Matter of Hart Family, LLC v Town of Lake George
2013 NY Slip Op 06904 [110 AD3d 1278]
October 24, 2013
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 27, 2013


In the Matter of Hart Family, LLC, Respondent, v Town ofLake George et al., Appellants.

—[*1]Miller, Mannix, Schachner & Hafner, LLC, Glens Falls (Leah Everhart ofcounsel), for appellants.

Muller & Mannix, PLLC, Glens Falls (Gary C. Hobbs of counsel), forrespondent.

Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Krogmann, J.), entered May23, 2012 in Warren County, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of respondent Lake George TownPlanning Board denying petitioner's request for site plan approval.

Petitioner owns a parcel of real property (hereinafter Lot No. 9) in the Trinity RockEstates subdivision in the Town of Lake George, Warren County, with approximately200 feet of shorefront on Lake George. When the subdivision was established in 1925,easements were granted to numerous other lot owners permitting them to launch andstore boats and to swim on Lot No. 9's shorefront. At least 45 lots now benefit from theseeasements, which are subject to petitioner's right to maintain and erect shorefrontstructures and docks that do not "occupy or obstruct more of the [shorefront]. . . than is occupied or obstructed by the present dock." The dock inexistence when the easements were granted was approximately 75 feet wide and waslater destroyed by storms. When this proceeding was commenced, petitioner had twodocks that extended from a concrete bulkhead on the shore into the lake in a "U"configuration about 21 feet wide. An open beach area was located to the south of thesedocks.

In October 2008, petitioner was granted a permit by the Lake George ParkCommission to construct a new E-shaped dock with an open-sided boat cover andsundeck that incorporates [*2]the existing northernmostpier, replaces the southernmost pier and measures 31 feet wide. Shortly before obtainingthis permit, petitioner applied for site plan approval from respondent Lake George TownPlanning Board. Following several meetings and a public hearing, the Board denied theapplication, citing health and safety concerns, among other things. Petitioner thereaftercommenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the Board's determinationon the sole ground that it lacked jurisdiction to review or deny the proposed site plan.Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court granted the application. Respondentsappeal.[FN1]

Contrary to respondents' contention, petitioner did not waive this jurisdictionalchallenge. Although the issue was apparently not discussed during the Board meetingsand public hearing, the claim that review of petitioner's site plan was beyond its authoritywas "actually raised" in correspondence from petitioner's counsel to the Board's attorneyand the zoning administrator of respondent Town of Lake George (Matter of Veltri v New York StateOff. of the State Comptroller, 81 AD3d 1050, 1054 [2011] [internal quotationmarks and citation omitted). Further, even assuming that the issue had not been thuspreserved, "a defect in subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any partyor by the court itself, and subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created through waiver,estoppel, laches or consent" (Burke v Aspland, 56 AD3d 1001, 1003-1004 [2008], lvdenied 12 NY3d 709 [2009]; see Matter of Stoffer v Department of Pub. Safety of the Town ofHuntington, 77 AD3d 305, 312 [2010]; Beneke v Town of Santa Clara, 28 AD3d 998, 1000 n 2[2006]). Accordingly, petitioner did not waive its jurisdictional challenge by submittingits site plan to the Board for review (see Town of Carmel v Melchner, 105 AD3d 82, 92[2013]).

We agree with Supreme Court that the Board lacked jurisdiction to grant or denypetitioner's application. When the state owns land under navigable waters in its sovereigncapacity, its exclusive authority preempts local land use laws and extends beyond theregulation of navigation "to every form of regulation in the public interest" (Town of N. Elba v Grimditch,98 AD3d 183, 188 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Town of Carmel vMelchner, 105 AD3d 82, 96-97 [2013]). The state holds title to the lands underLake George in its sovereign capacity (see People v System Props., 2 NY2d 330,344 [1957]) and, thus, has sole jurisdiction over construction in the lake's navigablewaters provided it has not delegated this authority to a local government (see Townof N. Elba v Grimditch, 98 AD3d at 188-189; Town of Alexandria vMacKnight, 281 AD2d 945, 945 [2001]).[FN2][*3]

"[A]bsent the delegations in Navigation Law§ 46-a allowing local municipalities to regulate the manner of construction andlocation of structures in waters owned by the [s]tate in its sovereign capacity,municipalities bordering or encompassing such waters . . . have noauthority to issue such regulations" (Town of N. Elba v Grimditch, 98 AD3d at195; see Langdon v Mayor of City of N.Y., 93 NY 129, 155-156 [1883]). Wereject respondents' contention that the state has delegated authority to regulate docks inLake George to them; the Town is not included among the local governmentsenumerated in Navigation Law § 46-a (2), and we find no such delegation in anyother source. Contrary to respondents' claim, Town Law § 130 (17) (1) (b) pertainsto "the anchoring or mooring of vessels" and does not address the construction of docks,boathouses or other structures covered by Navigation Law § 46-a. Although thestatutory authority of towns to enforce the State Uniform Fire Prevention and BuildingCode includes structures in navigable waters (see Executive Law § 371; Beneke v Town of SantaClara, 36 AD3d 1195, 1198 [2007], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 938 [2007]),the Town has never claimed that petitioner's dock system violates the Code and, further,has delegated Code enforcement to Warren County (see Lake George TownCode § 80-1). The Adirondack Park Agency did not delegate the requisiteauthority by adopting a land use plan for the Adirondack Park and approving the Town'slocal land use plan, as state-owned lands are exempt from the agency's land use program(see Executive Law § 805 [1] [a]; Lake George Town Code§§ 175-5, 175-11). Finally, language in the permit granted by the LakeGeorge Park Commission stating that petitioner was "not relieve[d] . . . ofthe responsibility of obtaining any other . . . permit . . . from[a] local government which may be required" does not constitute a " ' "clear and explicit"' " delegation of regulatory authority to the Town (DJL Rest. Corp. v City of NewYork, 96 NY2d 91, 95 [2001], quoting People v De Jesus, 54 NY2d 465,468 [1981], quoting Robin v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 30 NY2d 347, 351[1972]). Instead, the language merely warns that the Commission's regulatory authorityto issue or deny permits does not supplant authority that may also have been delegated toother agencies (see 6 NYCRR 646-1.6 [m]; see generally ECL 43-0117[4]; 6 NYCRR 646-1.1 [a] [1]). Accordingly, the state has not delegated authority torespondents to regulate or review petitioner's construction of a dock within Lake George,and Supreme Court properly annulled the Board's determination.

Rose, J.P., Lahtinen and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: Petitioner advises thatthe challenged construction has been completed. However, the claim is not moot; aftertaking this appeal, respondents timely moved for injunctive relief, and this Court deniedthe motion. Petitioner was thus placed on notice that completion was undertaken at itsown risk (see Matter of Dreikausen v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of LongBeach, 98 NY2d 165, 172 [2002]; Matter of Schupak v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town ofMarbletown, 31 AD3d 1018, 1019-1020 [2006], lv dismissed 8 NY3d842 [2007]).

Footnote 2: We need not resolve theparties' dispute pertaining to the location of the boundary line between the state'ssubmerged lands and privately owned shorefront. The new construction is locatedentirely within the lake's navigable waters, the existing shorefront concrete bulkhead willnot be altered, and the state's exclusive authority to regulate docks and wharves innavigable waters is unaffected by the fact that such structures may extend in part ontoshorefront private property (see Higgins v Douglas, 304 AD2d 1051, 1056[2003], overruled in part on other grounds Town of N. Elba v Grimditch, 98AD3d 183, 187 [2012]).


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