Matter of Weeks Woodlands Assn., Inc. v Dormitory Auth. of the Stateof N.Y.
2012 NY Slip Op 04209 [95 AD3d 747]
May 31, 2012
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 27, 2012


In the Matter of Weeks Woodlands Association, Inc., et al.,Appellants,
v
Dormitory Authority of the State of New York et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Albert K. Butzel, New York, for appellants.

Wachtel & Masyr, LLP, New York (Karen Binder of counsel), for Dormitory Authority ofthe State of New York, St. Mary's Hospital for Children, Inc. and St. Mary's Healthcare Systemfor Children, Inc., respondents.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York (Simon Heller of counsel), for NewYork State Department of Health, respondent.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Julie Steiner of counsel), formunicipal respondent.

Appeals from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Emily Jane Goodman, J.), enteredJanuary 18, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied petitioners'motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the cross motion of respondent New York StateDepartment of Health to dismiss the petition as against it, and from order and judgment (onepaper), same court and Justice, entered August 9, 2011, which to the extent appealed from aslimited by the briefs, granted the motion of respondent Dormitory Authority of the State of NewYork for summary judgment declaring that it had the authority to provide financing for thesubject construction project, denied petitioners' motion to renew, granted the cross motion ofrespondent New York City Department of Buildings for summary judgment dismissing theproceeding as against it, and denied petitioners' motion for summary judgment with respect to theapplicability of section 24-111 (a) of the Zoning Resolution of the City of New York, dismissed,without costs, as moot.

Petitioners seek to enjoin a construction project to modernize a hospital for disabled childrenoperated by a not-for-profit corporation, based primarily on alleged noncompliance with zoningrequirements. Petitioners concede that they did not seek injunctive relief against the project goingforward upon their appeal to this Court from Supreme Court's denial of their motion for apreliminary injunction. It now appears that the excavation, foundation walls, steel superstructure,concrete slabs, metal stud frames and duct work are complete. We see no [*2]evidence that the work was performed in bad faith, and the workcompleted could not be readily undone without undue hardship. While we would adopt thedissent's cogent analysis of the zoning issue if we were to reach the merits, in view of petitioners'failure to seek injunctive relief from this Court and the advanced stage of work on the project, wefind that the appeal has become moot and therefore must be dismissed (see Matter of Citineighbors Coalition ofHistoric Carnegie Hill v New York City Landmarks Preserv. Commn., 2 NY3d 727[2004]; Matter of Dreikausen v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 98 NY2d165 [2002]; Sutherland v New YorkCity Hous. Dev. Corp., 61 AD3d 479, 479-480 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 703[2009]; William Israel's Farm Coop. vBoard of Stds. & Appeals of City of N.Y., 25 AD3d 517 [2006]).

The dissent is mistaken in asserting that the Court of Appeals decisions inCitineighbors and Dreikausen support the position that this appeal is not moot. Atthe same time that it recognized that "a race to completion cannot be determinative [ofmootness]" (Dreikausen, 98 NY2d at 172), the Court of Appeals identified as the"[c]hief" factor in the mootness inquiry "a challenger's failure to seek preliminary injunctive reliefor otherwise preserve the status quo to prevent construction from commencing or continuingduring the pendency of the litigation" (id. at 173). In this case, to reiterate, after SupremeCourt denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, petitioners sought no injunctive relieffrom this Court upon the instant appeal.

Indeed, over a year's time, petitioners repeatedly chose not to apply to this Court forinjunctive relief to preserve the status quo pending further proceedings.[FN1] Hence, by August 2011 (five months before this appeal was argued), bonds in the amount of$102,200,000 had been issued to finance the project, approximately $30 million of the bondproceeds had been drawn down, and, according to the main respondents' initial brief, "excavationand foundations [were] complete, the erection of the steel superstructure [was] 70% complete,the installation of the concrete slabs on the basement floor [was] complete and the concrete slabson the ground floor [were] 50% complete." In light of this history, the dissent would turn the lawon its head by penalizing a not-for-profit institution, and the public agencies cooperating with it,for having gone forward with this project in reliance on (1) the issuance of all necessarygovernmental permits, (2) Supreme Court's denial of all applications for injunctive relief, and (3)petitioners' failure even to seek injunctive relief from this Court. Stated otherwise, it is theposition of the dissent that respondents should have imposed an injunction against proceedingwith the project on themselves. We disagree.[*3]

Petitioners and the dissent fail to come to grips with thefact that petitioners, by failing to seek injunctive relief from this Court upon any of the occasionswhen they were denied relief by Supreme Court, are themselves complicit in the project's havingreached its present advanced stage. Instead, the dissent makes an emotional appeal, essentiallyaccusing us of coming to the aid of those having "the power and the money to proceed withdispatch" (internal quotation marks omitted), as if this matter concerned a for-profit projectaimed at enriching private developers at the expense of local homeowners. Putting aside that thestatus of the proponents of this project has no particular bearing on petitioners' rights, the dissentseems to have lost sight of the fact that the intended beneficiaries of the project are the sick anddisabled children served by respondent hospital, a not-for-profit institution. Although the identityof those to be served by the project is also essentially irrelevant to the issues raised on thisappeal, we do not think it accurate to characterize these children as persons well-endowed with"power" and "money."[FN2] We add that the dissent is simply wrong in saying that respondents have acted "with a blatantdisregard for [petitioners'] rights." Respondents have at all times acted under color of law, andtheir construction of the zoning provision in question, while erroneous, certainly falls within thebounds of reason (especially given that the question is apparently one of first impression), and,after all, was accepted by Supreme Court.

