| Matter of Marquise JJ. (Brithany JJ.) |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 00962 [103 AD3d 937] |
| February 14, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Marquise JJ., a Permanently NeglectedChild. Cortland County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Brithany JJ.,Appellant. (And Another Related Proceeding.) |
—[*1] Ingrid Olsen Tjensvold, Cortland County Department of Social Services, Cortland,for respondent. O'Connor & Kruman, PC, Cortland (Randolph V. Kruman of counsel), attorney forthe child.
McCarthy, J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Cortland County(Campbell, J.), entered October 28, 2011, which, among other things, granted petitioner'sapplication, in two proceedings pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, torevoke a suspended judgment, and terminated respondent's parental rights.
In 2008, Family Court found that respondent neglected her child (born in 2004) byfailing to provide proper supervision and guardianship. In 2010, petitioner commenced aproceeding alleging that the child was permanently neglected. In January 2011, FamilyCourt adjudged the child to be permanently neglected, but suspended judgment for oneyear. A few months later, petitioner filed a petition alleging that respondent violated theterms of the suspended judgment, and then filed another petition seeking immediatesuspension of visitation. [*2]Following a hearing, thecourt found that respondent violated the terms of the suspended judgment and terminatedher parental rights.[FN1]Respondent appeals.
Family Court's determination that respondent violated the terms of the suspendedjudgment is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record. The court mayrevoke a suspended judgment and terminate parental rights if the petitioner establishesthe parent's noncompliance by a preponderance of the evidence (see Matter of Clifton ZZ. [LatriceZZ.], 75 AD3d 683, 684 [2010]; Matter of Leala T., 55 AD3d 997, 998 [2008]). Petitionerpresented evidence establishing that respondent violated numerous conditions of thesuspended judgment. Testimony from petitioner's caseworker and respondent's probationofficer, as well as respondent's medical records,[FN2]demonstrated that she violated the conditions requiring her to cooperate withcaseworkers, sign releases for information, abide by the terms of her probation, informher caseworker and probation officer if she left the area, take psychotropic medicationsas prescribed, accept techniques of effective discipline offered by a parent educator,avoid yelling at the child on the telephone, lead a law-abiding life and avoid the use ofstreet drugs. The medical records state that respondent tested positive for cocaine(although that initial test was not confirmed), and tests for levels of her prescribedmedication indicated that she had not been taking the prescribed dosage. Althoughrespondent's counsel cross-examined the witnesses and raised questions about some oftheir testimony or conclusions, we defer to Family Court's credibility determinations andwill not disturb its findings as they are supported by a sound and substantial basis in therecord (see Matter of Clifton ZZ. [Latrice ZZ.], 75 AD3d at 684-685).
Family Court's determination to terminate respondent's parental rights is alsosupported by a sound and substantial basis in the record. While a parent's failure tocomply with the conditions of a suspended judgment does not automatically compeltermination of parental rights, that noncompliance constitutes "strong evidence thattermination is, in fact, in the best interests of the child[ ]" (Matter of Clifton ZZ.[Latrice ZZ.], 75 AD3d at 685; see Matter of Ronnie P. [Danielle Q.], 85 AD3d 1246,1247 [2011]). Here, despite petitioner's provision of numerous appropriate services,respondent was unable to comply with the conditions or behave as an appropriate parentwould. She suffered psychotic breaks due to her failure to comply with her medicationregimen, was hostile and belligerent during visits and exhibited poor parentingtechniques that caused the child to feel frightened and unsafe. In contrast, the child wasmaking significant progress in foster care, and the foster parents intend to adopt him. Wedecline to disturb Family Court's determination that termination of respondent's parentalrights is in the child's best interests, as that determination is supported by a sound andsubstantial basis in the record (see Matter of Ronnie P. [Danielle Q.], 85 AD3d at1247; Matter of Clifton ZZ. [Latrice ZZ.], 75 AD3d at 685; Matter of TravisA. [Daisy B.], 4 AD3d 632, 634 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004]).
Mercure, J.P., Spain and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote 1: This Court previouslyaffirmed an order terminating the father's parental rights to this child (Matter of Marquise JJ. [JamieKK.], 91 AD3d 1137 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 801 [2012]).
Footnote 2: Although respondentnow contends that the medical records were hearsay, she did not object to their admissionat the hearing.