Zheng v City of New York
2012 NY Slip Op 02033 [93 AD3d 510]
March 20, 2012
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 25, 2012


Jasmine Zheng et al., Appellants,
v
City of New York etal., Respondents.

—[*1]The Legal Aid Society, New York (Steven Banks of counsel), and Weil, Gotshal &Manges LLP, New York (Konrad L. Cailteux of counsel), for appellants.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Alan G. Krams of counsel), forrespondents.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York (Randy M. Mastro of counsel), for amicicuriae.

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Judith J. Gische, J.),entered October 6, 2011, after a nonjury trial, dismissing the causes of action for specificperformance, injunction and deprivation of due process, and declaring that defendants are notcontractually obligated to continue making rent subsidy payments under the Advantage Program,affirmed, without costs.

In this action for specific performance, and declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs seek tobar termination of a rent subsidy program run by the NYC Department of Homeless Serviceseven though federal and state funding was withdrawn effective April 2011. Plaintiffs argue thatthe various documents appertaining to the subsidy program (Certification Letters, ParticipationAgreements and Lease Riders) contractually obligate the City to continue the subsidies.

We sympathize with plaintiffs and recognize that an adverse outcome could place them atrisk of again ending up in the New York City emergency shelters for the homeless and batteredwomen—a system undoubtedly already overcrowded and overburdened. Unfortunately,this cannot constitute a valid reason to reverse the trial court's determination because we are[*2]constrained to apply cardinal principles governing theconstruction of contracts to the course of conduct and communications between the parties.Accordingly, we find that the trial court correctly found that the Advantage rent subsidy programfor the homeless was simply a social services program, and that defendants did not intend to bebound contractually.

Brown Bros. Elec. Contrs. v Beam Constr. Corp. (41 NY2d 397, 399 [1977])reiterates the rule applicable here that the existence of a binding contract is not dependent on thesubjective intent of the parties, but on the objective manifestations of intent. Brown Bros.cautions that, in seeking a practical interpretation of the expression of the parties,disproportionate emphasis should not be placed on any single act, phrase or other expression, buton their totality given the attendant circumstances, the situation of the parties and the objectivesthey were striving to obtain (see also Four Seasons Hotels v Vinnik, 127 AD2d 310, 317[1987]). Although the question of contractual intent is essentially factual in nature, this does notmean that a court is obliged to accept at face value every conclusory assertion of fact regardingintent (id. at 318).

Here, plaintiffs and the dissent place undue emphasis on the trappings of contract languagesuch as "guarantee" or "will pay," construing them as legal promises rather than mere assurances;it was reasonable to understand "guarantee" as defendants do, as intending to allay fears that rentswould not be paid in the absence of public assistance, as had often happened under previoussubsidy programs. Plaintiffs and the dissent also rely too heavily on the signing procedure, whichwas meant to accomplish no more than ensure that participants were aware of the terms of theprogram.

Accordingly, the dissent's analysis of the course of conduct and communications between theparties suffers from one fundamental flaw. Even if the tenant participants and the landlordsintended to be contractually bound, there is no enforceable contract in either instance becausedefendants profess to have understood the documents differently with respect to their basicmaterial nature, i.e., that the City was undertaking a governmental social services obligation thatwas within its discretion to terminate rather than a contractual obligation; there was no meetingof the minds (cf. Gessin Elec. Contrs.,Inc. v 95 Wall Assoc., LLC, 74 AD3d 516, 518 [2010] [no contract if parties havediffering understanding of a material term]).

Ultimately, as the court properly found at the nonjury trial, all of the surroundingcircumstances lead to the ineluctable conclusion that the Advantage program was a social serviceprogram no different from any other, and not a contractual obligation undertaken by government.Absent a contract, there is no merit to plaintiffs' contention that the City is required to grant asecond year of rent subsidies if participants meet previously established criteria.

