| Matter of Stafford |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 07910 [111 AD3d 1216] |
| November 27, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Estate of Charlotte F. Stafford,Deceased. NBT Bank, NA, as Executor of Charlotte F. Stafford, Deceased, Respondent;Richard Stafford et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Michael J. Genute, Norwich and Lee & Emerson, Norwich (Thomas C. Emerson ofcounsel), for respondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Surrogate's Court of Chenango County(Ames, S.), entered May 29, 2012, which, among other things, granted petitioner'smotion for summary judgment dismissing respondents' objections to decedent's will.
Charlotte F. Stafford (hereinafter decedent) died in 2010 and was survived byrespondents—her three nephews—and their issue. Prior to her death,decedent had a keen interest in history and genealogy and served as the historian for theTown of Oxford in Chenango County. In 2001, decedent hired Vicky House to assist herwith some typing; decedent and House became friends and, after decedent suffered a fallin 2004, House moved into decedent's home to care for her.
Over the years, decedent executed a number of wills—culminating in theAugust 2007 will that is the subject of this proceeding. Pursuant to the terms of thatinstrument, and in addition to various charitable bequests, decedent's property was to bedistributed as follows: her [*2]ancestral home and all realproperty, together with $300,000 to maintain such property, was to be held in trust forthe benefit of the Town and to be used for historical preservation purposes; her"historical books, records, memorabilia and genealogies" were to be given to House to bedistributed between the Oxford Historical Society and the Oxford Town and/or VillageHistorian(s); and $100,000 was to be placed in a pet trust for the benefit of her cat,"Kissie Meouw Stafford." The pet trust would terminate upon Kissie's death—or21 years following decedent's death—but, in the interim, House—in hercapacity as Kissie's designated caretaker—was permitted to remain in decedent'sresidence rent-free. The remainder of decedent's estate was to be given to the OxfordMemorial Library, and decedent's will "intentionally ma[d]e no provision for[respondents]." A subsequent codicil to the will—the provisions of which are notat issue here—was executed in 2010.
Petitioner, as the executor of decedent's estate, offered the August 2007 will forprobate, and a hearing pursuant to SCPA 1404 was held in October and November 2010.Respondents subsequently filed objections, contending that the will was the product ofHouse's undue influence. In January 2012, petitioner moved for, among other things,summary judgment dismissing the objections, and respondents cross-moved for partialsummary judgment declaring that a confidential relationship existed between decedentand House. Surrogate's Court granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment,dismissed respondents' objections and allowed the will and codicil to proceed to probate.This appeal by respondents ensued.[FN1]
We affirm. Whether to dismiss a party's objections and admit the challenged will toprobate is a matter committed to the sound discretion of Surrogate's Court and, absent anabuse of that discretion, the court's decision will not be disturbed (see Matter of Shapiro, 100AD3d 1242, 1243 [2012]; Matter of Colverd, 52 AD3d 971, 972 [2008]). Althoughsummary judgment in a contested probate matter indeed is rare, it nonetheless "is properwhen the petitioner sufficiently establishes a prima facie case for probate and therespondent fails to raise any genuine issues of fact" with respect thereto (Matter ofColverd, 52 AD3d at 972). Upon reviewing the record before us, we discern no basisupon which to set aside the court's award of summary judgment to petitioner.
To establish undue influence, respondents were required to demonstrate thatdecedent "was actually constrained to act against [her] own free will and desire byidentifying the motive, opportunity and acts allegedly constituting the influence, as wellas when and where such acts occurred" (id. at 973 [internal quotation marks andcitation omitted]; see Matter ofAlibrandi, 104 AD3d 1175, 1177-1178 [2013]; Matter of Greenwald, 47AD3d 1036, 1037 [2008]; Matter of Castiglione, 40 AD3d 1227, 1229 [2007], lvdenied 9 NY3d 806 [2007]; Matter of Fellows, 16 AD3d 995, 996 [2005]). Theinfluence asserted must rise to the level of "a moral coercion" (Matter of Malone, 46 AD3d975, 977 [2007] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Favaloro, 94AD3d 989, 992 [2012]), and "[m]ere speculation and conclusory [*3]allegations, without specificity as to precisely where andwhen the influence was actually exerted, are insufficient to raise an issue of fact"(Matter of Alibrandi, 104 AD3d at 1178 [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]; see Matter of Malone, 46 AD3d at 977-978).[FN2]
Here, even assuming that respondents' proof was sufficient to establish that Househad motive and opportunity to influence decedent's testamentary dispositions,respondents failed to demonstrate that House actually exercised undue influence withrespect to the distribution of decedent's assets. By all accounts, decedent was a veryintelligent, private and strong-willed woman who "ran her life the way she wanted to runit." Thomas Emerson, the attorney who drafted the August 2007 will (as well asdecedent's January 2007 will, which made certain provisions for respondents), testified atthe SCPA 1404 hearing that he had various discussions with decedent regarding thedisposition of her estate beginning in November 2006. Despite his admitted concernsregarding House, Emerson did not observe any evidence of undue influence with respectto the execution of the various instruments[FN3]or the dispositions contained within (see Matter of Alibrandi, 104 AD3d at 1178;Matter of Greenwald, 47 AD3d at 1037).
