| Matter of Botsford v Bertoni |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 08575 [112 AD3d 1266] |
| December 26, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Brian Botsford, Appellant, v John Bertoni,as Mayor of the Village of Endicott, et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Coughlin & Gerhart, LLP, Binghamton (Paul J. Sweeney of counsel), forrespondents.
Peters, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lebous, J.), entered July31, 2012 in Broome County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent Mayor of theVillage of Endicott terminating petitioner's employment.
Petitioner was employed as a fire inspector by the Village of Endicott FireDepartment and was the president of its firefighters union. In May 2009, he was chargedwith multiple counts of misconduct pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 afterengaging in a verbal altercation with Stephen Hrustich, the Fire Chief, concerningHrustich's directive that all firefighters undergo a respiratory physical examination. Thecharges alleged that, upon arriving at the fire station to address the matter, petitionerstated to Hrustich, "What the f . . . is your problem" (hereinafter the firststatement) and, after a verbal warning, stated, "I am the f . . . ing [u]nionpresident and you cannot do a f . . . ing thing to me," or words to that effect(hereinafter the second statement). Shortly after the disciplinary charges were filedagainst petitioner, he filed an improper practice charge with the Public EmploymentRelations Board (hereinafter PERB) alleging that respondents' decision to discipline himamounted to anti-union animus.
At the hearing on the disciplinary charges, petitioner acknowledged that he had made[*2]the first statement but denied making the secondstatement, testifying that he instead stated, "I'm the union president and I'm acting in mycapacity as the union president." Crediting the testimony of Hrustich and a firefighterwho witnessed the encounter to the effect that petitioner in fact made the secondstatement, a Hearing Officer found petitioner guilty of the charges and recommended aperiod of unpaid suspension. Respondent John Bertoni, the Mayor of respondent Villageof Endicott, sustained the findings of guilt but modified the period of unpaidsuspension.[FN1]
During the March 2010 PERB hearing, held shortly after Bertoni had sustained thefindings in the disciplinary hearing, petitioner again testified that he did not make thesecond statement. Based upon this testimony and his testimony at the disciplinaryhearing, petitioner was served with another notice in June 2011 charging him withmisconduct amounting to perjury and making a false official statement, as well asincompetence for failure to be truthful. Following a hearing, a Hearing Officer issued arecommendation finding petitioner guilty of the charges set forth above andrecommending that his employment be terminated. Bertoni adopted the findings andpenalty of the Hearing Officer, and petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78proceeding challenging the determination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition and thisappeal ensued.[FN2]
As a preliminary matter, we cannot agree with the concurrence/dissent thatsubjecting petitioner to disciplinary action under these circumstances deprived him of hisrights under Civil Service Law § 75, violates public policy or is otherwiseimproper. Where a witness testifies falsely under oath, he or she may properly be subjectto additional proceedings and sanctions (see Brogan v United States, 522 US398, 404-405 [1998]; Lachance v Erickson, 522 US 262, 267-268 [1998];United States v Dunnigan, 507 US 87, 94-95 [1993]; Matter of Torres vKerik, 299 AD2d 214, 214 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 508 [2003]). Indeed,the United States Supreme Court has squarely held—under circumstancesindistinguishable from those present here—that "a [g]overnment agency may takeadverse action against an employee because the employee made false statements inresponse to an underlying charge of misconduct" (Lachance v Erickson, 522 USat 268). And, in so doing, the Court specifically rejected the argument—profferedby the concurrence/dissent here—that to permit the initiation of perjury chargesunder such circumstances may "coerce[ ] [individuals] into admitting the misconduct,whether they believe that they are guilty or not, in order to avoid the more severe penaltyof removal possibly resulting from a falsification charge" (id. at 267 [internalquotation marks omitted]). Simply put, "[p]etitioner was not penalized for exercising hisstatutory right to a hearing on the underlying [*3]charges,but for giving false testimony at that hearing" (Matter of Torres v Kerik, 299AD2d at 214; see Lachance v Erickson, 522 US at 267-268).
Reversal is required, however, because Bertoni should have been disqualified fromreviewing the Hearing Officer's recommendations. To be sure, an administrative decisionmaker is not deemed biased or disqualified merely on the basis that he or she reviewed aprevious administrative determination and ruled against the same employee, or presidedover a prior proceeding involving a similar defense or similar charges (see e.g. Matter of Compasso vSheriff of Sullivan County, 29 AD3d 1064, 1064-1065 [2006]; Matter ofHart v Coombe, 229 AD2d 754, 755 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 802 [1996];Matter of Joseph v Stolzenberg, 198 AD2d 506, 506 [1993]; see also Matter of Longton vVillage of Corinth, 57 AD3d 1273, 1276 [2008], lv denied 13 NY3d709 [2009]). However, where, as here, there is evidence indicating that the administrativedecision maker may have prejudged the matter at issue, disqualification is required(see Matter of 1616 Second Ave. Rest. v New York State Liq. Auth., 75 NY2d158, 161-164 [1990]).
