| People v Donovan |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 02719 [94 AD3d 1230] |
| April 12, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v KristinaDonovan, Appellant. |
—[*1] Emilee B. Davenport, Special Prosecutor, Lake George, for respondent.
Kavanagh, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Meyer, J.), entered October 20,2009 in Essex County, which sentenced defendant following her conviction of the crime ofcriminal mischief in the third degree.
In August 2008, defendant waived indictment and, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleadedguilty to criminal mischief in the third degree, a felony. In exchange for her guilty plea, defendantwas required to comply with an addiction recovery program and, if she successfully completedthe program, the felony plea would be vacated and she would be permitted to plead guilty to amisdemeanor and receive a sentence of three years of probation, and additional misdemeanorcharges pending against her would be dismissed. However, if defendant failed to comply with therecovery program, Supreme Court reserved the right to sentence her on the felony charge towhich she pleaded guilty.
In July 2009, defendant's case manager determined that, in order to complete the program,defendant would be required to reside in a halfway house until she completed mental healthtreatment. Upon learning of this development, defendant removed herself from the program.Accordingly, defendant was arrested and returned to Supreme Court for sentencing. Defendantmoved to vacate the plea and the court denied the motion. Thereafter, despite the People's requestto impose a prison sentence, the court sentenced defendant, in acknowledgment [*2]of the treatment progress she had made, to five years of probationand dismissed all other pending misdemeanor charges. Defendant now appeals.
We affirm. Defendant first contends that her plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntarybecause she did not have a clear understanding of what the plea agreement entailed. Contrary todefendant's contention, the record demonstrates that Supreme Court adequately advised her of thedirect consequences of her plea (seePeople v Harnett, 72 AD3d 232, 233 [2010], affd 16 NY3d 200 [2011]; People v Grimm, 69 AD3d 1231,1232 [2010], lv granted 14 NY3d 888 [2010]). During the course of the hearing, theterms of the plea were repeatedly stated in detail and the court confirmed on several occasionsthat defendant understood the plea and the potential consequences of failing to fulfill the terms ofher probation, including sentencing on the felony conviction. Defendant also confirmed that shehad received adequate time to discuss the plea and was satisfied with her representation bycounsel. Notably, defendant did not challenge the voluntariness of her plea until more than oneyear later, after she failed to comply with the provisions of the plea agreement.
Defendant also contends that her plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because shewas not informed that changes to her treatment plan and length could be imposed by her casemanager. However, inasmuch as the details of her treatment regimen were not an "immediate,definite or automatic result" of her guilty plea, but rather were fashioned by an agency outsideSupreme Court's control in response to defendant's particular needs, they were a collateralconsequence that the court was under no obligation to explain (People v Harnett, 72AD3d at 235; see People v Catu, 4NY3d 242, 244 [2005]; People vMuriqi, 9 AD3d 743, 744 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 679 [2004]). Additionally,the fact that the court reserved the right during the plea hearing to impose restitution atsentencing does not provide grounds for defendant to withdraw her plea[FN*](see People v Small, 82 AD3d1451, 1452 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 801 [2011]; People v Scott, 74 AD3d 1582[2010]). Finally, given that counsel negotiated a favorable plea agreement, which included a termof probation when defendant would otherwise have been facing the possibility of consecutiveprison sentences, and defendant's acknowledgment that she was satisfied with her representation,we find that defendant was afforded meaningful representation (see People v Ivey, 79 AD3d 1531,1532 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 859 [2011]; People v Lopez, 74 AD3d 1498, 1499 [2010]).
Defendant's remaining contentions have been examined and found to be without merit.
Peters, P.J., Rose, Lahtinen and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote *: No restitution was actuallyimposed.