackin of counsel), for appellant.

Sonya M. Kaloyanides, New York (Seth E. Kramer of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Paul Feinman, J.), entered April 28, 2010,dismissing this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul and vacate or, in the alternative,remand for imposition of a lesser penalty, the determination of the New York City HousingAuthority (NYCHA) which terminated petitioner's tenancy based upon findings that she failed toreport employment income, reversed, on the law, without costs, to grant the petition to the extentof vacating the penalty of termination and remanding the matter to NYCHA for the imposition ofa lesser penalty.

Where petitioner, a model tenant, has faithfully abided by an agreement with NYCHA tomake full restitution of her rent underpayments, the decision to terminate her tenancy constituteda disproportionate penalty that would likely leave petitioner, the single mother of three childrenwho also reside in the apartment, two of whom have diagnosed disabilities, homeless.

Petitioner Jacqueline Perez, 37 years of age, has lived in NYCHA housing for virtually herentire life and in the subject apartment for more than 17 years.

Petitioner alleged that in 2006, NYCHA sent a fax to petitioner's employer seekingverification of employment. Immediately thereafter, petitioner alleged that she and an assistanthousing manager, Mr. Emmeric, had a conversation wherein petitioner admitted that she hadmistakenly underreported her income. Petitioner alleged that Emmeric requested petitioner'spresence at an informal meeting and informed her to bring copies of her pay stubs. Petitioner wasnot told to bring an attorney and was not informed that the meeting might result incommencement of termination of tenancy proceedings, even though, she asserts, the NYCHAmanual provides that if "the Housing Manager believes that termination proceedings should beinitiated against a tenant, first Call-In Letter, Form 040.185 shall be used to call the tenant to theoffice for an interview," and that at the interview, "the tenant may be accompanied by someone,such as an attorney, to assist him/her."

Emmeric and Ms. Reid, another assistant housing manager, attended the meeting on behalf ofNYCHA. Petitioner alleges that Emmeric and Reid reached an agreement with her whereinpetitioner agreed to make NYCHA whole by paying a prorated increased amount of rent eachmonth. NYCHA maintains that there is no evidence that such an "unwritten agreement" [*2]was reached. Nonetheless, following the meeting, petitioner allegesthat she began paying a prorated increased amount of rent each month.

By letter dated July 6, 2006, Chief Investigator Christopher A. France requested thatpetitioner appear for an interview regarding her tenancy. At the meeting, petitioner once againadmitted that she had underreported her income and offered to make full restitution. Petitionerwas never informed that her tenancy was in jeopardy of being terminated.

By letter dated November 29, 2006, petitioner was informed that criminal charges were beingbrought against her due to the underreporting of her income. Petitioner subsequently pleadedguilty to petit larceny, a class A misdemeanor. She was given a conditional discharge so long asshe abided by the terms of a stipulation entered into among petitioner, the Assistant DistrictAttorney, and NYCHA, wherein petitioner agreed to pay NYCHA the sum of $300 per monthuntil the indebtedness was repaid. Petitioner, once again, was never informed that her tenancymight be terminated.

From July 2007 through the present, petitioner has fully complied with the repaymentschedule set forth in the stipulation, and NYCHA does not claim otherwise. Nonetheless, onNovember 24, 2008, long after petitioner had commenced repayments, petitioner was notifiedthat her tenancy was in danger of being terminated. The charges included non-desirability,misrepresentation, non-verifiable income and breach of rules and regulations in connection withthe underreporting of income from 1999 to 2005.

At the hearing, NYCHA's chief investigator, Christopher A. France, conceded that petitionerhad made arrangements to make full restitution of any outstanding monies owed NYCHA anddid not dispute that petitioner was current with her restitution payments.

Petitioner admitted that she had mistakenly underreported her income to NYCHA, butmaintained that she had never intended to defraud NYCHA. She testified that she had nevermissed a restitution payment and had, as of the time of the hearing, repaid half of theindebtedness. She lived in the subject apartment with three children, one of whom is 17 years oldand suffers from dyslexia and learning disabilities, and another who is seven years old and hasattention deficit disorder, learning disabilities and emotional problems.

Petitioner, who is employed as an assistant bookkeeper, testified that she did not earn enoughto afford non-NYCHA housing and faced homelessness in the event of eviction.

