Matter of Silverman v New York State Workers' CompensationBd.
2012 NY Slip Op 08853 [101 AD3d 1422]
December 20, 2012
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 6, 2013


In the Matter of Donna Silverman, Appellant, et al.,Petitioner,
v
New York State Workers' Compensation Board et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Michael H. Zhu, New York City, for appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Paul Groenwegen of counsel), forrespondents.

Stein, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), entered March 21,2012 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent Workers' Compensation Boarddeclining to renew petitioner's license to represent workers' compensation claimants.

Petitioner Donna Silverman (hereinafter petitioner) obtained a license to practice beforerespondent Workers' Compensation Board as a nonattorney representative pursuant to Workers'Compensation Law § 24-a in 1983.[FN1]Throughout the course of her career, petitioner's license was [*2]repeatedly renewed in accordance with Workers' CompensationLaw § 24-a (2) (see 12 NYCRR 302-1.7). However, in 2011, after reviewing herrenewal application and conducting an oral interview of petitioner, a Board panel recommendedagainst renewing her license based upon the panel's findings that petitioner had failed to discloseher partnership with her husband, petitioner Irwin Silverman, and that she lacked competentknowledge of the Workers' Compensation Law and related regulations. The full Board votedunanimously to approve the panel's recommendation, and petitioner was directed to, among otherthings, transfer representation of her clients to another license holder or attorney, other thanSilverman.

Petitioners commenced this proceeding seeking, as pertinent here, annulment or modificationof the Board's determination and also moved by order to show cause for a stay of the Board'sdecision. The motion for a stay was denied by Supreme Court (Lynch, J.), and Supreme Court(McDonough, J.) thereafter dismissed the petition. Petitioner now appeals.[FN2]

We affirm. Pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 24-a, the Board may issuelicenses to nonattorneys to appear before the Board "in accordance with the rules established byit" (Workers' Compensation Law § 24-a [1]). Licensed representatives are a uniquestatutory creation in that—despite the fact that they are not attorneys—they arepermitted to represent claimants before the Board (see Martin Minkowitz, PracticeCommentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 64, Workers' Compensation Law §24-a). Importantly, the applicable regulations require that a licensed representative have "acompetent knowledge of the law and regulations relating to workers' compensation matters andthe necessary qualifications to render service to his or her client" (12 NYCRR 302-1.2 [a] [6];see 12 NYCRR 302-1.4), and permit the Board, in its discretion, to require an applicantfor renewal of a license to submit to an oral review to demonstrate such knowledge (see12 NYCRR 302-1.4).

Here, during petitioner's oral review, the Board questioned her regarding her knowledge ofthe February 2010 full Board decision in Employer: American Axle (2010 WL 2417972,2010 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 2560 [Feb. 4, 2010]), which established specific guidelines to befollowed by claimants in order to demonstrate their attachment to the labor market for purposesof obtaining workers' compensation benefits. In the Board's view, petitioner's responses to suchinquiry demonstrated that she was not familiar with the implications of that case, despite the factthat it had been cited in at least three adverse determinations issued to petitioner's clients prior toher oral review. Upon our examination of the record, we cannot say that the Board's conclusionwas without a rational basis. Nor can we say, given the potential impact to petitioner's clients ofthe American Axle case, that her lack of familiarity therewith is inconsequential.[*3]

We similarly find adequate support in the record for theBoard's determination that petitioner failed to disclose a partnership relationship with Silvermanas required by 12 NYCRR 302-2.3. In reviewing such determination, we accord some deferenceto the Board's interpretation of its own regulations (see Matter of Gaines v New York StateDiv. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 90 NY2d 545, 548-549 [1997]; Matter of Lefkowitz v Public Serv.Commn. of the State of N.Y., 77 AD3d 1043, 1044 [2010]) and, contrary to petitioner'scontention, the Board is not limited to the definition of partnership contained in the PartnershipLaw. In determining whether a partnership exists, no one factor is controlling, and the Boardcould properly consider the overall relationship between petitioner and Silverman "in terms oftheir express or implied intent to exercise joint control and management of the business and toshare its profits and losses" (Sterling vSterling, 21 AD3d 663, 665 [2005] [internal citations omitted]).