The dissent argues that, to avoid mootness, it sufficed for petitioners to seek injunctive reliefin Supreme Court, even if they subsequently failed to apply for such relief upon their appeal tothis Court. Dreikausen indicates otherwise. In Dreikausen, the Court of Appealscited with approval Matter of Fallati v Town of Colonie (222 AD2d 811 [1995]), inwhich the appeal was found moot because (as summarized by the Court of Appeals) "noinjunction [was] sought before [the] Appellate Division" (98 NY2d at 173). The petition inFallati sought, inter alia, "to enjoin [the respondent] from improving or developing[certain] property pending the determination" of the proceeding challenging the compliance ofthe intended use with zoning rules (222 AD2d at 812-813). The Third Department dismissed theappeal from the dismissal of the petition on the following ground: "Since petitioner didnot seek injunctive relief during the pendency of this appeal, we find the controversyherein to be rendered moot" (id. at 813 [emphasis added]). Similarly, in Gabriel v Prime (30 AD3d 955[2006]), the Third Department dismissed as moot an appeal from a judgment declaring that acontract for the sale of real property had been effectively terminated, where the owner (whosought to avoid the contract) sold the property to a third party after entry of the judgment and "nolis pendens was filed nor a stay issued following Supreme Court's judgment in [theowner's] favor" (id. at 956 [emphasis added]; see also Matter of G.Z.T. Indus. vPlanning Bd. of Town of Fallsburg, 245 AD2d 741, 742 [1997] [appeal was dismissed asmoot because "(d)uring the pendency of this appeal, [*4]petitioner took no steps to safeguard its interests by, e.g., seeking totemporarily enjoin the planned construction"] [emphasis added]; Matter of Bytner v City ofAlbany Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 211 AD2d 1000 [1995] ["this appeal has been rendered mootin view of petitioner's failure to obtain an injunction protecting his interests during the pendencyof this appeal"]; cf. Vitiello v City of Yonkers, 255 AD2d 506, 507 [1998] [appeal wasnot moot where, after Supreme Court denied their application for a TRO against construction andgovernmental permission to proceed with the project was obtained, "the plaintiffs immediatelymoved in (the Appellate Division) for a preliminary injunction"]). In view of the foregoingauthority, we are mystified by the dissent's assertion that we have "fabricate[d]" the requirementthat a party seeking to halt construction move for injunctive relief at each stage of theproceeding.[FN3]

The dissent's position finds no support in Matter of Watch Hill Homeowners Assn. vTown Bd. of Town of Greenburgh (226 AD2d 1031 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 811[1996]), a case that the Court of Appeals distinguished in Dreikausen (98 NY2d at 173).The panel that decided Watch Hill included two justices of the panel that decidedFallati only a few months before and three justices of the panel that decided G.Z.T.Indus. about a year and a half later. Thus, we see little merit in the dissent's suggestion thatWatch Hill abrogates or relaxes the requirement that a party seeking to halt constructionmove for injunctive relief at each level of litigation. Moreover, nowhere in the WatchHill decision do we find any support for the dissent's assertion that the Court retainedjurisdiction of the appeal notwithstanding the petitioners' "failure to repeatedly seek injunctiverelief." And, to reiterate, the following year, in G.Z.T. Indus., three of the same justicesreaffirmed that an appeal seeking to halt construction may be dismissed as moot where theappellant made no effort to preserve the status quo "[d]uring the pendency of [the] appeal" (245AD2d at 742).[FN4][*5]

Also misplaced is the dissent's reliance on Matter ofFriends of Pine Bush v Planning Bd. of City of Albany (86 AD2d 246 [1982], affd59 NY2d 849 [1983]), another Third Department decision distinguished in Dreikausen(98 NY2d at 173). Far from supporting the dissent's contention that the present matter is notmoot, Pine Bush expressly held that the matter before the Court was moot because thepetitioners had not been diligent in seeking injunctive relief against construction activity(see 86 AD2d at 247). Indeed, Pine Bush found that the matter was moot on theground that the petitioners, after their motion to extend the automatic stay of the respondent'saction was denied, took "no further action" to maintain the status quo, and, on their appeal from asubsequent judgment of the trial court "made no motion for a stay pursuant to CPLR 5519"(id.). Because Pine Bush did not direct the cessation of further work on theproject, the case does not support the dissent's view that we should order a halt to the ongoingwork here. While the Pine Bush Court, rather than dismissing the appeal, addressed themerits after converting the article 78 proceeding to an action for a declaratory judgment (reliefnot requested by petitioners in this case), it did so on the ground that the issue presented was"likely to recur if not judicially resolved" (id. at 248). In this case, given that both themajority and the dissenters of this panel unanimously express the view that respondents'construction of the applicable zoning provision is erroneous, we do not believe that the issuepresented is likely recur. Similarly, given the concurrence of the majority and the dissent on themerits of the zoning issue raised in this case, in the unlikely event that a future dispute were toraise the same issue, we think it still more unlikely that the issue would evade appellate reviewby reason of the denial at the trial level of a timely application for injunctive relief.

In Dreikausen, the Court of Appeals distinguished both Watch Hill andPine Bush as cases in which "[c]ourts . . . have retained jurisdictionnotwithstanding substantial completion in instances where novel issues or public interests suchas environmental concerns warrant continuing review" (98 NY2d at 173). In this case, theenvironmental concerns invoked by petitioners are the increased traffic and the aesthetic costanticipated to result from the enlargement and expansion of the hospital buildings. In view of theadvanced stage the work on the project has reached and petitioners' failure to "d[o] all they couldto timely safeguard their interests" (Vitiello, 255 AD2d at 507), the concerns they invoke,while not to be deprecated, must be weighed against the public interest to be served by theupgrading of respondent hospital's antiquated 1950s-era facilities. The latter interest, to reiterate,is the enhancement of the hospital's ability to treat and rehabilitate sick and disabled children.Taking all of the circumstances into account, we find that the interests invoked by petitioners donot warrant retaining jurisdiction of their appeal notwithstanding their failure to take all availablesteps to protect their own interests.