The hearing officer sustained the charges and recommended termination of petitioner'stenancy, finding petitioner's testimony about "[t]he plight of the family, especially with a disabledchild," to be "an insufficiently mitigating circumstance." NYCHA approved the decision anddisposition finding petitioner tenant ineligible for continued occupancy and terminated hertenancy.

Petitioner thereafter brought this article 78 proceeding, alleging that NYCHA's decision toterminate her tenancy was in violation of NYCHA's own mandated procedures and constituted apenalty so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to the conscience.

We find that termination of petitioner's tenancy was "so disproportionate to the offense,"underpayment of rent, "in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense offairness" (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns ofScarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 233 [1974]).

Petitioner is a long-time resident of NYCHA housing with an otherwise unblemished record.She has already repaid over $10,0000 of the amount owed and in a few years restitution [*3]will be complete.[FN*]

We have stated that "[t]he forfeiture of public housing accommodations is a drastic penaltybecause, for many of its residents, it constitutes a tenancy of last resort" (Matter of Holiday vFranco, 268 AD2d 138, 142 [2000] [citations omitted]). We have also found that where thecircumstances underlying the charges against a tenant no longer exist, eviction of the tenantconstitutes a disproportionate penalty (see Matter of James v New York City Hous.Auth., 186 AD2d 498 [1992] [termination of tenancy for undesirability based on one incidentwhere petitioner set a fire in the subject apartment "shocked the conscience" where petitioner hadsince entered counseling and was taking medication and there was no indication that she hadreturned to alcohol or abuse of illicit substances]).

Supreme Court found that termination of petitioner's tenancy was not an excessive penaltysince she had concealed income. However, even if one classifies petitioner's offense as anintentional misrepresentation, evicting a tenant and her family may nonetheless constitute anunjustifiable penalty in light of the mitigating circumstances. The very case relied on by theSupreme Court, Matter of Davis v NewYork City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. (58 AD3d 418 [2009]), stands for thisproposition. This Court found that termination of tenancy was "shockingly disproportionate tothe offense," stating: "[The agency's] finding that petitioner intentionally failed to disclose herson's SSI benefits is supported by substantial evidence and has a rational basis in the record. Thepenalty of termination of the rent subsidy is shockingly disproportionate to the offense, however,since it will likely lead to homelessness for petitioner, a 25-year tenant, and the three minorchildren who live with her, one of whom is disabled" (id. at 419 [citations omitted]).

This is not an isolated holding. In Matter of Gray v Donovan (58 AD3d 488 [2009]), we foundtermination of the petitioner's housing subsidy to be "shockingly disproportionate to the offense,"notwithstanding her failure to report income earned by two adult children, where the petitionerhad lived in the building for more than 30 years, had no record of any prior offenses, and therecord indicated that termination of the subsidy would likely lead to homelessness for thepetitioner and her 13-year-old son.

In Matter of Williams vDonovan (60 AD3d 594 [2009]), we vacated the penalty of termination of a housingsubsidy and remitted for imposition of a lesser penalty, in spite of the fact that the tenant hadfailed to report income earned by an adult son, where the petitioner had resided in the apartmentfor 28 years and had an unblemished tenancy.

In Matter of Vazquez v New YorkCity Hous. Auth. (Robert Fulton Houses) (57 AD3d 360[*4][2008]), we vacated the penalty of termination where the tenant,who was chronically delinquent in rent payments and had been charged with unauthorized use ofan ATM card, made restitution of the amounts due to the complainant, had no prior criminalrecord, and cared for a family member with disabilities.

Like the tenants in the cited cases, petitioner has admitted to underreporting income and hasmade every effort to cure the violation by making restitution. Termination of her tenancy wouldhave severe consequences not only for petitioner but for the children she supports, two of whomhave disabilities. Since the penalty is "shockingly disproportionate to the offense," we vacate thepenalty and remit for imposition of a lesser penalty. Concur—Andrias, Saxe, Freedmanand Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.

