| Matter of Thornton v Edwards-Knox Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 02450 [105 AD3d 1206] |
| April 11, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Rita Thornton, Appellant, v Edwards-KnoxCentral School District Board of Education, Respondent. |
—[*1] Law Office of Frank W. Miller, East Syracuse (Frank W. Miller of counsel), forrespondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Demarest, J.), enteredDecember 21, 2011 in St. Lawrence County, which dismissed petitioner's application, ina proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondentterminating petitioner's employment.
Petitioner was employed by the Edwards-Knox Central School District as a busdriver until 2006, when she was promoted to the position of senior bus driver, a post thatentailed supervisory and record-keeping responsibilities. In 2010, respondent eliminatedthe senior bus driver position, and petitioner returned to her previous duties as a busdriver. Shortly thereafter, respondent discovered that petitioner had neglected tocomplete certain required records during the 2009-2010 school year. After aninvestigation, respondent charged petitioner with nine counts of incompetence andmisconduct alleging, among other things, that she had failed to properly complete andmaintain records required by several state agencies, provided bus drivers with advancenotice of purportedly random drug and alcohol testing and sent a disparaging email aboutthe school district to transportation supervisors in other school districts. Following ahearing pursuant to Civil Service Law article 75, a Hearing Officer found petitionerguilty of seven charges and recommended that she be discharged. Respondent adoptedthe Hearing [*2]Officer's findings and dismissedpetitioner, who subsequently commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. SupremeCourt dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals, and we affirm.
Petitioner's primary contention is that the penalty of termination isexcessive.[FN*]In evaluating this claim, this Court " 'must consider whether, in light of all the relevantcircumstances, the penalty is so disproportionate to the charged offense[s] as to shockone's sense of fairness' " (Matterof Bottari v Saratoga Springs City School Dist., 3 AD3d 832, 833 [2004],quoting Matter of Smith v Board of Educ. of Taconic Hills Cent. School Dist.,235 AD2d 912, 914 [1997]). Initially, we note that the record plainly establishes thatpetitioner's return to the position of bus driver after serving as senior bus driver was not a"demotion," but, rather, occurred as specified in the memorandum of understanding bywhich the position of senior bus driver had been created. The elimination of that positionwas not a disciplinary consequence of petitioner's misconduct. After the senior bus driverposition was eliminated, petitioner sent the disparaging email because she was "upset"about losing the post. Most of the remaining charged conduct had occurred prior to theelimination of the position, but respondent neither learned about it nor took disciplinaryaction until after petitioner had left the position.
We are unpersuaded by petitioner's argument that, in light of her unblemisheddisciplinary record as a bus driver, she should not be terminated for her offensesinvolving supervisory and administrative responsibilities, as these are not part of herwork as a bus driver. Petitioner's actions were of such a nature as to present relevantconcerns about her conscientiousness, judgment and professionalism. As Supreme Courtnoted, the charges here did not arise from a single issue or act, nor were the shortcomingslimited to matters that did not impact student safety. Among other things, petitioneracknowledged that she failed to alert anyone when, just before leaving the senior busdriver position in late August 2010, she discovered that she had "forgot[ten]," for aperiod of almost a full year, to maintain certain required certifications for the schooldistrict's bus drivers. Instead, she wrote a note to her successor, put it in a drawer withthe unfinished paperwork and left for a vacation. This failure—not discovereduntil just before school was scheduled to reopen in September 2010—necessitatedlast-minute testing and certification of the drivers on an emergency basis and nearlyprevented the opening of school. The school district's employees testified that this andpetitioner's other failures endangered the school district's eligibility for statetransportation aid and placed it at risk of fines and other legal and financialconsequences. Most seriously, the safety of the school district's students was jeopardizedby petitioner's warnings to drivers of the dates of random drug and alcohol tests. Thus,we find that petitioner's termination was neither disproportionate to her conduct nor tothe risk of harm it posed to the school district, and we will not disturb it (see Matterof Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32, 38 [2001]; Matter of Bottari v Saratoga SpringsCity School Dist., 3 AD3d at 833; Matter of Massaria v Betschen, 290 AD2d602, 605 [2002]; Matter of Collins v Parishville-Hopkinton Cent. School Dist.,274 AD2d 732, 734 [2000]).
Nor is reversal required on the ground that affidavits from the school district'ssuperintendent and individual members of respondent were attached to the verifiedanswer (see CPLR 7804 [e]). As petitioner argues, "judicial review of anadministrative determination is limited to the grounds presented by the agency at the timeof its determination" (Matter of Scanlan v Buffalo Pub. School Sys., 90 NY2d662, 678 [1997]; see Civil Service Law § 75 [2]). [*3]No violation of that requirement has been shown here. Theaffidavits of respondent's members merely averred that the members had considered theadministrative record and the Hearing Officer's recommendation and supportedpetitioner's termination. Supreme Court made no reference to these documents, and thecourt's reference to the superintendent's affidavit concerned facts that were fully set forthin the hearing testimony and exhibits, pertaining to the timing of the charges againstpetitioner and the contractual nature of her reassignment as a bus driver. As there wasnothing in any of the affidavits that might have provided new reasons for petitioner'stermination or otherwise attempted to correct deficiencies in the administrativerecord—which, as petitioner concedes, contains substantial evidence supportingthe Hearing Officer's determination—this claim is without merit (compareMatter of Scanlan v Buffalo Pub. School Sys., 90 NY2d at 678; Matter ofScherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 NY2d 753, 758-759[1991]).
Mercure, J.P., Rose and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote *: She concedes thatsubstantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer's findings as to her guilt.