Absent a contractual meeting of the minds, it is unnecessary to address the parties' argumentsregarding the existence of consideration for plaintiffs' becoming participants in the Advantageprogram. In any event, contrary to the dissent's suggestions, it is a fundamental principle ofcontract law that a promise to perform an existing obligation is not valid consideration (seeGoncalves v Regent Intl. Hotels, 58 NY2d 206, 220 [1983]; Nam Tai Elecs., Inc. v UBS PaineWebberInc., 46 AD3d 486, 487 [2007]). Pursuant to 18 NYCRR 352.35, plaintiffs wereobligated to cooperate and accept the housing offered by the Advantage program (see McCainv Giuliani, 252 AD2d 461 [1998], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 848 [1999]). Thus, theirclaim of providing consideration by suffering the detriment of leaving shelters and of leasingapartments that cost more than they could afford is also without merit. Concur—Gonzalez,P.J., Sweeny, Renwick and Richter, JJ.

Moskowitz, J., dissents in a memorandum as follows: Plaintiffs are a class of formerlyhomeless families and individuals for whom the City paid rent through a program calledAdvantage. The City induced these plaintiffs, many of whom are victims of domestic violence, toleave the relative safety of the shelter system and to enter into leases for apartments they couldnot afford. The City accomplished this by agreeing to pay all or a portion of plaintiffs' rent for ayear with the promise of a second year if they met the eligibility requirements for the Advantageprogram. However, once plaintiffs took the City up on its offer and moved, the City terminatedthat funding during the lease term.

The trial court refused to hold the City liable for the remaining rent. The trial court held thatthe Advantage program was merely a social benefit program that the City had a right toterminate. However, as the trial court recognized, the City can, and often does, implement asocial benefit program through enforceable contracts.

Here, the City did implement the Advantage program through enforceable contracts. TheCity clearly agreed to pay plaintiffs' rent in return for plaintiffs' leaving the shelter system. TheCity also agreed to pay rent so the landlords would provide housing for the Advantage program.These bargained for exchanges support the existence of a contract, primarily between theparticipants and the City, but also between the landlords and the City. Thus, because the Cityagreed to be bound, and, because plaintiffs, by vacating the domestic violence shelter system, andlandlords, by supplying apartments, provided consideration for that agreement, I dissent.

The following facts are undisputed or are from the findings of fact the trial court adopted. InFebruary 2007, the New York City Department of Homeless Services (DHS) proposed theAdvantage program, whereby it would provide rent subsidies to shelter residents who meetpublic assistance requirements and work at least 20 hours per week at minimum wage or above.In May 2010, DHS amended the program to increase participants' work and financialcontribution requirements.

When homeless families became eligible to participate in Advantage, the City issued them aCertification Letter setting forth the terms of the program and providing that the program"guarantees that the subsidy portion of the rent will be paid directly to your landlord forone year. You may receive a second year of rental assistance under Advantage if youmeet the eligibility criteria for a second year" (emphases added). Those eligible for Advantagewere expected to seek suitable apartments, with the loss of shelter eligibility as a possiblesanction if they failed to do so. However, as the trial court found, "[t]he Advantage Tenants werenot under a legal duty to rent Advantage apartments they could not afford, and they could nothave been sanctioned for refusing an apartment they could not afford."

In addition, Advantage participants were often required to sign a Participant Statement ofUnderstanding, that the City drafted and a DHS representative witnessed and signed. Right abovethe signature line for DHS, the Participant Statement refers to itself as "this agreement." TheParticipant Statement also provides that "[u]nder the Advantage program, the City of New Yorkwill pay a portion of my monthly rent (over and above my family's monthly rentcontribution) directly to my [l]andlord (emphasis added)." It further states that if the City finds aparticipant eligible for a second year, "the City will pay a second year of Advantage RentPayment to [the] Landlord on a monthly basis" (emphasis added).

When an Advantage participant signed a lease with a private landlord, the participant, thelandlord and a DHS representative (as witness) signed a rider. In the rider, the participant [*3]authorized the City to pay the Advantage portion directly to thelandlord. In addition, the lease riders state that the rent "must" be paid once a month. It isundisputed that the City drafted the lease riders.