Tom, J.P., dissents in a memorandum as follows: Following an investigation by the InspectorGeneral, petitioner, a tenant in New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) public housing, wasfound to have concealed employment income, thereby depriving the NYCHA of $27,144 in rent.She was arrested on charges of grand larceny in the third degree and offering a false instrumentfor filing in the third degree. On July 25, 2008, she entered a negotiated plea of guilty to thecrime of petit larceny in full satisfaction of the charges against her, receiving a conditionaldischarge in return for restitution in the amount of $20,000, to be paid in monthly installments.

In related administrative proceedings, NYCHA terminated petitioner's tenancy upon findingsthat she provided no explanation for failing to report her earned income to the NYCHA over aperiod of six years and that she had intentionally defrauded the agency. The Hearing Officerconcluded that the learning disabilities of her sons, ages 7 and 17, were insufficient mitigatingfactors and that termination was the appropriate disposition. This CPLR article 78 proceedingensued, culminating in Supreme Court's dismissal of the petition.

Stripped of its verbiage, the majority's rationale is that petitioner's tenancy should not beterminated because it might render her homeless. Granted, this Court has observed that publichousing is a last resort (see Matter of Holiday v Franco, 268 AD2d 138, 142 [2000]), butuniversal application of the principle would result in no tenant of public housing ever beingevicted, whatever the grounds. The appropriate standard of review is whether the administrativepenalty constitutes an abuse of discretion (CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. ofUnion Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County,34 NY2d 222, 232-234 [1974]), and if the sanction imposed does not shock the judicialconscience, it must be sustained (Matter of Featherstone v Franco, 95 NY2d 550, 554[2000]).

Here, petitioner was found to have intentionally defrauded the NYCHA over a six-yearperiod. In accordance with her plea agreement, petitioner was required to repay only $20,000 ofthe more than $27,000 in rent that she avoided paying, which amounts to no penalty at all. Ifdefrauding a governmental agency incurs no adverse consequence, others will be encouraged toengage in similar fraudulent conduct—hardly an outcome that promotes the ends ofjustice. Furthermore, the attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, dyslexia and unspecifiedemotional problems that affect her children are not such severe disabling conditions as to renderforfeiture of public housing accommodations a wholly disproportionate penalty.[*5]

As to the cases relied upon by the majority, in Matter of Davis v New York City Dept. ofHous. Preserv. & Dev. (58 AD3d 418, 419 [2009]), this Court considered the failure toreport income to be both inadvertent and immaterial, noting, "[P]etitioner's omission of her son'sincome had no effect on the amount of rent subsidy she received." Likewise, in Matter of Gray v Donovan (58 AD3d488, 488 [2009]), we stated, "[T]here is no indication . . . of the impact thatpetitioner's failure to report her adult children's income had, if any, on the amount of her housingsubsidy." Similarly, in Matter ofWilliams v Donovan (60 AD3d 594, 595 [2009]), we indicated that the record did notreflect "the precise amount of excess subsidy received by petitioner, if any," remanding thematter to the agency for calculation and imposition of a lesser penalty.

More to the point is Matter of Smithv New York City Hous. Auth. (40 AD3d 235 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 816[2007]), in which we upheld the termination of the petitioner's tenancy. The unauthorizedoccupancy of the apartment by petitioner's husband had the effect of concealing his income fromthe agency, "thereby producing a substantially lower rent" (id. at 235). Whileacknowledging the long duration of her tenancy and the hardship to the tenant and her15-year-old son, we concluded, "[W]e do not find that the penalty of termination shocks theconscience, especially since the termination of petitioner's tenancy was based on her ownconduct" (id.).

As in Matter of Smith, and unlike the cases relied upon by the majority, petitioner'sintentional concealment of her earnings had a material and substantial effect on the reduction ofher rent. Her payment of restitution was compelled by the prospect of imprisonment, not thewilling exercise of her own free will. Finally, the loss of her tenancy is entirely attributable to herown conduct. [Prior Case History: 2010 NY Slip Op 30763(U).]

Footnotes


Footnote *: NYCHA maintains thattermination of petitioner's tenancy does not shock the conscience because petitioner did not agreeto pay restitution "voluntarily," but rather, as part of a plea agreement pursuant to which thecharges against her were reduced. We disagree. In any event, petitioner alleges that she reached averbal agreement to repay NYCHA when first informed that she had underreported her income,prior to the entry of the formal stipulation.


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