With respect to the August 2007 will that disinherited respondents, Emerson testifiedthat the changes made to decedent's January 2007 will were precipitated by her desire topreserve her home for historical purposes, as well as her belief that respondents "weredirecting or trying to direct her as to what she should do with her estate."[FN4]Emerson further testified that he reviewed and discussed the requested changes withdecedent, in response to which decedent indicated, "That's what I want."[FN5]The paralegal who accompanied Emerson to decedent's home and witnessed theexecution of the August 2007 will similarly indicated that decedent "was adamant aboutthe changes she made." As for decedent's mental acuity and testamentary capacity on theday in question, Emerson testified that decedent was "very aware, alert . . .[and] knew [*4]what she wanted"—a sentimentechoed by the paralegal—and that he did not observe any behavior that caused himto question decedent's testamentary capacity (see Matter of Greenwald, 47 AD3dat 1037).[FN6]As Emerson succinctly put it, "[Decedent] had a mind of her own." Accordingly, despitehis concerns regarding the changes to decedent's will and any resulting benefit to House,Emerson was "comfortable" that the August 2007 will was "what [decedent] wanted."
The foregoing proof, in our view, was more than sufficient to discharge petitioner'sinitial burden on the motion for summary judgment (see Matter of Greenwald, 47AD3d at 1037). In opposition, respondents offered "no direct evidence that [House] didanything to actually influence decedent's distribution of her assets" (Matter of Walker, 80 AD3d865, 868 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 711 [2011]). Moreover, even creditingrespondents' claims that House made negative comments about them and curtailed theiraccess to decedent, such circumstantial proof permits conflicting inferences, as a result ofwhich "a conclusion of undue influence cannot be made" (Matter of Malone, 46AD3d at 978; see Matter ofTurner, 56 AD3d 863, 866 [2008]; see also Matter of Minervini, 297AD2d 423, 424-425 [2002]). Accordingly, petitioner's motion for summary judgmentdismissing respondents' objections was properly granted (see Matter ofCastiglione, 40 AD3d at 1229). In light of this conclusion, we need not address theremaining arguments raised by respondents on appeal.
Peters, P.J., McCarthy and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withcosts.
Footnote 1: Although respondents'notice of appeal makes no mention of the corrected Surrogate's Court order entered inFebruary 2013, "this technical defect does not inhibit our addressing the merits of thisappeal in the interest of judicial economy" (Matter of Edwards v Goord, 26 AD3d 659, 659 n [2006],lv denied 7 NY3d 710 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted];see CPLR 5520 [c]).
Footnote 2: Notably, inasmuch asrespondents failed in their attempt to demonstrate that a confidential relationship existedbetween House and decedent, no "inference of undue influence [arose]" (Matter of DelGatto, 98 AD3d975, 978 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Footnote 3: According to Emerson,House was not present for the execution of the August 2007 will.
Footnote 4: Emerson testified thatdecedent said of respondents, "Their heart[s are] in their pocketbook." Similarly, theparalegal who witnessed the execution of this will recalled that when decedent wasquestioned as to why she was changing her will, decedent replied, "[Respondents] justassume they are getting everything."
Footnote 5: Although the changesreflected in decedent's August 2007 will indeed represented something of a departurefrom her prior testamentary scheme, such revisions were both explained and otherwiseconsistent with decedent's interest in historical preservation (see Matter of Makitra, 101AD3d 1579, 1581 [2012] [the decedent explained the reasons behind the change inthe contested will and "gave good reasons for doing so"]).
Footnote 6: Emerson's conclusionsin this regard were consistent with the affidavit tendered by decedent's treating physician,who described decedent as "an assertive and strong-willed person who made her feelingsand desires known" and who, during the time period in question, "was self-directing andable to make her own health care decisions" (compare Matter of Nealon, 57 AD3d 1325, 1327-1328[2008] [the decedent evidenced increasing confusion and susceptibility to verbalsuggestions]).