We disagree with the dissent's suggestion that respondents' proceeding with themodernization of the children's hospital could reasonably be viewed as an instance of "bad faith,"notwithstanding that Supreme Court denied petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction andpetitioners then failed even to request such relief upon this appeal. While we agree with thedissent that, on balance, petitioners have the stronger argument on the merits, not [*6]even petitioners have suggested that respondents' position on themerits is frivolous or lacking in a good faith basis. If petitioners wished to cast the risk of goingforward with the work upon respondents, it was imperative for them at least to seek reliefpreserving the status quo at each stage of the proceeding, including the appeal to this Court. TheCourt of Appeals has expressly rejected the argument that a party suing to halt construction neednot seek a preliminary injunction if it anticipates that the bonding requirement for such relief willexceed the amount it wishes to provide. In Citineighbors, the petitioners "did not try toenjoin construction during this litigation's pendency, nonfeasance that they chalk up to 'monetaryconstraints' and the unlikelihood of success. In short, petitioners simply assumed that SupremeCourt would not grant them injunctive relief or, in the alternative, would require an undertakingin an amount more than they could or wanted to give. Under Dreikausen, however,petitioners were required, at a minimum, to seek an injunction in the circumstances presentedhere. Having pursued a strategy that foisted all financial risks (other than their own legal fees andrelated expenses) onto the property owner and the developer, petitioners may not expect us tooverlook the substantial completion of this construction project" (2 NY3d at 729-730).

Finally, while the dissenter states that he "seriously doubt[s] the veracity of the respondents'statements that the structure is virtually completed," we find that respondents have establishedthat, as of the time the appeal was argued, the construction was so far advanced that it could notbe undone without undue hardship. Under this standard, the construction need not be "virtuallycompleted" to render the dispute moot (see William Israel's Farm Coop., 25 AD3d at 517[appeal was dismissed as moot where the petitioner did not seek injunctive relief against theconstruction and "the new building's superstructure (was) 75% complete"]). That the currentstage of the construction is not reflected in the record is irrelevant because "mootness is an issuethat can be raised at anytime and, in fact, it is incumbent upon counsel to inform the court ofchanged circumstances which render a matter moot" (Gabriel v Prime, 30 AD3d at 956[internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]). Concur—Friedman, Freedmanand Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.

Saxe, J.P., and Catterson, J., dissent in a memorandum by Catterson, J., asfollows:

I must respectfully dissent. In my opinion, by dismissing this appeal as moot and declining toreach the merits of the zoning issue the majority has essentially affirmed an error of law. As setforth more fully below, the error fatally infects the State Environmental Quality Review(hereinafter referred to as SEQRA) negative declaration issued on the project which is a90,000-square foot expansion of St. Mary's Hospital in the Weeks Woodlands section of Bayside,Queens.

At best, it is disingenuous of the majority to state that it would adopt the dissent's "cogentanalysis" on the zoning issue if it had to reach the merits, but then to take the position that it does[*7]not need to do so. At worst, the majority tacitly butknowingly affirms an error of law, namely the erroneous interpretation of New York City ZoningResolution (hereinafter referred to as ZR) § 24-111 (a). This renders the greatest disserviceto the petitioners who sought judicial intervention in order to assert their rights against thosewho, as characterized by the petitioners' counsel at oral argument, have the "power and themoney" to proceed with dispatch.[FN5] In this case, the majority's finding is particularly egregious given that the petitioners' applicationsfor injunctive relief were denied repeatedly by a court that not only ignored the customaryanalysis appertaining to applications for such relief, but based the denial of the applicationssolely on its erroneous interpretation of the Zoning Resolution.

More significantly, the majority's holding ignores the fact that the erroneous interpretation ofthe zoning resolution infects the SEQRA negative declaration on the project issued by therespondent Dormitory Authority of the State of New York (hereinafter referred to as DASNY).Declining to reach the merits of the zoning issue is a total abnegation of this Court'sresponsibility. (See Save Audubon Coalition v City of New York, 180 AD2d 348, 355[1st Dept 1992] ["(j)udicial review of a lead agency's SEQRA determination is limited to. . . whether, substantively, the determination was affected by an error of law"][internal quotation marks omitted].)

DASNY's negative declaration was based on a finding that the project will not have a"significant adverse effect on the environment" because it "does not involve the introduction ofany land uses or new structures that do not conform to or comply with existing zoning." In turn,that unequivocal but totally erroneous statement relied on a simplistic interpretation of ZR§ 24-111 (a) in conjunction with a confirmation by the Department of Buildings (DOB)that St. Mary's was permitted a maximum floor area ratio of 1.0. The record reflects that theDOB confirmation was conveyed to DASNY by counsel for St. Mary's. The negative declarationand supplemental report are devoid of any suggestion that DASNY investigated any further, orthat it was aware of the DOB's inconsistent posture, as [*8]setforth more fully below, on the interpretation of the zoning resolution. Or, indeed that it took therequired "long hard look" at environmental issues.

For example, DASNY's report on the adverse impact of increased traffic in the neighborhoodstated that there would be no adverse impact because the expansion plans did not include anincrease of inpatient beds. As the petitioners correctly point out, "inpatients" do not increasetraffic. Instead, the critical inquiry should have been into St. Mary's expansion ofoutpatient/ambulatory services which are the types of daily services that increase traffic around ahospital. It is small wonder that DASNY's SEQRA review of the $200 million project, which,contrary to taking a "long hard look," was completed within 21 business days, now turns out tobe based on an error of law.

The majority blithely dispenses with this SEQRA deficiency by summarizing the petitioners'concerns as "increased traffic and the aesthetic cost." This completely misses the point that theSEQRA negative declaration at issue is based on an acknowledged zoning violation. Yet, themajority overlooks this violation of the law because it views the facility as one for adisadvantaged group. Hence, in my opinion, the majority is compelled to fabricate therequirement that injunctive relief must be sought in the Appellate Division.

