| People v Burch |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 05678 [97 AD3d 987] |
| July 19, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Loren Burch,Appellant. |
—[*1] P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Kenneth C. Weafer of counsel), forrespondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Breslin, J.),rendered April 21, 2011, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of criminal contemptin the first degree.
Defendant and the victim are the biological parents of two children. In February 2010, atemporary order of protection was entered in favor of the victim precluding defendant fromhaving any contact with her. Two months later, and while the order of protection remained ineffect, defendant arrived at the home of the victim's parents and demanded to speak with thevictim.[FN1]The victim's mother repeatedly instructed defendant to leave and, when he refused, the twobecame involved in an altercation, prompting the victim to call 911 and then run across the streetto secure the assistance of an off-duty member of the City of Albany Police Department.
As a result of this incident, defendant ultimately was indicted and charged in a second [*2]superseding indictment with criminal contempt in the first degree(count 1) and endangering the welfare of a child (counts 2 and 3). At the close of the People'sproof, County Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the second and third counts of theindictment, and the jury thereafter convicted defendant of the sole remaining charge of criminalcontempt in the first degree. County Court subsequently sentenced defendant to a prison term of1 to 3 years, prompting this appeal.
We affirm. As defendant did not move to dismiss the indictment due to the asserted lack ofrequired signatures, this issue is unpreserved and is " 'reviewable as of right only if the missingsignature renders the indictment jurisdictionally defective' " (People v Brown, 17 AD3d 869, 870 [2005], quoting People vStauber, 307 AD2d 544, 545 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 599 [2003]; accord People v Striplin, 48 AD3d878, 879 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 871 [2008]). In this regard, the face of theindictment is signed by the presenting Assistant District Attorney, and the accompanying backeris signed by both the Assistant District Attorney and the grand jury foreperson. Accordingly, weare satisfied that the requirements of CPL 200.50 (8) and (9) have been met (see People v Wheatley, 55 AD3d947, 948 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 931 [2009]; People v Striplin, 48 AD3dat 879; People v Brown, 17 AD3d at 870).
Defendant's remaining challenge to the indictment is equally lacking in merit. "[W]here anindictment count incorporates by reference the statutory provision applicable to the crimeintended to be charged, it has been repeatedly held that this is sufficient to apprise the defendantof the charge and, therefore, renders the count jurisdictionally valid" (People v Brown, 75 AD3d 655,656 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord People v Griswold, 95 AD3d 1454, 1455 [2012]; see People v Binns, 82 AD3d1449, 1450 [2011]). Based upon our review of the relevant count of the indictment, whichspecifically recited, among other things, the provision of the Penal Law under which defendanthad been charged, we are satisfied that defendant was provided with fair notice of the chargeagainst him.
Nor are we persuaded that defendant effectively was denied the right to be present at side barconferences due to County Court's requirement that he be accompanied by a court officer.Although a criminal defendant indeed has a statutory right to be present for such conferences(see CPL 260.20; People v Vargas, 88 NY2d 363, 375-376 [1996]; People vAntommarchi, 80 NY2d 247, 250 [1992]), this right may be waived by the defendant or hisor her attorney (see People vVelasquez, 1 NY3d 44, 49-50 [2003]; People v Abdullah, 28 AD3d 940, 941 [2006], lv denied 7NY3d 784 [2006]; People vBeverly, 6 AD3d 874, 875 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 637 [2004]) and, in anyevent, must be balanced against the trial court's "duty to maintain an orderly and securecourtroom" (People v Briggs, 285 AD2d 651, 652 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d654 [2001], citing 22 NYCRR 700.5 [a], [d]). Contrary to defendant's assertion, the record beforeus reflects that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Antommarchi rights (see People v Roberts, 80 AD3d787, 790 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 862 [2011])—a conclusion that is in noway altered by County Court's security policy (see People v Sudan, 298 AD2d 620, 621[2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 620 [2003]; People v Riley, 292 AD2d 822, 823-824[2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 640 [2002]).
As for defendant's challenge to the verdict itself, we are satisfied that the verdict is not [*3]against the weight of the evidence.[FN2]Insofar as is relevant here, a person is guilty of criminal contempt in the first degree when he orshe "violat[es] that part of a duly served order of protection, or such order of which the defendanthas actual knowledge because he or she was present in court when such order was issued. . . which requires the . . . defendant to stay away from the person. . . on whose behalf the order was issued" (Penal Law § 215.51 [c]; see People v Darpino, 51 AD3d1059, 1059-1060 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 735 [2008]).[FN3]Here, the underlying order of protection unequivocally instructed defendant to stay away fromthe victim and precluded him from having any contact with her. Although the victim's trialtestimony arguably supports defendant's present claim—that he did not knowingly violatethe order of protection because the victim was not supposed to be at her parents' house when hearrived to pick up one of his children for a weekend visitation—such testimony stands instark contrast to the testimony offered by the victim's mother. In this regard, the victim's motherstated that when she opened the door to her residence and asked defendant what he wanted, hereplied, "I want [the victim]." The victim's mother further testified that defendant thereafterrefused her repeated directives to leave the premises and lunged at her in an attempt to gain entryto the residence. Such testimony, in our view, is more than sufficient to sustain the verdict, andany conflicts in this regard presented a credibility issue for the jury to resolve (see generally People v Moyer, 75AD3d 1004, 1006 [2010]; People vMoore, 29 AD3d 1077, 1078 [2006]).
With respect to defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which is premised uponcounsel's asserted failure to move to dismiss the indictment upon speedy trial grounds, we areunable to evaluate the merits of defendant's claim as it involves matters outside the record and, assuch, is more appropriately addressed in the context of a CPL article 440 motion (see People v Peque, 88 AD3d1024, 1025 [2011]). Finally, defendant's challenge to County Court's Sandoval rulingis unpreserved for our review (seePeople v Phillips, 55 AD3d 1145, 1147-1148 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 899[2008]; People v Caswell, 49 AD3d1257, 1258 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 735 [2008]). Defendant's remainingcontentions, to the extent not specifically addressed, have been examined and found to be lackingin merit.[*4]
Rose, J.P., Spain, Malone Jr. and Kavanagh, JJ., concur.Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Footnote 1: Although the victim did not livewith her parents at this time, she and the children were at her parents' residence on the evening inquestion.
Footnote 2: Defendant's challenge to thelegal sufficiency of the evidence is not preserved for our review, but "our weight of the evidencereview necessarily involves an evaluation of whether all elements of the charged crime wereproven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial" (People v Thompson, 92 AD3d 1139, 1140 n 2 [2012] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Brown, 90 AD3d 1140, 1140 n [2011], lvdenied 18 NY3d 922 [2012]).
Footnote 3: The record contains conflictingproof as to whether defendant was served with the order of protection in open court or at somepoint thereafter. This issue need not detain us, however, because the order of protection is signedby defendant, thus acknowledging defendant's receipt thereof and "establish[ing] that it wasserved and that he was on notice as to its contents" (People v Soler, 52 AD3d 938, 940 [2008], lv denied 11NY3d 741 [2008]).