On March 17, 2011, apparently because the State of New York cut off funding for theAdvantage program, defendants announced that, as of April 1, 2011, the City would not continueto pay rents. This lawsuit followed on March 28, 2011. On June 2, 2011, after Supreme Courtdenied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, we granted plaintiffs' motion for reliefpending appeal, and ordered defendants to continue to make payments under the Advantageprogram. On September 13, 2011, the trial court rendered its decision after trial. The trial courtfound that the Advantage program was nothing more than a social benefit program that the Cityhad a right to terminate based on lack of funding. On February 2, 2012, this Court dismissed theappeal from the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, dissolved the stay thatwas in place and denied the motion for consolidation with this appeal and for a continued stay(Zheng v City of New York, 92AD3d 412 [2012]). On February 16, 2012, this Court, over my dissent, denied plaintiffs'motion for a stay pending appeal from the judgment (Zheng v City of New York, 2012NY Slip Op 64817[U] [2012]).

To demonstrate the existence of an enforceable agreement, a plaintiff must establish an offer,acceptance of the offer, mutual assent and an intent to be bound (Silber v New York Life Ins. Co., 92AD3d 436 [1st Dept 2012] ["(c)ourts look to the basic elements of the offer and theacceptance to determine whether there is an objective meeting of the minds sufficient to give riseto a binding and enforceable contract"]). The mutual assent must include agreement on allessential terms (Kowalchuk vStroup, 61 AD3d 118, 121 [2009]). A contract must also have the support ofconsideration (Brearton v De Witt, 252 NY 495 [1930]). The trial court found mutualassent and consideration to be lacking.

I disagree. First, there is a contract between the City and the Advantage participants by virtueof the Certification Letter, the Participant Statements and the riders to the leases through whichthe City agreed to pay plaintiffs' rent for two years. To manifest mutual assent, there needs to bean offer and acceptance of that offer, along with an arrangement embodying definite essentialterms (Gui's Lbr. & Home Ctr., Inc. vMader Constr. Co., Inc., 13 AD3d 1096 [2004], lv dismissed 5 NY3d 842[2005]). Here, the Certification Letter clearly represented an offer. In it, the City stated that the"Advantage program guarantees that the subsidy portion of the rent will be paid" and thatparticipants would be entitled to a second year provided they met eligibility requirements for theprogram. An individual plaintiff accepted that offer when it signed the lease rider and theParticipant Statement. The language in the Participant Statements, the lease riders and thesurrounding circumstances demonstrate the City's intent to bind itself to this arrangement. Withrespect to the surrounding circumstances, the City and the program participant signed theParticipant Statements at the same time they signed the leases and defendants required the finallease signing to be at defendants' offices under defendants' supervision. The trial court also foundthat "[i]n both internal and external communications, Defendants have referred to themselves asa party to the Advantage leases." More important, the City drafted and signed the ParticipationStatement and chose to denominate it an "agreement." In the Participant Statement, the Citybound itself when it agreed it "will pay" a portion of the monthly rent for one year and a secondyear on a monthly basis, subject to participant eligibility. These lease riders, that authorizedpartial payment or rent from the City, provided that the rent "must" be paid and provided for aCity representative to sign as a witness, effectuated the City's [*4]promise to pay and placed an affirmative obligation on the City tofund the specific Advantage portion the particular lease addressed. The City's obligations for thesecond year were dependent upon plaintiff's eligibility to remain in the program and nothing else.It is undisputed that most, if not all, of the participants meet, or have already met, the eligibilityrequirements.

