| Matter of County of Albany (Rossi) |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 02531 [94 AD3d 1164] |
| April 5, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Foreclosure of Tax Liens by County of Albany,Respondent. Josephine Rossi, Appellant. |
—[*1] Craig M. Denning, County Attorney, Albany (Gregory A. Rutnik of counsel), forrespondent.
Spain, J.P. Appeal from an order of the County Court of Albany County (Doyle, J.), enteredSeptember 16, 2009, which, in a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 11, denied respondent'smotion to vacate a writ of assistance.
Respondent is the former owner of residential real property in the Town of Colonie, AlbanyCounty, acquired by petitioner in a deed of foreclosure, recorded on September 8, 2008. OnNovember 20, 2008, petitioner moved pursuant to RPTL 1162 for a writ of assistance seeking toremove respondent from the premises. Shortly thereafter, respondent filed a bankruptcy petitionin United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York. Following a December2008 hearing at which respondent personally appeared, the writ was granted and was executed inJanuary 2009 by delivering possession of the premises to petitioner. Respondent unsuccessfullymoved to set aside the writ based on various grounds, including what she believed to be anautomatic stay in bankruptcy court. Respondent now appeals.
The appeal must be dismissed as moot. The writ was fully executed in January 2009 and theproperty was sold at public auction in August 2009. Thus, the relief respondentseeks—[*2]vacating the order granting thewrit—will not affect her rights as she has already vacated the premises and no longer hasany claim to the property.[FN*]Accordingly, the appeal is moot (seeMatter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens by County of Delaware [JRL Outreach Program, Inc.], 16AD3d 925, 926 [2005]; Colonie Constr. Prods. v Titan Indem. Co., 242 AD2d 852,853 [1997]) and, as the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply (see Matter ofHearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714-715 [1980]), it must be dismissed.
In any event, petitioner's claims regarding defects in service, notice and jurisdiction arebelied by the record and she was not entitled to an automatic stay based on her bankruptcypetition. Although the commencement of such a proceeding typically results in a stay of otherproceedings against a tax debtor (see RPTL 1140 [1]; 11 USC § 362 [a]), where adebtor files a new bankruptcy petition within one year of the dismissal of a previous bankruptcycase, the automatic stay is limited to 30 days (see 11 USC § 362 [c] [3] [A]).Respondent previously filed a bankruptcy petition in October 2005 and that proceeding was notdismissed until September 5, 2008. Thus, at most, she would have been entitled to a 30-day stayfollowing the November 28, 2008 filing of her second bankruptcy petition (see 11 USC§ 362 [c] [3] [A]), and County Court did not issue its order granting the writ until January5, 2009, well after the 30-day stay had expired. Further, an automatic stay of an act againstproperty of the debtor's estate only continues until such property is no longer property of theestate (see 11 USC § 362 [c] [1]) and, here, the deed of foreclosure was recordedbefore petitioner filed her second bankruptcy petition. At that point, she no longer had a right ofredemption in the property (see RPTL 1136 [3]) and, thus, the property was neverproperty of the bankruptcy estate (see In re Rodgers, 333 F3d 64, 69 [2d Cir 2003]).
Malone Jr., Kavanagh, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal isdismissed, as moot, without costs.
Footnote *: Respondent did not appeal fromthe foreclosure proceeding.