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners repeatedly and unsuccessfully soughtinjunctive relief in the court below. The petitioners opposed the expansion on the grounds that itviolates ZR § 24-11 (a) which limits the size of community facilities in residentialneighborhoods. The hospital is located on 7.7 acres in a neighborhood of single-family detachedhomes on tree-lined streets. Until its plans for expansion, the hospital operated as a 97-bedinpatient facility for the rehabilitation of disabled children. Now, it plans to double the size of thestructures on its property to 168,000 square feet and increase the size of its staff in order toconvert from a rehabilitative facility to one providing ambulatory outpatient services. Thepetitioners claim that the additional transportation required by outpatients as well as staff willgenerate much more traffic, noise and pollution. They oppose the construction because, uponcompletion, the floor to area ratio (hereinafter referred to as FAR[FN6]) would increase from 0.38 to 0.77. The petitioners claim this is a 50% larger FAR than permittedby ZR § 24-111 (a).

The respondents in this action include the New York State Department of Health (hereinafterreferred to as DOH) which initially approved the project; the New York City Department ofBuildings which issued the building permit; DASNY which conducted the SEQRA as well asproviding the financing for the project, and St. Mary's.

It is undisputed that St. Mary's is one of the few nonresidential uses in the area, and that thecurrent building was constructed in 1950. In December 2006, St. Mary's submitted a certificate ofneed for major modernization to DOH. It initially envisaged a new five story addition constructedon the east side of the existing building between the south wing and the cloister garden. Theoriginal design attempted to reduce the overall impact of the addition by "tucking" it into theexisting facility.

In February 2008, DOH determined that the project was a Type I action for SEQRA purposesand that the lead agency would be Queens County or the authority having jurisdiction. Itapproved St. Mary's request, subject to certain conditions and contingencies including [*9]confirmation that all necessary local zoning approvals had beengranted.

On October 6, 2008, St. Mary's sought confirmation from DOB that the maximum FAR forits building was 1. DOB denied the request, stating, "proposed hospital enlargement[/]alterationshall comply with ZR 24-111 with FAR 0.5 or secure BSA [Board of Standards and Appeals]approval for FAR more than 0.5." A FAR of 0.5 denotes that the total floor area of a builtstructure on a parcel of property cannot exceed half the square footage of that parcel.

ZR § 24-111 (a), adopted on February 28, 1973 as an amendment to the ZoningResolution of 1961, states that, in the district in which St. Mary's is located, the FAR forcommunity facilities like St. Mary's, shall not exceed the floor area permitted for residential useswhich was set at 0.5. The amendment concluded with an exception clause as follows: "Theprovisions of this paragraph shall not apply to buildings for which plans were filed with theDepartment of Buildings prior to November 15, 1972, including any subsequent amendmentsthereof."

On October 20, 2008, DOB changed its mind, stating, "O.K. to . . . permit FARof 1.0" because "building was built prior to Nov. 15, 1972." On March 25, 2010, St. Mary'srequested approval from DOH for updated project costs, stating that it needed to construct alarger building than originally planned. DOH approved the request on April 9, 2010.

On May 12, 2010, DASNY voted to go forward with the financing of St. Mary's expansion.On May 21, 2010, DASNY proposed to designate itself the lead agency under SEQRA. Withinjust one month, on June 22, 2010, DASNY issued a negative declaration determining that St.Mary's expansion would "not have a significant adverse effect on the environment."

On June 23, 2010, DASNY's board authorized the issuance of bonds for St. Mary's. On July12, 2010, DOB issued a building permit, and St. Mary's announced it would begin constructionon August 24, 2010. At the time of this appeal, St Mary's was proceeding with the constructionof a new 90,000-square-foot building connected to its existing building.

Meanwhile on August 6, 2010, the petitioners brought the instant article 78 proceeding andaction for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the respondents. They sought a TROwhich the court denied on August 20, 2010.

On August 26, 2010, the petitioners filed an amended petition. The petitioners alleged,inter alia, that DOB and St. Mary's had failed to comply with ZR § 24-111 (a) andthat the projected addition would bring total floor area to 168,000 square feet with a FAR of0.77. They moved for a preliminary injunction which the court denied. The court found, interalia, that the petitioners had failed to establish a likelihood of success on their argument thatthe "grandfathering" provision of ZR § 24-111 (a) did not apply to St. Mary's. The courtheld that "a literal reading of the grandfathering provision would appear to apply to allbuildings whose plans were filed with DOB prior to November 15, 1972, whether or not theywere completed then. Petitioners would effectively have the court insert language into ZR§ 24-111 (a) modifying the word 'buildings' so as to apply the provision only to buildingsstill under construction or in the planning pipeline, the plans for which were filed with DOBprior to November 15, 1972. However, . . . 'new language cannot be imported into astatute to give it a meaning not otherwise found therein' " (2011 NY Slip Op 30286[U], *23-24[citations omitted]).[*10]

The motion court's order was entered January 18, 2011.The petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal on or about March 7, 2011. They perfected theappeal by the end of March, and moved for a calendaring preference for the June 2011 term. ThisCourt denied the motion on April 14, 2011. (2011 NY Slip Op. 69941[U].)

On or about April 5, 2011, the petitioners moved the court below to renew, and for a TROenjoining construction pending a decision on the motion to renew. They stated that DOB hadresponded to their FOIL request after the motion court rendered its initial decision. The responseincluded decisions by DOB and Board of Standards and Appeals (hereinafter referred to as BSA)which interpreted ZR § 24-111 (a) in a manner consistent with the petitioners'interpretation that St. Mary's was prohibited from expanding to a FAR of 1.0.

DOB opposed the petitioners' motion to renew and cross-moved for summary judgment. Thepetitioners cross-moved for summary judgment on the ground that the building permit that DOBissued to St. Mary's violated ZR § 24-111 (a). While the court rejected respondents'argument "that petitioners fail to provide a reasonable justification for not providing thepurported new 'fact' sooner," it nevertheless found that this new fact would not change its priordecision. Therefore, it denied the petitioners' motion to renew. It granted DOB's cross motion forsummary judgment dismissing the proceeding against it, and denied petitioners' motion forsummary judgment on the issue of ZR § 24-111 (a), stating, "For the reasons set forth in[the prior] decision, . . . the [grandfathering] provision applies to all buildingswhose plans were filed prior to November 15, 1972, not merely those that were in the pipeline atthat point." (2011 NY Slip Op 32178[U], *19.)