The use of the word "may" in relation to the second year of rent subsidies does not refer tothe City's discretion to permit a second year of funding. Rather, read in context with phrase "ifyou meet the eligibility criteria for the second year" the word "may" clearly refers to theAdvantage participants meeting the criteria for the program, such as the income ceiling. As thetrial court found, nowhere in the Participant Statement or the lease riders did defendantscondition the City's obligation to pay on the City's fiscal condition or on state or federal funding("Nothing in the Advantage program documents or public informational materials authorizesDefendants to terminate Advantage payments in the middle of an Advantage lease term becauseof lack of funding"). Thus, the Participant Statement and the leases contained all the essentialterms necessary to carry out the agreement, namely that the City would pay a sum certain directlyto the landlord once per month and the participants would move out of the shelter and into anapartment.

Contrary to the decision of the trial court, it is clear plaintiffs provided consideration tosupport the contract. The City admits that it has a legal obligation to provide shelter to thehomeless (see Boston v City of New York, Sup Ct, NY County, Dec. 12, 2008, index No.402295/08 [homeless families]; Callhan v Carey, Sup Ct, NY County, index No.42582/79; Eldredge v Koch, Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 41494/82 [homelessindividuals]), and the trial court observed that "[h]omeless families and individuals who left[d]efendants' shelters to move into private, permanent housing as Advantage [t]enants relieved[d]efendants of their obligation to provide them with housing in the shelter system under theBoston final judgment and the rulings and orders in Callahan andEldredge."

Moreover, the City admits that it is cheaper to fund Advantage than to house plaintiffs in theshelters. In a letter to Elizabeth Berlin, the Executive Deputy Commissioner for the New YorkState Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, protesting the cuts to the Advantageprogram, Robert Doar, the Commissioner of the Human Resources Administration for the City ofNew York and Seth Diamond, the Commissioner for the City's Department of HomelessServices, stated that terminating Advantage "will cost the City and State more money than iscurrently spent on the subsidy. Specifically, there will be a substantial increase in shelter costs,which we estimate to be $133 million." Further, as the court noted, "[W]hen Advantagerecipients left shelters and entered into private apartments, the requirement to provide servicespursuant to such State regulation ceased."

A cost savings of $133 million to carry out an existing legal obligation is certainly sufficientconsideration (see e.g. Elfenbein v Luckenbach Terms., Inc., 111 NJL 67, 72, 166 A 91,93 [1933] [consideration adequate where there "would have been no saving had defendant notacted"]). That the state may or may not pick up much of this $133 million after the fact is of nomoment. Any cost savings to the City may serve as consideration (see Mencher v Weiss,306 NY 1, 8 [1953] ["the law does not weigh the quantum of consideration . . . Theslightest consideration is sufficient to support the most onerous obligation"] [internal quotationmarks omitted]).

The City argues that plaintiffs had a legal obligation to seek housing anyway and that apreexisting legal obligation cannot serve as consideration. The majority buys into this argument.[*5]However, this argument is a red herring. As the trial courtfound, plaintiffs had no preexisting obligation to move into apartments they could not afford ontheir own. Nor did plaintiffs have an obligation to place themselves in a worse situation than theywere before. Rather, as the trial court found, "All Advantage Tenants, even if [d]efendantspromised to cover their entire rent payment, had to enter into leases with their landlords andthereby incur a new legal obligation" and "[w]hen the Advantage Tenants moved out of shelter toenter Advantage leases, they legally bound themselves to leases they could not afford on theirown." It is black letter law that, a new, as opposed to an existing, legal obligation can serve asconsideration (see Weiss v Weiss, 266 App Div 795 [1943] ["(p)erformance by apromisee of an act which he is not obligated to perform, or the surrender by him of a privilegewhich he has the legal right to assert, is sufficient consideration for a promise, since it is a legaldetriment, irrespective of whether it is an actual detriment or loss to him"]).

Moreover, there was an agreement between the City and the landlords to which plaintiffswere third-party beneficiaries.[FN*]Unlike the arrangement between the City and the participants, the trial court did not rule that thecontract between the City and the landlords was invalid due to lack of consideration. Rather, thetrial court found no mutuality of assent between the landlords and the City. This was error. Theoverwhelming weight of the evidence supported a finding that the City and the landlordsprovided their mutual assent to contract through the process of offer and acceptance. Viewedobjectively as we must (see TAJ Intl. Corp. v Bashian & Sons, 251 AD2d 98, 100[1998]), the words that the City chose to use in the Advantage program documents and materials:"guarantees," "shall pay" "will pay" "will issue" "assures" and "commitment" demonstrate anintent to bind oneself contractually.