The record here reflects that, not only did petitioner and Silverman share office space, skilland knowledge and cover for each other at hearings on behalf of their respective clients,Silverman also represented most of petitioner's clients before the full Board withoutremuneration. While there was some evidence to support a contrary conclusion, viewing thebusiness relationship between petitioner and Silverman as a whole, we find sufficient grounds forthe Board's determination that a partnership existed, which petitioner did not disclose to theBoard. Upon our review of the record in its entirety, we are therefore satisfied that the Board'sdecision to deny renewal of petitioner's license had a rational basis and was not arbitrary andcapricious (see generally Matter ofRaymond Hadley Corp. v New York State Dept. of State, 86 AD3d 899, 900 [2011]),and we discern no reason to disturb it. Accordingly, Supreme Court properly dismissed thepetition.

Peters, P.J., Rose and Egan Jr., JJ., concur.

Malone Jr., J. (dissenting). I do not agree that the decision of the Workers' CompensationBoard to deny the license renewal application of petitioner Donna Silverman (hereinafterpetitioner) has a rational legal basis, so I would reverse Supreme Court's judgment, grant thepetition and annul the Board's determination.

The Board's conclusion that petitioner—who had been a licensed workers'compensation representative with multiple license renewals for 28 years—lackedcompetent knowledge of the Workers' Compensation Law was based upon its dissatisfaction withher answers to just a few questions posed by the Board panel during her oral interview, inquiringabout what advice she gives to claimants regarding their search for work. The questions wereobviously intended to assess her knowledge of the Board's decision in Employer: AmericanAxle (2010 WL 2417972, 2010 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 2560 [Feb. 4, 2010]). That decisionenumerated several specific measures, at least one of which a claimant must take and documentto demonstrate attachment to the labor market. Importantly, the questions were, withoutexception, poorly worded and nonspecific, to the point of vagueness. Nevertheless, petitioner didaccurately describe the measures that a claimant must take and document to demonstrate anindependent job search and connection to the labor market; she correctly indicated that she wouldadvise a claimant to register with both the Department of Labor and with employment agencies.Although her responses were not what the Board apparently sought, [*4]the unartfully phrased, ambiguous questions posed to her did notelicit more detailed responses, and clearly did not establish that she lacked knowledge of eitherthe Workers' Compensation Law generally, or American Axle specifically. In fact, thequestioning Commissioner's response to petitioner's correct answer was itself incorrect.

Secondly, I find that the Board's decision to deny renewal of her license on the ground thatshe engaged in an undisclosed partnership with her husband, petitioner IrwinSilverman,[FN3]is both arbitrary and capricious. While I agree that the Board's interpretation of its ownregulations is entitled to some deference, the Board did not explain in its determination eitherwhat constitutes a proscribed "partnership" within the meaning of 12 NYCRR 302-2.3 or whataspects of petitioner's relationship with her husband it considered relevant in determining that apartnership did exist. That decision was entirely subjective, best summed up by the comment ofone Board panel member during the oral review who stated, "Sounds like a partnership to me."Something more substantial than an "I know it when I see it" analysis should be used beforepetitioner is deprived of the license that she held and extensively practiced under for decades.

For these reasons, I dissent. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: Between 1983 and 1998,petitioner worked in that capacity for her husband, petitioner Irwin Silverman, an attorney whoseprimary area of practice is workers' compensation cases. After Silverman was suspended fromthe practice of law for one year in 1998 (Matter of Silverman, 238 AD2d 89 [1998],lv denied 91 NY2d 808 [1998]), petitioner identified herself as a self-employed licensedrepresentative.

Footnote 2: Inasmuch as petitioner does notraise in her appellate brief issues previously argued at the trial level—relating to dueprocess, a reduction of the sanction imposed and modification of the portion of the determinationrestricting the transfer of clients—they are deemed to be abandoned (see Matter of Barnes v Prack, 92 AD3d990, 990 [2012]; Cassadei vNationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 21 AD3d 681, 683 [2005]).

Footnote 3: He is an attorney whospecializes in Workers' Compensation Law matters.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.