The petitioners appealed on or about August 10, 2011, and the respondents moved toconsolidate the two appeals and adjourn them to the December term. The petitioners opposed onthe grounds that delaying the preliminary injunction appeal could foreclose it as moot. This Courtcalendared the appeals for the December term. At oral argument on January 18, 2012, therespondents represented to this Court that the construction of the new building was essentiallycomplete.

On appeal, the petitioners assert that the court below erred in its interpretation of theexception clause in ZR § 24-111 (a), and therefore that it erred in its denial of apreliminary injunction on the grounds that the petitioners would not succeed on the merits oftheir zoning claim. As the petitioners assert, the court below erroneously construed the zoningordinance as an "invitation to create non-compliance that was not present before." Moreover, thecourt's interpretation is simply not supported by legislative history or by the stated purpose orintent of the City Planning Commission (hereinafter referred to as CPC) the drafter of the ZoningResolution provision. I agree, and for the reasons set forth below, I would reverse, and grant thepetitioners an injunction enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the construction at St.Mary's Hospital until it conforms or obtains an area variance.

As a threshold matter, the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within thediscretion of the motion court and generally should not be disturbed unless it is demonstrated thatthe court abused its discretion. (See Borenstein v Rochel Props., 176 AD2d 171 [1st Dept1991].) Here, however, the court did not make the determination as an exercise of discretion byweighing the elements upon which a preliminary injunction is usually granted or denied. (SeeAetna Ins. Co. v Capasso, 75 NY2d 860, 862 [1990] [in addition to likelihood of success,movant must show irreparable harm in absence of injunction, and the balance of equities inmovant's favor].) Instead, it denied the preliminary injunction based solely on its determinationthat statutory interpretation [*11]forecloses the petitioners' zoningclaim. Unfortunately, as the majority agrees, the court below erred on the law.

It is well settled that "[t]he primary consideration of the courts in the construction of statutesis to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature." (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY,Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a]; see e.g.,Matter of M.B., 6 NY3d 437, 447 [2006].)

The intention of the Legislature is first to be sought from "a literal reading of the act itself."(McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [b].) However, a "literalapplication" will be rejected where it would "substantially compromise[ ]" the "meaning andeffect" of a statute. (Matter of LaCroix vSyracuse Exec. Air Serv., Inc., 8 NY3d 348, 355 [2007].) Courts are not foreclosed fromconsidering legislative history. (Matter of M.B., 6 NY3d at 449, 451.)

Further, statutes must be given "a reasonable construction, it being presumed that areasonable result was intended by the Legislature." (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1,Statutes § 143.) Nor should statutes be construed in a manner that would make them"absurd." (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 145; see also Matter ofMedical Socy. of State of N.Y. v State of N.Y. Dept. of Health, 83 NY2d 447, 451-452[1994].)

In relevant part, the exception clause of ZR § 24-111 (a) states that the provisionsrestricting community facilities to a FAR of 0.5 "shall not apply to buildings for which planswere filed with [DOB] prior to November 15, 1972 including any subsequentamendments thereof" (emphasis added). Respondent St. Mary's, on appeal, imports thelanguage of the court below in its entirety, arguing that the court construed the exception clauseaccording to "its natural and most obvious sense"; that the plain text would appear to apply to allbuildings whose plans were filed prior to November 15, 1972; and that the petitioners areimpermissibly urging the court below to insert language modifying the word "buildings" so as toapply the provision only to buildings still under construction or in the "pipeline."

St. Mary's states that its original certificate of occupancy is dated 1952, and that it providesthat plans for St. Mary's were filed in 1948. St. Mary's therefore concludes simply—andsimplistically: "Since the plans were filed with Department of Buildings before 1972, [St. Mary'sHospital] is not subject to ZR section 24-111 (a)'s restriction to a 0.5 FAR."

Moreover, relying on "the ordinary definition of amendment, that is correction ormodification" respondent adds: "[A]s DOB pointed out, and as Supreme Court correctly held theplans for the horizontal enlargement are a 'subsequent amendment' to the original plans, in thatthe enlargement is a modification of the scope of the project as shown in plans filed prior to1972."

Such an interpretation, however, violates a cardinal rule of statutory construction byimpermissibly rendering superfluous a phrase of the provision drafted by the legislative body, inthis case, the CPC. (See Levine v Bornstein, 4 NY2d 241, 244 [1958] ["all parts of an actare to be read and construed together to determine the legislative intent"].) The interpretationdesired by the respondents does not require the phrase "including any subsequent amendmentsthereof." Had the drafters truly intended to grant a community facility like St. Mary's acontinuing and eternal right to expand its building up to a FAR of 1.0, just because plans for its1951 facility were filed before November 15, 1972, it could have accomplished the exemption bysimply stating that "the provisions shall not apply to [*12]buildings for which plans were filed prior to November 15, 1972."St. Mary's contention that "subsequent amendments" in this case refers to the plans for thenew construction at St. Mary's Hospital does not render it any less superfluous: Theresimply would be no necessity for the phrase if St. Mary's interpretation of the provision were thecorrect one.

On the other hand, I find persuasive the petitioners' assertion that the term "subsequentamendments" has a specific meaning which precludes the term being applied loosely to anymodification or alteration—especially one made more than 60 years after the original planswere filed. In the absence of definitions in the Zoning Resolution itself, the petitioners rely on theCity Construction Code asserting as follows: that the phrase "subsequent amendments thereof" inthe context of ZR § 24-111 (a) refers to amendments to the "plans filed prior to November15, 1972." As such, pursuant to the New York City Administrative Code, subsequentamendments to plans or "approved construction documents" filed prior to November 15, 1972"shall be submitted, reviewed and approved before the final inspection of the work. . . is completed." (Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 28-104.3,28-101.5 [emphasis added].) A final inspection is performed by the DOB prior to the issuance ofa new or amended certificate of occupancy, or a letter of completion. (Administrative Code ofCity of NY §§ 28-116.2.4.1, 28-116.2.4.2.)

