| Matter of 1801 Sixth Ave., LLC v Empire Zone DesignationBd. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 03705 [95 AD3d 1493] |
| May 10, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| 2—In the Matter of 1801 Sixth Avenue, LLC,Appellant, v Empire Zone Designation Board et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 1.) Inthe Matter of Hiawatha Associates, LLC, Appellant, v Empire Zone Designation Board et al.,Respondents. (Proceeding No. 2.) In the Matter of Erie Boulevard Hydropower, LP, Appellant, vEmpire Zone Designation Board et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 3.)In the Matter of Pioneer Fulton Shopping Center, LLC, Appellant, v Empire Zone DesignationBoard et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 4.) In the Matter of 600 Erie Place, LLC, Appellant, vEmpire Zone Designation Board et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 5.) In the Matter of 600Erie Place II, LLC, Appellant, v Empire Zone Designation Board et al., Respondents.(Proceeding No. 6.) In the Matter of Third National Associates Group, Appellant, v Empire ZoneDesignation Board et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 7.) In the Matter of Third NationalAssociates, LLC, Appellant, v Empire Zone Designation Board et al., Respondents. (ProceedingNo. 8.) |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Owen W. Demuth of counsel), forrespondents.
Egan Jr., J. Appeals (1) from that part of eight judgments of the Supreme Court (Cahill, J.),entered February 10, 2011 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioners' applications, in eightcombined proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78 and actions for declaratory judgment, toreview a determination of respondent Empire Zone Designation Board revoking petitioners'certifications as empire zone business enterprises, and (2) from eight orders of said court, enteredFebruary 10, 2011 in Albany County, which denied petitioners' motions for leave to conductcertain discovery.
Petitioners are eight separate entities that previously were certified as empire zone businessenterprises. In June 2009, respondent Commissioner of Economic Development revokedpetitioners' respective certifications—effective January 1, 2008—based upon eachentity's failure to satisfy what is commonly referred to as the "1:1 benefit-cost test" (seeGeneral Municipal Law § 959 [a] [v] [6]).[FN1]Upon each petitioner's administrative appeal, respondent Empire Zone Designation Board upheldthe underlying revocation. Petitioners thereafter separately commenced these combined CPLRarticle 78 proceedings and actions for declaratory judgment contending that the Board'sdetermination was arbitrary and capricious and violative of, among other things, the Due Process,Equal Protection and Contract Clauses of the NY and US Constitutions. Respondents answeredand moved to dismiss petitioners' declaratory judgment actions, and petitioners cross-movedpursuant to CPLR 408 for disclosure.[*2]
Supreme Court thereafter dismissed petitioners' CPLRarticle 78 claims on the merits, concluding that the Board's determination was neither arbitraryand capricious nor otherwise affected by an error of law, and granted respondents' motions todismiss all but one of the declaratory judgment causes of action—leaving intact petitioners'claim that the retroactive application of General Municipal Law § 959 (a) (v) (6) wasunconstitutional. Finally, Supreme Court—in a separate series of orders—deniedpetitioners' respective motions for disclosure. Petitioners now appeal the dismissal of their CPLRarticle 78 claims, as well as the partial dismissal of the underlying declaratory judgment actions.Petitioners also separately appeal the denial of their requests for disclosure.[FN2]
As a threshold matter, respondents contend that the instant appeals must be dismissedbecause the judgments and orders from which they are taken are nonfinal and, further, petitioners'right to appeal has been extinguished by the subsequent entry of a final judgment in thesematters. We agree and, accordingly, dismiss the underlying appeals.
"[A] 'final' order or judgment is one that disposes of all of the causes of action between theparties in the action or proceeding and leaves nothing for further judicial action apart from mereministerial matters" (Burke v Crosson, 85 NY2d 10, 15 [1995]). Alternatively, "anonfinal order or judgment results when a court decides one or more but not all causes of actionin the complaint against a particular defendant . . . but leaves other causes of actionbetween the same parties for resolution in further judicial proceedings" (id. at 15-16;accord Kline v Town of Guilderland, 289 AD2d 741, 742 [2001]). "No appeal as of rightlies from a nonfinal order in a CPLR article 78 proceeding" (Matter of Pettersen v Town of Fort Ann, 72 AD3d 1322, 1323[2010] [citations omitted]). While no similar bar exists as to a nonfinal order issued in thecontext of a declaratory judgment action, "the right to appeal from a nonfinal order terminatesupon the entry of a final judgment" (State of New York v Joseph, 29 AD3d 1233, 1234 n [2006], lvdenied 7 NY3d 711 [2006]; see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]; PixelIntl. Network v State of New York, 255 AD2d 666 [1998]; see also CPLR 5501 [a][1]), which, as noted previously (see n 2, supra), has now occurred.
Petitioners, relying upon the doctrine of implied severance, contend that—at the veryleast—the judgments dismissing their CPLR article 78 claims on the merits are "final" asto those issues and, hence, are appealable. The flaw in petitioners' argument on this point is thatthe doctrine of implied severance does not apply where, as here, within each petition/complaint,all of the causes of action arise out of the same underlying transaction, continuum of facts orlegal relationship (see Burke v Crosson, 85 NY2d at 16-17). Hence, petitioners' CPLRarticle 78 claims cannot be severed from petitioners' declaratory judgment causes of action forpurposes of these appeals. We reach a similar conclusion with regard to petitioners' discoveryapplications. Accordingly, the appeals must be dismissed in their entirety.
Peters, P.J., Malone Jr., Kavanagh and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeals aredismissed, without costs.
Footnote 1: The statutory scheme(see General Municipal Law § 955 et seq.) and the relevant amendmentsthereto are discussed at length in Matter of WL, LLC v Department of Economic Dev.(97 AD3d 24 [2012]).
Footnote 2: During the pendency of theseappeals, respondents moved for summary judgment as to the remaining declaratory judgmentcause of action. Supreme Court denied respondents' motion and, upon searching the record,granted summary judgment in favor of petitioners, finding that the retroactive application ofGeneral Municipal Law § 959 (a) (v) (6) was unconstitutional. Respondents haveappealed.