First, the Certification Letters suggested that participants show the letter to landlords duringan apartment search. These letters stated that the City "guarantees that the subsidy portionof the rent will be paid directly to your landlord" (emphasis added). The Participant Statements,that participants and the City signed at the same time as the leases, contained the assurance thatthe City "will pay the Advantage Rent Payment directly to [a participant's] Landlord on amonthly basis." More important, the Landlords' Statements of Understanding, that the Citydrafted, state that "[u]nder the Advantage Program, the City . . . will pay directly tome, the Landlord, monthly rent . . . for a period of one year, on behalf of the eligibleAdvantage client." The DHS Advantage Rental Assistance Program Brochure states "WorkAdvantage . . . assures landlords of monthly rent payments with no paymentdisruptions." Finally, the lease riders themselves state "The City shall pay the Program Tenant'srent directly to the [l]andlord." A clearer indication of assent to guarantee rent payment would behard to imagine.

The trial court was also incorrect in finding that the landlords did not manifest assent. Theterms in the documents that the City required the landlords to sign unequivocably demonstratethe landlord's intent to bind themselves contractually. For example, in the Landlord Statement ofUnderstanding, the landlords stated, "I understand that if the Program tenant leaves the[a]partment due to an eviction or move, I, the [l]andlord, will return any pre-paid AdvantageRent Payments to the City, or, if the City elects this option, allow another Advantage client toreside in the [a]partment for the remainder of the [l]ease term." Thus, in exchange for [*6]guaranteed rental payments, the landlords actually ceded controlover who could reside in their apartments. Also, in the Landlord Statements, the landlordsdemonstrated their commitment to rent for a second year: "I understand that the Program Tenantis automatically entitled to a self-executing renewal of the Lease for a second year at the samerent provided for in this Rider, provided that (a) Program Tenant has been found eligible by theCity for a second year of the Advantage Program." Like many contracts, the lease riders contain aset-off provision should the landlords default on any of their responsibilities: "The Landlordacknowledges and agrees that in the event that the Landlord is in default of any obligation to theCity of New York, DHS may withhold for the purpose of set-off, all or a portion . . .of the Rent payment." In the lease riders, the landlords also agreed that they "shall not demand,request, or receive any payments or other consideration from Program Tenant . . .beyond that authorized in the [l]ease and this Rider." Thus, there was an agreement between theCity and the landlords whereby the landlords agreed to forgo certain rights in exchange forguaranteed rental payments for one to two years. The commitments the landlords made certainlydemonstrate intent to be contractually bound. This exchange of promises is a textbook exampleof mutual assent.

Accordingly, there was clearly a contract between the Advantage participants and the City.There was also a contract between the City and the landlords. Taking an objective view of theevidence, one can only conclude that the City assented to this arrangement. As a matter of law,there was consideration to support these contracts. Now, because the City breached itscontractual obligations, the landlords face the expense of eviction proceedings in court andnonreceipt of rent. Plaintiffs are now potentially liable for the balance of leases they cannotafford. They are also in an untenable situation whereby they face eviction and homelessness.Many Advantage participants are victims of domestic violence. They will not be eligible to returnto the relative safety of the domestic violence shelter system unless they suffer new incidents ofdomestic violence. If they do suffer further domestic violence, the domestic violence sheltersmay not have room as they are always at capacity. Plaintiffs will likely go into the homelessshelter system where they will not receive the protections they need to avoid their abusers. Or,they may be forced to return to the dangerous homes they sought to escape in the first place.Some may simply take to the streets.

Footnotes


Footnote *: The City does not dispute that, ifit entered into contracts with the landlords, plaintiffs would be third-party beneficiaries to thosecontracts.


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