Thus, any "subsequent amendments" to the hospital plans filed in 1948 would beamendments reflecting changes or modifications to the hospital building envisioned in the 1948plans and could have been submitted only before the 1951 facility was completed andbefore the issuance of its certificate of occupancy. The respondents make no such claim for theircurrent plans.[FN7]

Contrary to the motion court's decision, therefore, no new language needs be imported intothe exception clause to limit the "buildings" therein to projects in the pipeline. The reference to"subsequent amendments" per se limits the scope of the exception clause to projectswhich were commenced prior to November 15, 1972 and were still "in the works" awaiting finalinspection and certificates of occupancy. Hence, I conclude that the term "subsequentamendments" simply cannot apply to plans filed by St. Mary's with DOB in 2010, more than ahalf-century after St. Mary's original plans were filed with DOB.

This interpretation is further supported by the legislative history of the 1973 ZoningResolution, and comports with the legislative intent of CPC as expressed in its reportrecommending adoption of the provisions. The report establishes that in 1973, CPC clearlyintended to correct the overbuilding of community facilities in residential neighborhoods bylimiting FAR for projects that would negatively impact residential neighborhoods in the future.The concern of the drafters was that the availability of "community facilities bulk. . . has caused buildings out of character with the surrounding residentialdevelopment and has overburdened the streets and other supporting services in the area." Thereport highlights the fact that "[t]hese facilities in R1 and R2 Districts [like Weeks Woodland]are usually developed on large lots and have made use of building types more than 4 or 5 storieshigh which are out of scale with the [*13]typical building type in[those] districts. Frequently they are constructed with a total disregard of the topography of thearea and the existing local street patterns which are inadequate to handle the traffic generated bythese uses."

The report states clearly that the provisions aimed at reducing the FAR are intended to guidethe development of "[a] significant number of [community facilities which] are presentlybeing built or planned using community facilities bulk" (emphasis added). The CPC report,however, recognized the "concern of sponsors who have invested large amounts of time andenergy on preparing plans for these facilities and who fear the delay occasioned by another roundof approvals."

The report further states: "[Community facilities] may continue to locate in R1 to R7residential districts as-of-right so long as they have the same floor area ratio as residentialbuildings. In R1 and R2 districts, floor area bonuses will go as-of-right only to those communityfacilities which had their plans on file with the [DOB] as of November 15, 1972"(emphasis added). Hence, it is evident, that the CPC enacted the provisions for communityfacilities in the process of being planned, constructed and built at that time. As thepetitioners assert, it is more logical to draw the inference that the purpose of the exception clausewas to protect a developer's investment in current plans rather than exempt non-conformingstructures for which plans had not been filed—and would not be filed for another 37 years.

Specifically, the use of "as of" in the context of discussing ongoing projects suggests a"cut-off" date/deadline for projects in the planning stages at the time the 1973 provisions werebeing drafted. Neither the tenor nor the language of the report even remotely suggests thatNovember 15, 1972 is a "grandfathering" date allowing future expansion up to a FAR of 1 byall the buildings already in existence throughout the city.

Interestingly, in September 2011, CPC issued proposals for new amendments to the ZoningResolution. One was a proposal to amend ZR § 24-111 (a) by deleting the exception clauseon the grounds that it is "obsolete." This proposal was characterized as a technical amendment, adescription of those amendments which the CPC, after checking with DOB, believed were notsubject to dispute.

Although as a consequence of this litigation and the DOB's current interpretation, CPCsubsequently abandoned the proposal, nevertheless its initial stated intent to delete the exceptionclause indicates its view that there was no entity left to take advantage of the exemption. As thepetitioners argue, if the exception clause meant what the respondents assert it means, CPC wouldnot have proposed deleting it for "obsolescence."

More significantly, the record reflects that DOB has interpreted the exception clauseinconsistently. Until October 20, 2008 when DOB reversed its opinion and granted St. Mary's apermit for its expansion plans, it appears to have adhered to the interpretation urged by thepetitioners.

In their motion to renew, the petitioners presented evidence, obtained after a formal FOILrequest, that in 2006, DOB denied an application for expansion by Our Lady of Snow Church,Queens, also defined as a community facility under the ZR. The church argued that the exceptionclause of ZR § 24-111 (a) allowed such an expansion. DOB rejected the argument stating:"[t]he . . . statement pertaining to Bldg plans filed prior to 11/15/1972 is intended asa vesting provision to allow Bldgs filed prior to the effective date of the Zoningamendment to [*14]continue in compliance with the priorzoning allowable floor area."

Furthermore, DOB initially denied St. Mary's application on the same basis. When theagency reversed itself within a period of just 14 days, it gave an explanation totally at odds withits prior denials, that is, it exempted St. Mary's from the 0.5 FAR because "building was builtprior to Nov. 15th, 1972." DOB gave no explanation for its change of position. It now states,without explanation, that its ruling in the Our Lady of Snow application was "erroneous."

Lastly, the petitioners correctly assert that their interpretation of the exception clausecomports with the well established requirement that "grandfathering" provisions must benarrowly construed. (Matter of Albert v Board of Stds. & Appeals of City of N.Y., 89AD2d 960, 961-962 [1982], appeal dismissed 59 NY2d 673 [1983] ["(w)hile it iscustomary for a zoning ordinance to be strictly construed in favor of the property owner, there arecountervailing considerations when the ordinance limits the extension of nonconforming uses,because such uses detract from the effectiveness of the comprehensive zoning plan"] [citationsomitted].)

