| Matter of VTR FV, LLC v Town of Guilderland |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 09123 [101 AD3d 1532] |
| December 27, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of VTR FV, LLC, et al., Appellants, v Town ofGuilderland et al., Respondents, and Abode Blue Chip, LLC, et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Whiteman, Osterman & Hanna, LLP, Albany (John J. Henry of counsel), for Abode BlueChip, LLC and another, respondents.
Stein, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McNamara, J.), entered February 7,2012 in Albany County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and actionfor declaratory judgment, granted respondents' motions to dismiss the petition.
Local Law No. 1 (1993) of the Town of Guilderland provided for the creation of a plannedunit development, pursuant to the town zoning law, on an area of land in the Town ofGuilderland, Albany County, known as the Mill Hill Plantation (hereinafter the Mill Hill PUD).The general purpose of Local Law No. 1 was to establish an affordable community for elderlyGuilderland residents which would provide all levels of living from independent housing toassisted living and, finally, skilled nursing care. Implementation of the plan was to be completedin four phases. As relevant here, phase I involved the development of an assisted living facility,whereas a nursing home was to be built on the phase IV site.
Petitioners are the owners of an assisted care facility developed in accordance with phase I.After the enactment of Local Law No. 1 in 1993, no plans were made to build a skilled [*2]nursing facility on the phase IV site. In 2011, respondent TownBoard of the Town of Guilderland amended Local Law No. 1 to expand the definition of "nursinghome" to include an assisted living facility and/or memory care facility, thereby enablingrespondents Abode Blue Chip, LLC and Crestmoore Mill Hill Community Corporation to build asecond assisted living or memory care facility within the Mill Hill PUD. Petitioners commencedthis hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking to annul theamendment to Local Law No. 1 and further seeking a declaration that such amendment isunconstitutional, null and void. Supreme Court granted respondents' pre-answer motions todismiss and this appeal ensued.
We affirm. Supreme Court properly dismissed the first two causes of action set forth in thepetition[FN*]based upon petitioners' lack of standing. To achieve standing, petitioners were required to showthat they suffered an injury in fact different from that suffered by the general public (see Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. vCommon Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 304 [2009]). Moreover, as thechallengers to an administrative action, petitioners bore the burden of demonstrating, not onlythat such action "will in fact have a harmful effect on [them, but also] that the interest asserted isarguably within the zone of interest to be protected by the statute" (Matter of Sun-Brite CarWash v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d 406, 412 [1987][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Here, petitioners allege that, in reliance on the phased development plan under which theywould be operating the only assisted living residence in the Mill Hill PUD, they purchased andmade extensive renovations to an existing facility, and completed the lengthy process forapproval as an assisted living facility. Their allegations distill to a claim of "the threat ofincreased business competition, which is not an interest protected by the zoning law[ ]"(Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead,69 NY2d at 415). Thus, notwithstanding the proximity of petitioners' property to the phase IVsite affected by the amendment to Local Law No. 1, the economic harm they allege is insufficientto confer standing on them (see id. at 409-410, 414).
Nor have petitioners alleged any specific noneconomic environmental harm so as to establishan injury that falls within the zone of interest protected by the State Environmental QualityReview Act (see ECL art 8; Matter of Village of Canajoharie v Planning Bd. of Town of Florida, 63AD3d 1498, 1501 [2009]; Matter of Town of Coeymans v City of Albany, 284AD2d 830, 833 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 602 [2001]; Matter of McGrath v TownBd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 254 AD2d 614, 615 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 803[1999]). Accordingly, Supreme Court properly dismissed the first two causes of action alleged inthe petition.
Supreme Court also correctly determined that the 2011 amendment did not constitute [*3]illegal spot zoning, as petitioners failed to establish that theamendment was not "part of a well-considered and comprehensive plan calculated to serve thegeneral welfare of the community" (Matter of Save Our Forest Action Coalition v City ofKingston, 246 AD2d 217, 221 [1998] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Baumgarten v Town Bd. ofTown of Northampton, 35 AD3d 1081, 1084 [2006]). While it is indeed true that LocalLaw No. 1 originally called for a skilled nursing facility on the phase IV site, a central concern ofthe Mill Hill PUD in 1993 was "to encourage the creation of affordable housing opportunities forretirement aged persons and to further encourage the creation of mixed-use neighborhoods."Inasmuch as no plans had been made to build a skilled nursing facility on the phase IV site andthe land had remained vacant for more than 17 years, expanding the definition of "nursing home"to include the project proposed by Abode and Crestmoore took into account changing conditions(see Matter of Town of Bedford v Village of Mount Kisco, 33 NY2d 178, 188 [1973]),furthered the purpose of the law and addressed the concerns of the community. Moreover, theamendment did not permit a use "totally different from that of the surrounding area" (Matter of Rotterdam Ventures, Inc. v TownBd. of the Town of Rotterdam, 90 AD3d 1360, 1362 [2011] [internal quotation marksand citations omitted]). Thus, although the amendment may have benefitted Abode andCrestmoore, "it was nevertheless[ ] enacted for the general welfare of the community"(Goodrich v Town of Southampton, 39 NY2d 1008, 1009 [1976]; see Boyles v TownBd. of Town of Bethlehem, 278 AD2d 688, 690-691 [2000]), and petitioners failed to showthat it constituted illegal spot zoning.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the amendment of Local Law No. 1 did not effect aregulatory taking of their property without just compensation. Where, as here, the governmentaction does not eliminate all economically viable uses of the property, courts must examineseveral factors to determine whether a taking nonetheless occurred, "including the [amendment's]economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the [amendment] interferes withreasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action" (Matter of Smith v Town of Mendon, 4NY3d 1, 9 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). As Supreme Court noted,the 2011 amendment served a legitimate governmental interest in expanding affordable housingoptions for seniors in the area, in addition to "increasing the tax base and creating jobs."Petitioners have not established that the amendment interfered with their investment-backedexpectations, particularly in light of the fact that there have apparently been no plans to build askilled nursing facility on the phase IV site for over 17 years. While petitioners assert that theyexpended significant financial resources purchasing, renovating and investing in their facility,there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the change brought about by the amendmentinterfered in any way with the returns on those investments. Thus, Supreme Court correctlydetermined that petitioners failed to provide "evidentiary support for their conclusory assertion offinancial harm" and did not meet their heavy burden of showing that the amendment resulted in aregulatory taking (see Held v State ofNew York Workers' Compensation Bd., 85 AD3d 35, 43 [2011], lv dismissed anddenied, 17 NY3d 837 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1906 [2012]).
Mercury, J.P., Rose, Kavanagh and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, with costs.
Footnote *: The first cause of action assertedthat the amendment of Local Law No. 1 was arbitrary and capricious because respondents "failedto adequately consider and place primary importance on the intent and function of the Mill HillPUD" in contravention of Town Code § 280-17 (H). The second cause of action assertedthat the Town Board's failure to complete a full environmental assessment form was contrary tothe Town's comprehensive plan, requiring annulment of its finding of no significantenvironmental impact for purposes of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (seeECL art 8).