In his decision in the first disciplinary proceeding, Bertoni not only agreed with theHearing Officer's report, but stated his own opinion that "I do not believe [petitioner's]account of what was said." In his affidavit submitted in petitioner's CPLR article 78proceeding challenging the first disciplinary determination, Bertoni went one stepfurther. In that document, while explaining the portion of his decision addressingpetitioner's version of the second statement, Bertoni averred that he found that version"incredible." While the falsity of petitioner's account of the second statement was not atissue in the second proceeding, as that issue was conclusively determined in the firstproceeding, the central issue in the second proceeding was whether petitioner's falsetestimony was given knowingly and willingly. Thus, after concluding that he did notbelieve petitioner's account of what was said and that petitioner's version was"incredible," Bertoni put himself in the position of determining whether the statementthat petitioner did in fact make was made knowingly and willfully. These questions areinextricably intertwined, and Bertoni's statements regarding petitioner's testimony in thefirst proceeding were such that "a disinterested observer may conclude that [Bertoni]ha[d] in some measure adjudged the facts" surrounding the knowing and willful question"in advance of hearing it" (Matter of 1616 Second Ave. Rest. v New York State Liq.Auth., 75 NY2d at 162 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; seeMatter of Syquia v Board of Educ. of Harpursville Cent. School Dist., 180 AD2d883, 884 [1992], affd 80 NY2d 531 [1992]). Accordingly, Bertoni should haverecused himself. Because he did not, respondents' determination was affected by an errorof law. The proper remedy is to remit the matter for a de novo review of the presentrecord and the Hearing Officer's recommendations by a qualified and impartial individual(see Matter of Correia vIncorporated Vil. of Northport, 12 AD3d 599, 601 [2004]; Matter ofMemmelaar v Straub, 181 AD2d 980, 982 [1992]; see also Matter of 1616Second Ave. Rest. v New York State Liq. Auth., 75 NY2d at 165).
McCarthy and Spain, JJ., concur.
Egan Jr., J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority thatSupreme Court's judgment must be reversed and that the underlying determination mustbe annulled. However, for the reasons that follow, I am of the view that the appropriateremedy is not to remit this matter for a de novo review of the Hearing [*4]Officer's recommendation, but, rather, to grant the petitionin its entirety. Accordingly, and to that extent, I respectfully dissent.
I think it would be helpful to keep this proceeding in its proper perspective. StephenHrustich, the Fire Chief, and petitioner, a fire inspector for the Village of Endicott FireDepartment and the president of its firefighters union, engaged in a heated discussionconcerning Hrustich's directive that all firefighters undergo a respiratory physicalexamination. Words were said back and forth, during the course of which petitioneradmittedly stated to Hrustich, "What the f . . . is your problem." Accordingto Hrustich, he then warned petitioner that he was "way out of line" and that he shouldwatch his tone, in response to which petitioner said, "I'm the f . . . ing unionpresident and there's nothing you can f . . . ing do about it." Precisely whatwords were uttered in the context of this one sentence has now become the center of thisentire proceeding.
As a result of the foregoing exchange, Hrustich—as was hisright—charged petitioner with three specifications of misconduct, includinginsubordination, and ordered that petitioner immediately be suspended without pay for30 days. Petitioner—as was his right—requested a hearing pursuant to CivilService Law § 75, during the course of which Hrustich, petitioner and otherstestified as to their recollection of the encounter. In this regard, petitioner admitted thathe told Hrustich, "I'm the union president and I'm acting in my capacity as the unionpresident," but denied that this sentence was punctuated by profanity. At the conclusionof the hearing, the Hearing Officer believed the employer's version of the exchange,found petitioner guilty of misconduct and recommended that petitioner be suspended for20 working days without pay (subject to a credit for the previously ordered unpaidsuspension). Respondent John Bertoni, the Mayor of respondent Village of Endicott,sustained the finding of guilt but—as was his right—deemed the penaltyimposed to be, among other things, insufficient and ordered petitioner to serve a total of60 days of unpaid suspension. In the interim, the firefighters union filed an improperpractice charge against respondents with the Public Employment Relations Board(hereinafter PERB), and Hrustich and petitioner again testified as to the disputed verbalexchange—each sticking to their guns regarding their recollection of the event.