Given the finding that the petitioners would prevail on their zoning claim, I would reject therespondents' argument that both appeals are moot because construction is "substantiallycomplete." First, I seriously doubt the veracity of the respondents' statements that the structure isvirtually completed. Second, even if this fact was reflected in the record, in my opinion, it couldnot defeat the petitioners' right to appellate review. No public policy justifies abrogating thatright simply because a party with the means to press on regardless with a multi-million dollarconstruction has done so. Any argument that emphasizes the ground gained in the respondents'race to complete construction has been explicitly and soundly rejected by the Court of Appeals.(See Dreikausen, 98 NY2d at 172 ["a race to completion cannot be determinative"].) TheCourt was unequivocal in its holding that "relief remains at least theoretically available even aftercompletion of the project. Simply put, structures changing the use of property most often canbe destroyed " (id. [emphasis added]; see also Matter of Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill v NewYork City Landmarks Preserv. Commn., 2 NY3d 727, 729 [2004]).

The Court provided guidelines for evaluating mootness. Chief among the factors itenumerated is "a challenger's failure to seek preliminary injunctive relief." (Dreikausen,98 NY2d at 173; see also Citineighbors, 2 NY3d at 730 ["under Dreikausen. . . petitioners were required, at a minimum, to seek an injunction"][emphasis added].) In Dreikausen and Citineighbors, the petitioners did not seeka TRO or a preliminary injunction when they filed their article 78 proceeding. (See 98NY2d at 171; 2 NY3d at 728.) By contrast, in the case at bar, the petitioners sought a TRO whenthey filed their original petition, but it was denied. They sought a preliminary injunction in theiramended petition in August 2010, but the court denied it in January 2011. Subsequently, theymoved to renew, and again made an application for a preliminary injunction, which was alsodenied. The respondents' further reliance on Dever v DeVito (84 AD3d 1539 [3d Dept 2011], lvdismissed 18 NY3d 864 [2012]) and Matter of Sherman v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Scarsdale (82 AD3d899 [2d Dept 2011]) is misplaced even though the petitioners acknowledge that therequirement to provide a bond for delaying construction of a multi-million dollar project hasdeterred them from seeking a stay in this Court. In Dever, the appellant not only failed toseek a stay in the Appellate Division but also "eventually withdrew [*15]her appeal and thereafter failed to pursue any additional legalrelief to preserve the status quo or prevent further construction of defendants' residence." (84AD3d at 1541.) In Sherman, the appellants not only failed to move for a preliminaryinjunction in the Appellate Division but also failed to so move in Supreme Court. (82 AD3d at899-900.) Indeed, the record reflects that petitioners in this case have had applications for either aTRO or a preliminary injunction pending before the court below for 9 of the 12 months that thecase was before that court.

In my opinion, while it is clear that the Court in Matter of Fallati v Town of Colonie(222 AD2d 811 [3d Dept 1995])—a case upon which the majority relies because it is citedwith approval by the Court of Appeals—found mootness when petitioner failed to seekinjunctive relief in the Appellate Division, it is equally clear that in Matter of Watch HillHomeowners Assn. v Town Bd. of Town of Greenburgh (226 AD2d 1031 [3d Dept 1996],lv denied 88 NY2d 811 [1996]), also cited with approval by the Court of Appeals,petitioner's failure to repeatedly seek injunctive relief did not lead to dismissal of the appeal. Inmy opinion, the majority's reasoning that, because two justices were common to the panels ofboth cases, Watch Hill does not abrogate or relax the requirement of moving for relief "ateach level of litigation," is incoherent. Specifically, the majority does not address the import ofthe plain and unequivocal language of Watch Hill which appears to apply directly to thecase at bar: "While construction . . . can render a challenge of this type moot whenthe petitioner has not made any attempt to preserve its rights pending judicial review. . . that is not the circumstance here, for petitioner sought preliminary injunctiverelief—which was denied—as soon as it became aware that construction wasimminent. Respondents were thus placed on notice that if they proceeded with construction, itwould be at their own risk." (Matter of Watch Hill, 226 AD2d at 1032 [emphasisadded].)

In other words, a finding of mootness is not mandated by the fact that a petitioner has failedto seek injunctive relief at any particular stage of litigation; rather the analysis must focuson the stage of construction, and whether a petitioner has sought injunctive reliefbefore construction is substantially completed. (See Matter of Dreikhausen v Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of City of Long Beach, 98 NY2d 165, 171-174 [2002].)

The majority's dictate that the petitioners should have immediately come to this Courtblatantly ignores the fact that in August 2010 on the day the TRO (temporary restraining order)was denied, the motion court immediately set the case down for oral argument on apreliminary injunction for early September, and the application was before that court untilJanuary 2011 when the motion court's denial was entered as an order.

The respondents were therefore on notice prior to beginning construction. Specifically, theywere on notice, as of the petitioners' motion to renew in April 2011, of the fact that even theDOB had at one time interpreted the zoning resolution exemption to include only projects in thepipeline as of November 1972. It is, therefore, of no relevance, in my opinion, that they did notcome "immediately" to this Court when their application for a TRO was denied on August 20,2010.[*16]

Instead, I find that the respondents' increasedconstruction activity at this time is all the more egregious since it strongly suggests that theysimply ignored the admonition of the Court of Appeals that "a race to completion cannot bedeterminative." (Dreikhausen, 98 NY2d at 172.)

In my opinion, the majority paints itself into a corner because it appears to ignore theDreikhausen Court's holding that mootness, and consequently dismissal of an appeal, isfound by "weighing" various factors. In turn, weighing means assessing the relative importanceor significance of the factors in a given set of circumstances. Hence, in some cases, courts havedismissed appeals because petitioners waited until construction was virtually complete beforeseeking injunctive relief; in others "notwithstanding . . . completion. . . novel issues or public interests such as environmental concerns warrantcontinuing review." (Dreikhausen, 98 NY2d at 173, citing with approval Matter ofFriends of Pine Bush v Planning Bd. Of City of Albany, 86 AD2d 246 [3d Dept 1982][appeal should not be dismissed on ground of mootness since a question of general interest andsubstantial public importance is present and is likely to recur if not judicially resolved],aff'd 59 NY2d 849 [1983]; Watch Hill, 226 AD2d 1031.)

