| Matter of Burke v Verizon Servs. Group |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06613 [87 AD3d 1237] |
| September 29, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Claim of Kevin F. Burke, Appellant, v VerizonServices Group et al., Respondents. Workers' Compensation Board,Respondent. |
—[*1] Foley, Smit, O'Boyle & Weisman, Hauppauge (Theresa E. Wolinski of counsel), for VerizonServices Group and others, respondents.
Malone Jr., J. Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed May 7,2010, which, among other things, denied an application for an award of counsel fees to claimant'scounsel.
Claimant suffered an injury at work on May 5, 2009 and applied for workers' compensationbenefits. Prior to any award of benefits, the employer's workers' compensation carrier beganmaking payments to claimant in the amount of $550 per week. In addition, as part of its benefitplan, the employer began paying claimant wages in lieu of workers' compensation benefits so thatclaimant was receiving his full salary. In October 2009, the employer requested reimbursementfor the payments it had made in lieu of the workers' compensation benefits, but only "in the eventof an award for schedule loss and/or facial disfigurement."
At a hearing, the Workers' Compensation Law Judge (hereinafter WCLJ) determined that theemployer had reserved the right for reimbursement, contingent on any future schedule loss of useaward. Further, the WCLJ found the injury to be work-related and awarded benefits [*2]in the amount of $550 per week for the time period of May 13,2009 to July 20, 2009.[FN*]Although acknowledging the possibility that claimant may have a permanent disability resultingin a loss of use of an extremity, the WCLJ found no medical evidence supporting such a findingat that time. Claimant requested review by the Workers' Compensation Board, arguing that theemployer should not be allowed to reserve the right to reimbursement contingent on a futureschedule loss of use award. Alternatively, claimant's counsel requested that it be awarded counselfees.
On review, the Workers' Compensation Board found that the employer had waived anycurrent reimbursement, but had reserved its right to future reimbursement, contingent on aschedule loss of use award made on this claim. Further, the Board concluded that since therewere no payments currently being made to claimant and no current reimbursement owed to theemployer, there is no source of funds upon which a lien for counsel fees can attach. Based on thelack of such a source of funds, the Board denied the request for counsel fees. Claimant nowappeals.
Pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a), "[i]f the employer has madeadvance payments of compensation, or has made payments to an employee in like manner aswages during any period of disability, [the employer] shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of anunpaid instalment or instalments of compensation due, provided [the employer's] claim forreimbursement is filed before [an] award of compensation is made." Further, "an employer hasthe right to reimbursement for the full amount of wages paid during a claimant's period ofdisability from the claimant's schedule award of workers' compensation benefits" (Matter ofHendrick v City of Albany Police Dept., 227 AD2d 808, 808 [1996]; accord Matter of Monteleone v Town of N.Castle, 73 AD3d 1422, 1423 [2010]). Here, the employer filed a timely claim forreimbursement, which included proof of the terms of its benefit plan and the amount requested(see Workers' Compensation Law § 25 [4] [c]). We discern nothing in theapplicable statute that prohibits the employer from applying to be reimbursed only in the event ofa future schedule loss of use award. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the Board inlimiting the source of reimbursement to a future schedule award.
We do, however, find that the Board should not have denied the request for counsel feesbased upon the fact that no new award money is currently flowing to claimant. A lien for counselfees "attaches to any compensation awarded," and the fact that there is presently no balance dueto claimant does not necessarily preclude an award of such fees, payable either now or as a lienagainst any future awards made to claimant (Matter of Dickman v City of New York, 25AD2d 931, 931-932 [1966], affd 18 NY2d 969 [1966]; see Matter of Scandale v NewYork Tel. Co., 55 AD2d 761 [1976]; Matter of Glickman v New York State Dept. ofTaxation & Fin., 35 AD2d 1055 [1970], lv denied 28 NY2d 485 [1971]; compareEmployer: Westbury Transp., Inc., 2001 WL 1018096, 2001 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 94113[WCB No. 0961 0566, July 31, 2001]). Therefore, the matter must be remitted for furtherconsideration by the Board.
Mercure, J.P., Spain, Kavanagh and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision ismodified, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied the request for counsel fees;matter remitted to the Workers' Compensation Board for further proceedings not inconsistentwith this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Footnote *: The employer claims that it paidclaimant wages in lieu of compensation for this time period totaling $9,756.60.