Having read the transcript of the initial disciplinary proceeding, I defer to theHearing Officer's finding that petitioner indeed said, ""I'm the f . . . ingunion president and there's nothing you can f . . . ing do about it," and Iagree that petitioner's words would constitute misconduct under anycircumstances—particularly when uttered to his superior officer. I alsoacknowledge that the Mayor's decision to increase the suspension imposed is sustainable.What happened next, however, is wrong.
Based upon his testimony at the November 2009 disciplinary hearing and the March2010 PERB hearing, petitioner was served with a second notice of misconduct charginghim with, among other things, perjury and failure to be truthful. This set of chargesapparently stemmed from Hrustich's belief that, because the Hearing Officer did notcredit petitioner's testimony during the initial disciplinary hearing and because petitionercontinued to deny—during the course of the subsequent PERBhearing—that he used profanity with respect to the contested sentence, petitionernecessarily gave false testimony. To my analysis, permitting a subsequent disciplinaryproceeding to be commenced under these circumstances not only violates public policybut, more to the point, effectively places a public employee such as petitioner in theuntenable position of having to choose between exercising his or her fundamental rightto testify—at the risk of incurring additional disciplinary charges and suffering aneventual loss of [*5]employment—or foregoing hisor her rights, remaining silent and hoping for a lesser penalty.
There is no question that a public employee subject to removal or other disciplinaryaction is afforded various fundamental rights under Civil Service Law § 75,including—insofar as is relevant here—the right to a hearing and the right"to summon witnesses in his [or her] behalf" (Civil Service Law § 75 [2]), thelatter of which surely encompasses the right to testify in one's own defense. And while Icertainly am not suggesting that petitioner's right to present a defense (or to testify insupport of the improper practice charge) includes the right to offer false testimony orotherwise suborn perjury, I also do not believe that petitioner should have been subject tofurther disciplinary action merely because (1) the Hearing Officer who presided over thefirst disciplinary proceeding credited the employer's version of the sentence, and (2)despite such finding, petitioner continued to deny—during the course of theensuing PERB hearing—that he twice used profanity with respect to the secondsentence he uttered to Hrustich.
In this regard, it must be remembered that petitioner did not lose his jobbecause—as the initial Hearing Officer found—he used profanity in thecontext of both of his statements to Hrustich; that demonstrated misconduct only resultedin the imposition of a 60-day unpaid suspension. Rather, petitioner lost his jobsolely because—in the context of exercising his right to present a defenseand/or testifying in support of the improper practice charge—he denied (orcontinued to deny) that he used the "F" word in the second sentence spoken to Hrustich.Arguably, petitioner would have been better off if he simply had admitted the initialmisconduct—notwithstanding the fact that he truly may have believed that he didnot actually utter the offending words—and elected to forgo either his right to ahearing or his right to testify on his own behalf, as it was—in effect—hisinvocation of his rights under Civil Service Law § 75 that cost him his job. Thebringing of the second set of charges under these circumstances is really a stretch, andthe penalty obtained—dismissal—is totally out of proportion to the act. Theirony of what occurred here aside, I believe that the procedure adopted by theemployer—if allowed to stand—will have a chilling effect upon a publicemployee's right to present a defense and testify on his or her own behalf and, for thatreason, I agree that the underlying determination must be annulled.[FN3]
Moreover, even if I did not otherwise have misgivings regarding the procedureemployed here, I nonetheless would be compelled to grant the petition because the recordas a whole is not, to my analysis, sufficient to support the inference of knowledge andwillfulness required to sustain the charges at issue. Accordingly, for all these reasons, Iwould reverse Supreme Court's judgment, annul the challenged determination, grant thepetition in its entirety and restore petitioner to his former position—complete withback pay and benefits.[*6]
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on thelaw, without costs, determination annulled, and matter remitted to respondent Village ofEndicott for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.
Footnote 1: Petitioner commenced aCPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the determination, and Supreme Courtdismissed the petition. Petitioner did not appeal.
Footnote 2: We note that, whilepetitioner incorrectly invoked the arbitrary and capricious standard of review beforeSupreme Court, the petition raised a question of substantial evidence and, therefore,should have been transferred to this Court after Supreme Court disposed of the otherobjections that could have terminated the proceeding (see CPLR 7804 [g]; Matter of Brunner v Bertoni,91 AD3d 1100, 1101 n [2012]; Matter of Thibodeau v Northeastern Clinton Cent. School Bd. ofEduc., 39 AD3d 940, 941 [2007]).
Footnote 3: I also am left to wonderwhat would have happened if the outcome of the original disciplinary proceeding hadbeen different. In other words, if the Hearing Officer had credited petitioner's version ofthe events and found petitioner to be not guilty of misconduct, would the Mayor haveinitiated disciplinary charges against Hrustich for giving false testimony at petitioner'sdisciplinary hearing?