| Matter of Warner v Board of Educ., Cobleskill-RichmondvilleCent. Sch. Dist. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 05032 [108 AD3d 835] |
| July 3, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Samuel T. Warner et al., Individually andon Behalf of All Other Retired Cobleskill-Richmondville Administrators, Respondents, vBoard of Education, Cobleskill-Richmondville Central School District et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Arthur P. Scheuermann, School Administrators Association of New York State,Latham, for respondents.
Peters, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Devine, J.), enteredSeptember 13, 2012 in Schoharie County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, among other things, grantedpetitioners' cross motion for summary judgment.
Petitioners are former school administrators who retired from respondentCobleskill-Richmondville Central School District (hereinafter District) between 1992and 2005. From July 1993 forward, the Cobleskill-Richmondville AdministratorsAssociation (hereinafter Association) has been the exclusive collective bargaining unitfor the District's certified [*2]administrators.[FN*]With regard to health insurance, the collective bargaining agreements (hereinafter CBAs)in effect from July 1993 to June 2003 provided: "Individuals who retire during the termof the contract shall be covered at the rate of 100 percent of the charge for individualcoverage and 75 percent of the charge for dependent coverage, as applicable. Employeeshired after July 1, 1976 shall be required to satisfy ten (10) years of service in order to beeligible to continue the health insurance program in retirement as offered by the District."Successive CBAs in effect from July 2003 to June 2009 contained nearly identicallanguage regarding the rate and eligibility for retiree health insurance coverage.
In June 2009, the Association and the District agreed to modify the terms of theretiree health insurance coverage provision for the July 2009 through June 2012 CBA toprovide that employees who retire during the 2010-2011 or 2011-2012 school yearwould receive health insurance coverage at the rate of 84% of the charge for individualor dependent coverage, while those who retire during the 2009-2010 school year wouldcontinue to receive the rates of 100% for individual coverage and 75% for dependentcoverage. In March 2010, each petitioner received a letter from respondent Lynn LisyMacan, the Superintendent of the District, and respondent Board of Education of theDistrict stating that, "[a]s of July 1, 2010, the rate of contribution for both eligible activeand eligible retired [Association] employees shall be 16% of the charge for individualand dependent coverage."
Petitioners thereafter commenced this combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article78 and action for declaratory judgment alleging that respondents breached theircontractual obligations to petitioners and were acting in an arbitrary, capricious andunlawful manner by reducing the District's share of the cost of petitioners' healthinsurance coverage. They sought, among other things, a declaration that respondents areobligated to contribute to the cost of petitioners' health insurance throughout theirretirement. Following joinder of issue, respondents moved for summary judgmentdismissing the petition/complaint and petitioners opposed the motion and cross-movedfor summary judgment. Supreme Court granted petitioners' cross motion, finding that theplain language of the CBAs unambiguously obligated the District to provide lifetimehealth insurance coverage for those bargaining unit members who retired prior to the2010-2011 school year at a rate of 100% for individuals and 75% for dependents.Respondents now appeal.
A written agreement that is clear and complete on its face must be enforcedaccording to [*3]the plain meaning of its terms (see Samuel v Druckman & Sinel,LLP, 12 NY3d 205, 210 [2009]; W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77NY2d 157, 162 [1990]; Matterof Bower v Board of Educ., Cazenovia Cent. School Dist., 53 AD3d 967, 968[2008], lv dismissed 11 NY3d 837 [2008]; Della Rocco v City ofSchenectady, 252 AD2d 82, 84 [1998], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 1000 [1999]).Extrinsic evidence may be considered to discern the parties' intent only if the contract isambiguous, which is a question of law for the court to resolve (see Greenfield vPhilles Records, 98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002]; Red-Kap Sales, Inc. v Northern Lights Energy Prods., Inc., 94AD3d 1281, 1281-1282 [2012]; Hudock v Village of Endicott, 28 AD3d 923, 924 [2006]).In determining whether an ambiguity exists, " '[t]he court should examine the entirecontract and consider the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which it wasexecuted. Particular words should be considered, not as if isolated from the context, butin the light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifestedthereby' " (Currier, McCabe &Assoc., Inc. v Maher, 75 AD3d 889, 890-891 [2010], quoting Atwater &Co. v Panama R.R. Co., 246 NY 519, 524 [1927]; accord Kass v Kass, 91NY2d 554, 566 [1998]; see Matter of Bower v Board of Educ., Cazenovia Cent.School Dist., 53 AD3d at 968-969).
Reading the CBAs as a whole and in accordance with these principles, we find noambiguity. Pursuant to the CBAs in effect at the time each petitioner retired, an employeewho had completed 10 years of service was entitled to health insurance coverage "inretirement." In order to receive that coverage at a rate of 100% per individual and 75%per dependent, the only requirement was that the individual "retire during the term of thecontract." Despite respondents' contentions, nothing in the provisions at issue suggeststhat the coverage was limited to the time period of the CBA in effect at the time of anindividual's retirement. Furthermore, given that retirees are not involved in subsequentcollective bargaining negotiations, "it is logical to assume [from the absence of any suchdurational language] that the bargaining unit intended to insulate retirees from losingimportant insurance rights during subsequent negotiations by using language in each andevery contract which fixed their rights to coverage as of the time they retired" (DellaRocco v City of Schenectady, 252 AD2d at 84; see Myers v City ofSchenectady, 244 AD2d 845, 847 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 812 [1998]).Thus, we conclude that the CBAs at issue unambiguously provide lifetime healthinsurance coverage to petitioners pursuant to the terms of the CBA in effect at the time oftheir retirement, and therefore consideration of the extrinsic evidence submitted isunnecessary (see Matter of Bower v Board of Educ., Cazenovia Cent. SchoolDist., 53 AD3d at 968-969; Hudock v Village of Endicott, 28 AD3d at 924;cf. Matter of Giblin v Village ofJohnson City, 75 AD3d 887, 888-889 [2010]; compare Williams v Village ofEndicott, 91 AD3d 1160, 1163 [2012]). Moreover, even were we to find anambiguity, the extrinsic evidence introduced to aid in the construction of the CBAs fullysupports the interpretation proffered by petitioners. Accordingly, summary judgment wasproperly awarded to petitioners.
Lahtinen, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote *: In July 1993, theCobleskill Central School District merged with the Richmondville Central SchoolDistrict to form the Cobleskill-Richmondville Central School District. Petitioners SamuelT. Warner and Anthony Lambiase were employees of the Cobleskill Central SchoolDistrict and retired in 1992 under a premerger collective bargaining agreement thatcontained substantially similar language to the postmerger collective bargainingagreements.