| Matter of Absolut Care of Three Rivs. v Shah |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 08613 [101 AD3d 1327] |
| December 13, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Absolut Care of Three Rivers, as TemporaryAdministrator of the Estate of Carolyn Bradian, Deceased, Petitioner, v Nirav R. Shah,as Commissioner of Health, Respondent, et al., Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kate H. Nepveu of counsel), forCommissioner of Health, respondent.
Rose, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of theSupreme Court, entered in Schuyler County) to review a determination of the Department ofHealth which found decedent ineligible for certain Medicaid benefits.
After decedent was admitted to petitioner's skilled nursing facility in January 2010, petitionerapplied for Medicaid benefits on her behalf. Finding transfers of decedent's assets for less thanfair market value, the Schuyler County Department of Social Services determined that decedentwas ineligible and would remain so for a penalty period of approximately 13 months (seeSocial Services Law § 366 [5] [e] [3]). A fair hearing was held and the Department of[*2]Health affirmed the decision. Petitioner then commenced thisproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78.
"In reviewing a Medicaid eligibility determination rendered after a hearing, this Court must'review the record, as a whole, to determine if the agency's decisions are supported by substantialevidence and are not affected by an error of law' " (Matter of Mallery v Shah, 93 AD3d 936, 937 [2012], quoting Matter of Campbell v Commissioner ofN.Y. State Dept. of Health, 14 AD3d 766, 768 [2005]; accord Matter of Loiacono v Demarzo,72 AD3d 969, 969 [2010]; Matterof Rogers v Novello, 26 AD3d 580, 581 [2006]). Here, the record discloses thatdecedent's mother established a trust in 1995, naming decedent as a beneficiary of the trust assetsto be distributed upon the mother's death. In 2004, decedent executed a durable power of attorneyauthorizing her daughter to act on her behalf. Decedent's mother died in April 2009 and, in July2009, decedent's daughter opened a joint bank account with decedent, acting as herattorney-in-fact. Decedent was admitted to the hospital in late December 2009, after being foundunresponsive and living in unhygienic conditions. At the time of her admission, she was noted tobe "confused and not interacting." No medical proof was submitted regarding decedent's mentalstate prior to her admission to the hospital, but the hospital records note that she had reportedlybeen "fine." Decedent was moved to petitioner's nursing facility in January 2010, where she wasnoted to rarely speak and have poor short term memory, but to be able to understand questions,follow commands and make herself understood. Later that month, the proceeds from the trust dueto decedent—approximately $129,000—were deposited in the joint account. On thatsame day, the daughter transferred over $100,000 from the joint account to her own account and,shortly thereafter, made additional transfers of more than $17,000. Petitioner applied forMedicaid benefits on decedent's behalf in May 2010. As of January 2011, decedent was noted tohave "advanced dementia."
Petitioner argues that the challenged determination is based on an error of law because thetransfers by decedent's daughter exceeded her authority as decedent's agent and were, therefore,"exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medical assistance" (Social Services Law§ 366 [5] [e] [4] [iii] [B]). We note, however, that the daughter's opening of the jointaccount was authorized by virtue of her ability to engage in banking transactions as decedent'sattorney-in-fact (see General Obligations Law § 5-1502D [former (2)]).[FN*]Although the power of attorney did not authorize the daughter to then make a gift to herself bywithdrawing the trust proceeds, the presumption of Banking Law § 675 applies here (see Matter of Velie, 62 AD3d1244, 1245 [2009]). Thus, pursuant to Social Services Law § 366 (5) (e) (6), thedaughter's transfers can be attributed to decedent (see Matter of Mallery v Shah, 93 AD3dat 939). Given this, petitioner was required to show that the transfers fell within a statutory orregulatory exception (see id.; Matter of Rogers v Novello, 26 AD3d at 581).
Although petitioner theorizes that decedent was unaware of her entitlement to the trustproceeds or any of the actions taken by her daughter due to her diminished mental capacity andargues that the evidence establishes the applicability of the exception found in Social ServicesLaw § 366 (5) (e) (4) (iii) (B), the only medical proof submitted pertains to decedent'smental [*3]capacity after decedent's mother died and after thecreation of the joint account. While petitioner contends that the daughter's actions were animproper gift to herself in violation of her fiduciary duty, thus creating a presumption ofself-dealing, the acts of the daughter are equally consistent with the conclusion that decedent hadanticipated and acquiesced to the eventual transfer. Thus, in the absence of proof supporting itsclaim of self-dealing, petitioner is unable to overcome the conclusion that the proceeds weretransferred—at least in part—in order to qualify for Medicaid (see Matter ofMallery v Shah, 93 AD3d at 937-938; Matter of Loiacono v Demarzo, 72 AD3d at970).
Mercure, J.P., Lahtinen, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determinationis confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote *: We also note that the 2008amendments to General Obligations Law § 5-1502D, made effective September 1, 2009,now prevent attorneys-in-fact from using the banking authorization to open a joint account (L2008, ch 644, §§ 6, 21).