In declining to rule on the zoning issue, the majority leaves the door open for any communityfacility which initially filed plans before 1972 to be granted permission by DOB to expand up toa maximum floor to area ration (hereinafter referred to as FAR) of 1.0 in an R2A residentialneighborhood. The majority's view that agreement by the majority and dissent on theinterpretation of the zoning regulation tends to make such a situation unlikely to recur, in myopinion, is simply an evasion of the issue since that interpretation is nothing more than dicta atthis point.

Finally, the Court of Appeals determined that an equally significant factor in evaluatingmootness is whether the work was undertaken without authority and in bad faith.(Dreikausen, 98 NY2d at 173.) While St. Mary's did obtain approval from the DOH andDOB, it cannot be said that it was unaware that the petitioners alleged a zoning violation. Thepetitioners filed a challenge with DOB, then filed their petition with Supreme Court.Subsequently the petitioners moved to renew, and noticed appeals in both proceedings.

Thus, the respondents were aware or should have been aware, at the very least, that theexception clause of ZR § 24-111 (a) has been interpreted inconsistently by DOB, and thatthe CPC determined to delete it on the grounds of obsolescence. Hence, in my opinion, norespondent should have been sanguine about the interpretation of the provision; nor could any ofthe respondents have been advised that appellate review would be a foregone conclusion.Proceeding with construction with dispatch could be viewed as an "unseemly race to completionintended to moot petitioners' lawsuit." (Cf. Citineighbors, 2 NY3d at 729.) In thiscase, for example, according to the petitioners' affidavits on which the court below relied, on theday of April 25, 2011, with the petitioners' appeal and a motion to renew pending, "141 trips"were made through the neighborhood by a front-end loader, and the construction companyadvised the petitioners that work was likely to continue through "some weekends." Moreover, therespondents ensured their "edge" in the race by opposing the petitioners' motion for expeditingthe first appeal, and by initiating a series of motions that delayed the date of argument. Hence,barely six months later when the respondents submitted briefs for this appeal, they were ready toargue, albeit without citation to any admissible evidence, that the petitioners' challenge was mootbecause foundations had been poured and the steel superstructure was 70% completed. [*17]In particular, the argument of respondents St. Mary's andDASNY's on appeal should give this Court reason to view the continuing construction as such an"unseemly race." Relying on Knaust v City of Kingston (157 F3d 86, 88 [2d Cir 1998]),the respondents purport to inform this Court that "[it] lack[s] the power, once a bell has beenrung, to unring it." [Prior Case History: 2011 NY Slip Op 30286(U).]

Footnotes


Footnote 1: After Supreme Court deniedtheir initial application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) in August 2010, petitioners didnot immediately come to this Court to seek interim relief. Petitioners again failed to seek suchrelief from this Court in January 2011, when Supreme Court denied their first motion for apreliminary injunction. Petitioners again failed to seek such relief from this Court in March 2011,when they moved this Court for other relief in connection with their appeal from the first orderunder review. Petitioners again failed to seek such relief from this Court in April 2011, whenSupreme Court denied their application for a TRO in connection with the renewal of their motionfor a preliminary injunction. Finally, petitioners once again failed to seek such relief from thisCourt in August 2011, when Supreme Court denied their renewed motion.

Footnote 2: The dissenter protests too muchin asserting that we "stoop[ ]" to characterizing as an emotional appeal his reference torespondents' alleged "power" and "money." Since the resources available to respondents are notlegally relevant, the dissent's reference thereto serves no evident purpose other than emotionalmanipulation. However, if the dissent finds the temptation to make such a reference irresistible,far from being "meanspirited[ ]," it is only fair to take note of the children for whose benefit theproject is intended.

Footnote 3: Petitioners cite Matter ofParkview Assoc. v City of New York (71 NY2d 274 [1988], appeal dismissed and certdenied 488 US 801 [1988]), in which the Court of Appeals held that the City was notestopped to revoke the portion of a building permit that erroneously permitted the construction ofa greater number of floors than were lawful under zoning requirements, even though therevocation would require the destruction of several floors that had already been built. However,the issue in Parkview was not mootness (as here), but whether the circumstances of thecase were such as to give rise to a "rare exception to the unavailability of estoppel againstgovernmental entities" (id. at 279). Accordingly, Parkview is not authority forexcusing the failure of private litigants, such as petitioners herein, to seek injunctive reliefpending the determination of litigation.

Footnote 4: As more fully discussed below,where it is contended that an appeal from a court's refusal to stop construction has been renderedmoot by substantial completion of the project, the competing interests and equities must beweighed against each other in determining whether or not the appeal should be dismissed.Accordingly, even if the petitioners in Watch Hill failed to seek injunctive relief from theAppellate Division after Supreme Court denied their initial application (and nothing in thedecision indicates that this was the case), the retention of jurisdiction of the appeal in WatchHill does not constitute authority for retaining jurisdiction in every case having a similarprocedural fact pattern.

Footnote 5: It is troubling that the majoritystoops to characterizing this latter statement as one intended by the dissent to make an"emotional appeal" considering the majority's emotionally manipulative observation in its verynext sentence that the dissent "seems to have lost sight of the fact that [the project is intendedfor] sick and disabled children." Moreover, the majority's observation demonstrates a rarejudicial mean spiritedness in its deliberate mischaracterization of the dissent's position as ifemphasizing the legal rights of the petitioners must be equated with disregard for severelydisabled children: Whatever the intended use of the facility, it does not alter the fact that thoseracing to get the project approved, commenced and completed are doing so with a blatantdisregard for the rights of the petitioners. For example, the manager of the construction projectwho, as the record reflects, informed the petitioners in a July 2010 meeting that the work wouldbe conducted after hours, and on Saturday and Sundays, and then added: "we are going to makeyour lives miserable over the next two years."

Footnote 6: FAR is calculated by dividingthe total floor area of a structure by the total area of the lot containing the building.

Footnote 7: On the contrary, it should benoted that, at oral argument, counsel for St. Mary's impliedly conceded that the plans for the newconstruction are not the "subsequent amendments" contemplated by ZR § 24-111 (a) byrefusing repeatedly to answer the question as to how the plans could be described as"amendments."


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